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Introduction 
Introduction 
'Legitimacy [....] comes from having acted in our own self-defense', says Paul 
Wolfowitz with regard to the war in Iraq; only 'the U.N. system creates legitimacy', 
says Joschka Fischer. These are two fairly common logics of legitimacy found in practi-
cal international politics. Yet certainly, this does not help very much when studying 
international legitimacy since the logics behind (international) legitimacy do tend to 
change. This brings me to the heart of my endeavour - namely: to argue for the neces-
sity of studying the phenomenon legitimacy in international relations in International 
Relations (IR); to argue for studying it strictly normatively; to argue for its moral na-
ture; and not only to argue that legitimacy criteria must be derived from social contract 
theory, but to argue that they must be derived from KANT. In short: K A N T ought to reside 
as a judge for international legitimacy. 
Laying the foundations, chapter one deals with the concept of legitimacy - legitimacy in 
general; in international relations; and in International Relations Theory. Legitimacy is 
needed in any social relationship, and as an object of study in IR. It is too powerful and 
its meaning too diverse to be neglected. IR must address the question of international 
legitimacy and must address it adequately. And adequately means to study it norma-
tively. Why a normative approach? Because when speaking of legitimacy, one is neces-
sarily speaking of morality; it is a moral concept - both domestically and internation-
ally. Jurisprudence commonly fails to acknowledge this and so do the descendants of 
W E B E R . Only a normative approach does do justice to its moral nature. Yet, normative 
study requires us to have criteria against which certain cases can be judged. And these 
criteria are provided most suitably by moral and political philosophy; in particular by 
social contract theory. Legitimacy understood properly cannot be found in positivist 
international system theory; it is located in normative international society theory. And 
since a society needs a contract, the focus shifts to social contract theory as the source 
for legitimacy criteria. 
Chapter two deals with the social contract. My affirmative standpoint towards it rests 
mainly on the fact that the social contract is a fairly well-established idea in IR. How-
ever, and undoubtedly: a HOBBESian social contract is very different from that of a 
KANT ; and one of the middle ages very different from that of a twentieth century 
RAWLS . Hence, in the quest for a proper source for 'legitimacy criteria', a pre-selection 
among social contract theories must be made. And there are very many to choose from 
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as the investigation into its ideal-types and history will reveal. HoBBES, ROUSSEAU, 
KANT , and RAWLS are used here for the following reasons. Firstly, the social contract is 
a modem phenomenon; and all four of them are deeply rooted in modernity. Secondly, 
criteria must be found for international legitimacy; and all four of them are well-
established figures in IR. On the whole, I consider them to be relatively easily defensi-
ble sources for legitimacy criteria. Certainly, this is not a revolutionary selection; yet 
normative IR theory is not a radical enterprise, and neither is social contract theory. 
Chapters three and four dive into the social contract theories of HOBBES and ROUSSEAU, 
as well as into those of K A N T and RAWLS , respectively. The former two are rejected as 
sources for legitimacy criteria; the latter two, and in particular KANT , offer a superior 
basis for progress in this area. This justifies the bipartite organization: pessimists versus 
optimists. '"Optimist" and "pessimist" are tricky words, yet it is difficult to find better 
ones'". W A L T Z says (albeit in a different context); I agree. HOBBES and RoussEAU are 
pessimists: they do not picture even the most primitive form of an international society; 
there is no international social contract in sight; legitimacy is limited to the domestic. 
This clearly separates them from K A N T and RAWLS , the optimists: they do envisage 
both an international society and an international social contract; they take legitimacy 
beyond borders. To verify this argument, all four are examined and approached simi-
larly: each first sub-section deals with the domestic social contract and its methodologi-
cal-philosophical premises; each second sub-section then deals with the implications for 
the international sphere and/or the international social contract. It is virtually impossible 
to understand why, for instance, HOBBES rejects an international social contract between 
all his Leviathans when not considering the idea behind Leviathan in the first place. 
Thus far then I will have argued that international legitimacy needs to be studied; that it 
needs to be studied normatively; that its moral nature must be properly acknowledged; 
that only normative international society theory is able to engage in this endeavour; in 
addition, that legitimacy criteria must be derived from a social contract; and that 
HOBBES and ROUSSEAU are somewhat inadequate sources, while K A N T and RAWLS 
surely are adequate - or in other words: the optimists provide an excellent point of ref-
erence. Chapter five defends all these positions. Yet it does more. It defends interna-
tional legitimacy against another 'enemy' within IR theory; against the post-modem 
Man. the State and War: a theoretical analysis (1959), 2"^ edition (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001), 18. 
Introduction 
attack - an attack precisely against such 'excellent points of reference'. And also, it de-
fends, by evaluating the four social contracts and their meanings for international le-
gitimacy, KANT'S social contract theory as the most promising source for the purposes 
of enquiring into legitimacy in international relations, and of deriving proper legitimacy 
criteria from it. 
Chapter 1. Legitimacy, international relations, and International Relations Theory 
1. Legitimacy, international relations, and International Relations Theory 
1.1 Legitimacy needed: its diversity and power 
The question of legitimacy is found wherever 'striving for a share of power or for influ-
ence on the distribution of power'' takes place. It may be true that politics is the strug-
gle for power, where power is the 'probability that one actor within a social relationship 
will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance'^ over others, but having 
mere or naked power is insufficient; it lacks the sense of rightfulness. While power is 
not more than one's capability to achieve, or better, to compel compliance by means of 
coercion or force, authority is qualitatively different. Although the result is the same, 
namely, the successfiil exercise of one's wil l over others, authority entails 'the right to 
command, and correlatively, the right to be obeyed.'^ What transforms power into au-
thority or what accounts for this qualitative difference is legitimacy; or put differently: 
authority is legitimate power.'' 
What makes power legitimate? As so often, the simpler the question, the more difficult 
the answer. One very first idea of the complexity and diversity of legitimacy becomes 
available when exploring its etymological roots. Derived from the Latin adjective le-
gitimus, it means: concerned with the law; legal; legally prescribed or recognized; born 
in lawful wedlock; lawful; prescribed by custom, usage, natural law; regular; proper.^ 
An example illustrates the difficulty when speaking of legitimacy: assessing, for in-
stance, the legitimacy of the Nazi regime in Germany, one would obtain completely 
different results when the applied yardstick is legality instead of, for example, propri-
ety; and this then has also severe consequences for assessing whether the commands of 
such regime have to be obeyed or not. Certainly, what is decisive here is the yardstick 
that is used, whether it be, for example, some juridical-procedural standards a legalist 
may employ or the moral standards of a moral philosopher. What goes without saying is 
' M A X W E B E R , 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics' (1919) , in his Political Writings, edited by 
P E T E R L A S S M A N N A N D R O N A L D S P E I R S (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 311. 
^ I D E M , The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1915) , edited by T A L C O T T P A R S O N S (London: 
William Hodge, 1947), 139. 
R O B E R T P. W O L F F , 'The Conflict between Authority and Anarchy', in J O S E P H R A Z (ed.), Authority (Ox-
ford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 20. 
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C f R . B . F R I E D M A N , 'On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy', in R A Z (ed.), Authority, 60. 
C f W A L T E R W . S K E A T , An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, 2"'' edn. (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1884), 328; Oxford Latin Dictionary, 8"^  edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 1014. 
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nevertheless worth mentioning since it is the challenge with legitimacy: depending on 
the lenses through which one sees it, even the most evil regime, to remain with the ex-
ample, could be conferred legitimacy. The problem with the diverse meanings legiti-
macy can have applies basically to any relationships of command and obedience. It does 
not matter whether one looks at, for instance, classrooms, families, sport clubs, project 
teams, or executive boards; to have the mere power to command is one thing, to have 
the right to command and therefore the right to be obeyed is quite another. And regard-
less of the viewpoint - the view of a power holder or a power subject or an academic, 
etc. - various ways exist how to convert power into authority, that is, to make power 
legitimate: by conventions or norms; by a social contract; by power's conformity with 
some universal principles; by the sacredness of authority or of the norms; by the special 
expertise the power holder possesses; by popular approval; by personal relations or ties 
between power holders and power subjects; and by some personal qualities of the power 
holder.^ How every single way fiinctions in detail is not important here. What is impor-
tant is the fact that this catalogue is far from exhaustive. And even i f it were possible to 
agree, for instance, on the idea of a social contract as the legitimizing factor, there 
would not be available any coherent or 'single unbroken [social contract] tradition 
stretching back from Rawls and Gauthier through Hobbes to the ancient Greeks'' to 
draw on. This is why matters get even more complicated: which social contract? 
The main argument thus far is the following. The social contract is only one way of 
transforming power into authority or, to speak with M A X W E B E R again, only one of 
many 'grounds legitimating any rule'* - employed from only one particular point of 
view, namely, from moral and political philosophy. There are not only many other dif-
ferent ways, but also many other different viewpoints. The next section deals with these 
matters in more detail focussing on the three academic disciplines jurisprudence, social 
sciences, and moral and political philosophy. Why these three? The etymological roots 
of legitimacy imply its juridical (among its moral) character; from M A X W E B E R , 'one of 
the founders of twentieth-century social science and probably its greatest practitioner'^, 
* Cf. C R A I G M A T H E S O N , 'Weber and the classification of forms of legitimacy', The British Journal of 
5oc/o/ogv, Vol. 38 (1987). 
' D A V I D B O U C H E R A N D P A U L K E L L E Y , 'The social contract and its critics: an overview', in their (eds.) 
The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls (London: Routledge, 1994), 1. 
* 'The Profession and Vocation of Polities', 311. 
' S H E L D O N S. W O L I N , 'Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory', in W I L L I A M 
C O N N O L L Y (ed.), Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 63. 
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we derive a notion of legitimacy that 'has proved to be the dominant model for empiri-
cal investigations of leg i t imacy 'and , the social contract is a (one) analytical tool of 
moral and political philosophy. Although I find DAVID B E E T H A M ' S comment that 'the 
whole Weberian theory of legitimacy has to be left behind as one of the blindest of 
blind alleys in the history of the social science, notable only for the impressiveness of 
the name that it bears, not for the direction in which it leads''' too harsh, I will nonethe-
less argue against the WEBERian and in favour of a normative approach when studying 
legitimacy. 
Legitimacy, as I understand it, is a through and through moral concept. Broadly speak-
ing, the next section demands a normative approach for a moral concept. The argument 
for a normative approach to legitimacy is the connecting point to the subsequent sec-
tion. Despite the fact that IR 'has been dominated by positivism''^ and although it is 
often claimed that IR 'must be viewed under the category of power and that the conduct 
of nations is, and should be, guided and judged exclusively by the amoral requirements 
of the national interest''"', I will pursue a different position. Following the tradition 
which argues 'that the subject needs to concern itself more with normative issues 
[...and] that the subject is unavoidably normative'"'', the overall aim is to show that le-
gitimacy, social contract, morality and normativity - terms that are not standard vocabu-
lary in IR - have (to have) their place within the wider IR language. Legitimacy wil l be 
located in normative international society theory. Only when all these tasks are success-
fully completed, can we proceed to chapter two where the idea of the social contract -
very basically the idea of 'political obligation [. . .] as a contractual obligation' '^  - enters 
the stage. Here it begins to perform its leading role as the source for legitimacy. The 
remaining part of this section deals with the meaning and significance of legitimacy 
both generally and particularly in the international realm. Beginning with STANLEY 
R O B E R T GRAFSTEtN, 'The Failure of Weber's Conception of Legitimacy: Its Causes and Implications', 
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 43 (1981), 456. 
" D A V I D B E E T H A M , The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillan, 1991), 25. 
S T E V E S M I T H , 'Positivism and beyond', in S T E V E S M I T H , K E N B O O T H A N D M A R Y S I A Z A L E W S K I (eds.), 
International theory: positivism and beyond (Camhridge: CUP, 1996), 11. 
M A R S H A L L C O H E N , 'Moral Skepticism and International Relations', in C H A R L E S R. B E I T Z E T A L . (eds.), 
International Ethics (Princeton: PUP, 1985), 4. 
S T E V E S M I T H , 'The Forty Years' Detour: The Resurgence of Normative Theory in International Rela-
tions', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 21 (1992), 490. 
" M I C H A E L L E S S N O F F , Social Contract (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1986), 2. 
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MiLGRAM and HANNAH ARENDT may seem odd; however, they perfectly reveal the 
power of legitimacy as a mechanism of social control. 
MiLGRAM focussed on the act of obeying orders. What caused his interest in the Nazi 
epoch is obvious: a system of command and obedience 'has been reliably established' 
during the Nazi period, when 'millions of innocent people were systematically slaugh-
tered on command', possible only because 'a very large number of people obeyed or-
ders.''^ His well-known obedience experiment has the following logic: ordinary people 
are told by the experimenter to administer electric shocks to a person, a professional 
actor only pretending to suffer; when do people, increasingly 'hurting' the person, stop 
administering shocks, stop obeying the orders given? Since most people did not stop 
altogether, the question of why not? naturally arises. The key for imderstanding their 
behaviour is legitimacy. They perceived the experimenter as a 'legitimate authority' and 
thus felt somehow obliged to obey; the mere sense of legitimacy made them perform 
sadistic actions. This provides a very first idea of the significance of legitimacy: even 
where naked power or coercion obviously plays no role - the people are only told to 
administer, they are not even explicitly told to obey - nevertheless, 'ordinary people 
[...] without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terrible de-
stmctive process'. This is why MiLGRAM states 'that Arendt's conception of the banal-
ity of evil comes closer to the tmth than one might dare imagine'.'^ He refers to 
ARENDT'S controversial Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil where 
she makes the point that the dilemma with Adolf Eichmann was 'precisely that so many 
were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and 
still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal.''* 
Having shown the power and influence legitimacy can have on human actions, the same 
power applies to intemational legitimacy. What at first sight may seem to be rather pe-
culiar becomes clearer when focussing on one particular parallel between MILGRAM'S 
experiment and the international sphere: there exists a rule in the experiment - that to 
administer shocks - which is not enforced but is nevertheless obeyed; the same phe-
nomenon applies internationally. Rules and norms do exist, and they are hardly en-
S T A N L E Y M I L G R A M , Obedience to Authority: An experimental view (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 
citations on p. 1. 
" I B I D . , 6-8. 
H A N N A H A R E N D T , Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil (London: Faber and Faber, 
1963), 253. 
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forced but usually obeyed.'^ This leads to the so-called 'compliance question'^": what 
causes states to follow and obey international law, rules, norms, commitments, and trea-
ties? Or, asked from a different perspective: how can compliance with norms be secured 
or at least, in a first step, accomplished? What 'remains among the most perplexing 
questions in international relations'^' is indeed of greatest interest and importance since 
the 'international social system does not possess an overarching center of political 
power to enforce rules.'^^ It is for that reason why THOMAS FRANCK quite concisely 
asks: 'Why do powerful nations obey powerless rules?'^^ Here, the focus must shift to 
three reasons - which are applicable not only to the international sphere but to any so-
cial system - why states obey: firstly, coercion (or force); secondly, self-interest (or 
reward-based or price); and, thirdly, legitimacy. In case of coercion, states follow 
norms, or compliance can be secured, only because they fear the potential punishment 
they face for non-conformity. When states comply by reasons of self-interest their sub-
mission 'ha[d] to be "purchased" through the offer of rewards'^ "*. The third mechanism 
of these ideal-types of social control, legitimacy, makes states comply because they ac-
knowledge a duty to obey - whatever, worth mentioning here, this sense of duty rests 
on.^ ^ And for FRANCK , legitimacy is the key for answering the compliance question. 
What must sound fairly ridiculous in the ears of orthodox IR scholars is that powerful 
nations obey powerless rules '[bjecause they perceive the rule and its institutional pe-
numbra to have a high degree of legitimacy'^^, and not for reasons of coercion or self-
interest - with the latter two explanations falling into the neorealist and neoliberal 
" Cf. T H O M A S M . F R A N C K , The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: OUP, 1990), 3; 
H A R O L D H . K O H , 'Why do Nations obey International Law', The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106 (1997), 
2603. 
I B I D . , 2600. 
^' I B I D . , 2599. 
I A N H U R D , 'Legitimacy and Authority in International Polities', International Organization, Vol. 53 
(1999) . 379. 
The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, 3. 
" M A T H E S O N , 'Weber and the classification of forms of legitimacy', 200. 
'^ The threefold standard classification is, e.g., employed or used (but sometimes labelled differently) in: 
R O D N E Y B A R K E R , Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: OUP, 1990), 11; B E E T H A M , The Le-
gitimation of Power, 38; H U R D , 'Legitimacy and Authority in International Polities', 379; 
M A T H E S O N , 'Weber and the classification of forms of legitimacy', 200; J O H N P A R K I N S O N , 'Legiti-
macy Problems in Deliberative Democracy', Political Studies, Vol. 151 (2003), 182; A L E X A N D E R 
W E N D T , Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 250. 
^* F R A N C K , The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, 25 [italics omitted]. 
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school, respectively.^' Worth mentioning here, FRANCK sees legitimacy through legal 
lenses. But nevertheless: legitimacy in the international realm, too, exercises its power. 
Yet, there is another important meaning of legitimacy in the intemational sphere. 
Somewhat relating to the idea when enquiring into state legitimacy domestically, it im-
plies that 'we sometimes count states as legitimate i f they achieve certain kinds of inter-
national recognition' . MARTIN WIGHT uses the term in this way, and by explicitly 
speaking of intemational legitimacy he links legitimacy to the 'the collective judgement 
of intemational society about rightful membership of the family of na t ions 'Wha t 
makes it soimd differently to the way it was used when approaching the compliance 
question does, of course, follow the same logic: where it is neither coercion nor self-
interest that makes states obey or comply or accept a rule, a law, a stmcture, an order, 
etc., it must be the sense of legitimacy; it must be the sense of the commands' or obliga-
tions' rightftilness. 
Indeed, legitimacy is a powerful tool: it is able to transform naked power into authority; 
it is able to make people do sadistic things; it is able to even govem the behaviour of 
states; and it is able to regulate which state can have access to the family of nations. 
Since it is so powerful, everyone wants to possess it in one way or another; but: 'Le-
gitimacy means different things at different times and in different places'^°. This natu-
rally leads to the next section and its attempt to categorize the main lenses through 
which legitimacy is seen and how it is approached and studied. Arguing for its moral 
character, it illustrates where in each case legitimacy is grounded; the social contract is 
only one source. 
1.2 Legitimacy studied: a normative approach for a moral concept 
There is a need for establishing a taxonomy since legitimacy is at least as confusing as it 
is powerful; there is not one coherent idea of what legitimacy is or what it means and 
how it is used and studied. Instead, it is an 'unfortunately ambiguous'^' and 'rather 
^ Cf. H U R D , 'Legitimacy and Authority in Intemational Polities', 380; W E N D T , Social Theory of Interna-
tional Politics, 250. 
J O H N S I M M O N S , 'Justification and Legitimacy', Ethics, Vol. 109 (1999) , 747. 
" 'International Legitimacy', in H E D L E Y B U L L (ed.), Systems of Slates (Leicester: LUP, 1977), 153. 
J O H N W I L L I A M S , Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (Basing-
stoke: Macmillan, 1998), 3. 
A L L E N B U C H A N A N , Justice. Legitimacy, andSelf-Determination (Oxford: OUP, 2003) , 146. 
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nebulous'^^ term which is 'rarely defined except by implication'''^ and, when defined 
explicitly, 'defined [.. .] in many different ways'"'''; it is 'employed loosely and in sev-
eral senses'-'\ and is 'neither very clear nor easy to apply'^^; summing it up in 
BEETHAM'S words, legitimacy needs to be 'rescue[d] [.. .] from the confusion into which 
it has sunk''''. The following taxonomy corresponds to the standard classification found 
in the domestic context where investigations into ruler vs. ruled or government vs. gov-
erned relationships have been traditionally made by three academic disciplines, namely, 
political theory/moral and political philosophy, jurisprudence and constitutional theory 
as well as the social sciences, especially political science and sociology.^* Hence, it in-
volves the three major positions that are taken up when legitimacy and its grounds are 
approached and studied: jurisprudence; social sciences, with special focus on WEBER; 
£ind moral and political philosophy. Examining legitimacy according to this classifica-
tion reveals that jurisprudence and the WEBERian approach are flawed; both approaches 
do not acknowledge the irmermost quality of legitimacy, namely its moral character, as 
well as the need (only consequently) to study it normatively; it reveals that the legiti-
macy criteria, necessary for the normative method, must be sought in moral and politi-
cal philosophy, and in the social contract theory in particular. 
To begin with jurisprudence, (international) lawyers 'tend simply to translate legitimacy 
as legality'^^. A few centuries ago, legitimacy was used according to one of its original 
meanings: where, at the times of hereditary monarchy, power was inherited, the transfer 
of it became merely a question of lawful descent; this meant that a child, to be qualified 
for taking over the rule from its parent rulers, must have been bom in lawful wedlock. 
" D A V I D D . C A R O N , 'The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council', The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 87 (1993), 556. 
" J O H N P A R K I N S O N , 'Legitimacy Problems in Deliberative Democracy', 182. 
" J O H N F R A S E R , 'Validating a Measure of National Political Legitimacy', American Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 18(1974), 117. 
" W I G H T , 'international Legitimacy', 153. 
J A N P A K U L S K I , 'Legitimacy and Mass Compliance: Reflections on Max Weber and Soviet-Type Socie-
ties', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 16 (1986), 37. 
^' The Legitimation of Power, vii. 
C f B E E T H A M , The Legitimation of Power, 4f; R O D N E Y B A R K E R , Political Legitimacy and the State, 8-
14. B E E T H A M speaks of political philosophy, B A R K E R of political theory, yet both mean the same 
kind of discipline. 
" I N I S L . C L A U D E , J R . , 'Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations', Interna-
tional Organization, Vol. 20 (1966), 368. 
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that the 'parents of the child must have been lawfully married''"'. Things are, at least in 
democratic states, different today; however, the basic principle from the viewpoint of 
jurispmdence remains the very same: something is legitimate i f it is lawful; legitimacy 
is 'equivalent to legal validity.'*^ A prominent example of this understanding of legiti-
macy certainly is FRANCK ; and the lenses through which he sees legitimacy are charac-
teristic for most intemational legal scholars. When enquiring into the compliance ques-
tion, a question which is definitely among 'the meat and potatoes of jurisprudential in-
quiry'''^, FRANCK suggests that legitimacy is 'a property of a rule or rule-making institu-
tion which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively be-
cause those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and oper-
ates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.''*^ The distinctive 
yardstick for conferring legitimacy is, then, a right process; the right process of how, for 
instance, a mle or law has come about. What those juridical-procedural accounts of le-
gitimacy, which reduce legitimacy to a mere 'matter of satisfying some legal criteria'"'', 
fail to see is 'whether the law itself is justifiable, and whether it conforms to moral or 
political principles that are rationally defensible.''*^ Followers of this approach must live 
with the accusation of being 'fundamentally positivistic and process-oriented'"^ and 
FRANCK , interestingly, has made a significant shift in his later work Fairness in Interna-
tional Law and Institutions: instead of asking why nations obey international norms and 
laws, he raises the question whether intemational law is fair.'*' But be it as it may: le-
gitimacy must not be confused with pure legality; it is more than a juridical label. 
With W E B E R , to arrive at the social sciences, it gets even worse; here, legitimacy has 
nothing to do with anything close to faimess or morality at all. His theory of legitimacy 
M A R G A R E T P U X O N , Legitimacy and Legitimation (London: Oyez Publications, 1965), 7. 
B E E T H A M , The Legitimation of Power, 4. 
T H O M A S F R A N C K , 'Legitimacy in the Intemational System', The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 82 (1988), 706. The literature on the compliance question is large; see, e.g., F R A N C K ' S 
Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: OUP, 1995) and A B R A M C H A Y E S A N D 
A N T O N I A H . C H A Y E S , The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 
(Cambridge: HUP, 1995). 
The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, 24 [italics omitted], 
'"' F R A S E R , 'Validating a Measure of National Political Legitimacy', 118. 
B E E T H A M , The Legitimation of Power, 4. 
K O H , 'Why do Nations obey Intemational Law', 2644. 
Cf. Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: OUP, 1995), 6. 
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- held as the 'source of the confusion''*^, and having provoked 'almost universal criti-
cism by [...] political philosophers''*' - constructs legitimacy around the mere belief 
people have in it (or not). One must speak in circles to explain W E B E R ' S view: power is 
legitimate when the people believe it to be legitimate (and vice versa); and what sounds 
so straightforward is at the same time exactly the core of the problem, namely, that it 
mistakenly does 'dissolve legitimacy into belief or opinion.'^" W E B E R ' S almost obses-
sion to more or less equate legitimacy with the people's beliefs shines through in his 
three 'typical claims to legitimacy made by authorities''', namely, the rational, tradi-
tional, and charismatic claim. Firstiy, what W E B E R calls legal authority rests 'on a belief 
in the "legality" of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to author-
ity under such rules to issue commands'; secondly, traditional authority is based 'on an 
established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the 
status of those exercising authority under them'; and lastly, charismatic authority means 
that it is the charismatic 'leader as such who is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him 
and his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as they fall within in the 
scope of the individual's belief in his charisma.''^ For W E B E R , these three claims -
worth mentioning that 'none of these three ideal types [. . .] is usually to be found in his-
torical cases in "pure" form'' ' ' - are made when power is to be transformed into author-
ity; and it is (t)his three-fold classification that has 'achieved classical status in the lit-
erature of political-science and political sociology''". 
This is the ideal place to show again the power of legitimacy and its superiority as a 
mechanism of social control; to show why W E B E R states that 'every such system [of 
authority] attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its "legitimacy".'" Taking 
on the view of the power holder, letting legitimacy do the work, i.e. to ensure compli-
B E E T H A M , The Legitimation of Power, 7. 
G R A F S T E I N , 'The Failure of Weber's Conception of Legitimacy...', 456. 
J O H N H . S C H A A R , 'Legitimacy in the Modem State', in W I L L I A M C O N N O L L Y (ed.), Legitimacy and the 
State {OxfoTd: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 108. 
" G R A F S T E I N , 'The Failure of Weber's Conception of Legitimacy...', 462 . 
W E B E R , The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, pp. 300-1 [italics added]. 
" I B I D . , 301. For the concept of 'ideal type' see M A X W E B E R , '"Objectivity" in Social Science and Social 
Policy' (1904) , in his The Methodology of the Social Sciences, edited by E D W A R D A . S H I L S A N D 
H E N R Y A . F I N C H (New York: The Free Press, 1949). 
" M A R T I N E . S P E N C E R , 'Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority', The British Journal of Sociology, 
Vol.21 (1970) , 123. 
The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 298. 
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ance, is less costly (not only monetary) than coercing or buying it: coercion is ineffi-
cient and costly insofar as only persistent observation ensures obedience; self-interested 
actors constantly assess their pay-off for obedience and withdraw from it as soon as the 
rewards seem to be inadequate. Legitimacy, however, provides not only voluntary com-
pliance but also the stabilizing effect power holders are appealed to.^ ^ Power subjects 
want it to see and power holders need it to have. It is this with legitimacy that only un-
derlines my opening words: 'Politics is not merely a struggle for power but also a con-
test over legitimacy'". Another aspect of the power lying behind legitimacy is shown 
by HURD: he (rightly) reasons, that if anarchy is seen as the missing of an authority and 
if legifimacy means that a norm, internalized by an actor because of the perception of it 
as legitimate, takes on an authoritative character over the actor, then it follows that, '[i]f 
we accept that some authoritative intemational institutions exist, by virtue of their being 
accepted by states as legitimate, then the intemational system is not an anarchy.' Le-
gitimacy then even leads to a 'call for a political theory of intemational relations "after 
CO 
anarchy'". No doubt, legitimacy must be an object of study in IR; with a proper place 
in IR theory and a proper methodological approach. 
The belief-centric WEBERian approach - usually referred to as descriptive (or empirical 
or explanatory) account of legitimacy, in opposifion to the prescriptive version which I 
will turn to shortly - is widely employed in IR. This has led to the comment, implying 
dissatisfaction with it, that legitimacy '[wjhen applied in IR, virtually all commentators 
begin by recognising some such distinction [between descriptive and prescriptive theo-
ries of legitimacy], and most end up by adopting a loosely-based WEBERian ap-
proach.'^^ One well-known example is HENRY KISSINGER: when writing about the Con-
cert of Europe in the nineteenth century and conceding that the legitimate order manu-
factured by the diplomats at the Vienna congress was the essence of stability after 1815, 
he defines an order to be legitimate, when its 'stmcture is accepted by all major pow-
ers'^". Another example makes the WEBERian approach even more clear. Legitimacy, 
here, 'refers to the normative belief by an actor that a mle or institution ought to be 
" C f I B I D . , 298; H U R D , 'Legitimacy and Authority in Intemational Polities', 383f; M A T H E S O N , 'Weber 
and the classification of forms of legitimacy', 200. 
" C L A U D E , J R . , 'Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations', 368. 
H U R D , 'Legitimacy and Authority in Intemational Polities', citations on pp. 401, 404. 
" C L A R K , 'Legitimacy in a global order'. Review of International Studies, Vol. 29 (2003), 80. 
A iVorld Restored (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), 145. 
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obeyed'^', and the author explicitly says that he 'make[s] no moral claim about the uni-
versal legitimacy, or even less the moral worth, o f any particular international rule; I am 
interested strictly in the subjective feeling by a particular actor or set o f actors that some 
rule is legitimate.'^^ Legitimacy in this descriptive WEBERian sense means that it 'be-
comes [ . . . ] a matter o f fact, the fact that [...actors] hold a certain b e l i e f " and implies 
that i t is the task o f the social scientist, when studying this phenomenon, to 'make a re-
port (which may be empirically true or false) about other [...actors'] beliefs.'^'* The 
WEBERian approach is, although widely used, not the only way o f studying legitimacy 
within the social sciences and is far f rom uncontroversial. Its twin sister, the so-called 
normative (or prescriptive) approach to legitimacy, is highly critical o f W E B E R ' S tech-
nique and follows a quite different, much more promising method: legitimacy princi-
pally 'refers to a set o f norms and values [ . . . ] that are sufficiently shared to make a[ny] 
political system possible'; this means for the researcher that the first task is 'to find out 
the content and sources o f these values in every political s y s t e m ' . H o w this normative 
approach functions is illustrated best by considering the criticism its proponents make 
o f the descriptivists.^^ 
One o f the main criticisms, especially from moral and political philosophers, is evoked 
by the separation o f legitimacy f rom any sense o f morality; indeed, the WEBERian be-
lief-centrism mistakenly implies an any thing-goes-mentality. Where anything can be 
legitimate only because the people or the actors believe it to be legitimate, even the Nazi 
regime, to come back to this early example, could be conferred legitimacy. What else is 
erroneous with this descriptive reductionism or oversimplification? The work of the 
social scientists is reduced to ask relevant actors - besides: who are the relevant actors? 
- whether they believe something to be legitimate or not, and to formulate a report 
about all the beliefs. This research strategy is too narrow insofar as it leaves aside or 
cannot explain important and relevant political phenomena such as obeying a specific 
H U R D , 'Legitimacy and Authority in International Polities', 381. 
" I B I D . , 381. 
" G R A F S T E I N , 'The Failure of Weber's Conception of Legitimacy...', 456. 
^ B E E T H A M , The Legitimation of Power, 8. 
G . H O S S E I N R A Z I , 'Legitimacy, Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East', The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 84 (1990), 70. 
66 
The following criticism is mostly drawn from: B E E T H A M , The Legitimation of Power, G R A F S T E I N , 'The 
Failure of Weber's Conception of Legitimacy...'; M A T H E S O N , 'Weber and the classification of forms 
of legitimacy'; S C H A A R , 'Legitimacy in the Modem State'. 
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norm out o f self-interest while at the same time finding the norm itself illegitimate (or 
vice versa). In addition, although it is the belief o f the actors, i.e. the power subjects, 
that confers legitimacy, i t nevertheless gets a power centric notion; the notion o f legiti-
macy being merely the product o f proper persuasion o f the power subjects by power 
holders. One must keep in mind that power holders do 'seek legitimization not only to 
satisfy their consciences but also to buttress their positions.'^'' Lastly, legitimacy is not 
only reduced to almost a matter of mere sentiment but it seems also to be irrelevant how 
these sentiments have come about - which may be, for instance, the 'product of condi-
tioning [or] the frui t o f symbolic bedazzlement'^*. In contrast to these four shortcom-
ings, the normative approach provides what was asked for, namely, that a ' fuller view is 
needed.'^^ 
This ' ful ler view' does not operate on the surface. Instead o f asking actors about their 
beliefs it does look beyond them; what is important are the values or norms or expecta-
tions which imderpin their beliefs. The social scientist fol lowing this approach is setting 
out general criteria for legitimacy wi th regard to the actors' values, and then, in a sec-
ond step, judges the relevant power relation it is focused on against these criteria. What 
seems to be very similar to the way philosophers would approach legitimacy is differ-
ent; the normative social scientist, when making a judgement about legitimacy, does 
assess the power relations not against ideal or universal principles the philosopher em-
ploys: 'Legitimacy for social scientists is always legitimacy-in-context, rather than ab-
solutely, ideally or abstractly.'^° For B E E T H A M , as an example, power is legitimate 
when it meets the fol lowing criteria: firstly, that power 'is acquired and exercised in 
accordance wi th established rules'; secondly, that these rules 'can be justified in terms 
o f beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate'; thirdly, that there is 'demonstrable 
expression o f consent on the part o f the subordinate ' .Whether these legitimacy crite-
ria are sufficient is not important here but they show that, when the social scientist uses 
certain criteria which were set out before, then the 'question "do [...actors] believe in 
the legitimacy o f a given power?" becomes redundant'^^. To put it generally, the prefer-
" C L A U D E , J R . , 'Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations', 368. 
S C H A A R , 'Legitimacy in the Modem State', 110. 
* ' i B i D . , no. 
™ B E E T H A M , The Legitimation of Power, 11-23, citation on p. 14. 
'^ See I B I D . , chap. 3, citations on pp. 16-18. 
" I B I D . , 13. 
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able normative study o f legitimacy is pursued best 'through the belief systems of the 
relevant actors.'^^ This is something done by J O H N W I L L I A M S ^ ' ' . Being one o f the rare 
exceptions employing a normative approach to legitimacy in IR^^ he focuses not 'upon 
compliance wi th a variety o f legal, procedural and institutional standards'^^ but on the 
values (or beliefs) o f the actors - in his case, the involved actors in Yugoslavia's col-
lapse in the early 1990s - which have underpinned their judgements o f what is legiti-
mate and what not. In building an 'Orthodox Western Model o f Legitimacy', W I L L I A M S 
concentrates on three values and their implications being, firstly, the Westphalian states-
system; secondly, the liberal state; and, thirdly, a liberal international economic order. 
In other words, i n his model these three values function as the general criteria or factors 
against which certain questions o f legitimacy can be judged. Additionally, in order 'to 
help link these three spheres together', W I L L I A M S refers to two further ideas acting as 
fourth and fifth value: the phenomenon o f nationalism and the idea o f the social con-
tract." 
The idea o f a social contract as a source o f legitimacy finally leads to moral and politi-
cal philosophy. Legitimacy from this point o f view 'entails the moral justifiability of 
power relations' , and morality becomes the decisive yardstick. The source for legiti-
macy are moral categories and an 'entity has political legitimacy i f and only i f it is mor-
ally justified in wielding political p o w e r ' W h a t is it , then, that can be morally justi-
fied? What is right and wrong, the good, or ethical? Here, besides the social contract 
tradition, three other traditions instantly come into mind: firstly, the view of virtue eth-
ics, one o f the oldest normative ethical traditions and closely associated with P L A T O and 
A R I S T O T L E , that morality merely comes as a by-product o f developing good habits and a 
generous personality; secondly, the consequentialist view o f utilitarians, such as J E R E M Y 
B E N T H A M and the two M I L L S , proposing that moral conduct derives f rom maximizing 
utility and happiness for the greatest number; and, lastly, its utmost opponent, deonto-
logical theories, where ethics and moral conduct is based on duties that are independent 
" C L A R K , 'Legitimacy in a global order', 80. 
See Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia. 
" C L A R K , 'Legitimacy in a global order', 80, fn 28. 
W I L L I A M S , Legitimacy in International Relations..., 3. 
" Cf. I B I D . , chapter 2, citation on p. 9. 
B E E T H A M , The Legitimation of Power, 5. 
" B U C H A N A N , JMi^ /ce, Legitimacy, andSelf-Determination, 146. 
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o f any outcomes - thus also called non-consequentialist theories - and where the K A N T -
ian categorical imperatives is the exemplar.*" 
Having classified legitimacy according to the three major viewpoints with their particu-
lar lenses that are employed, I must emphasize again that legitimacy is a moral concept. 
It might have legalistic etymological and practical roots but it is the notion o f propriety 
that is the distinguishing quality. Therefore, it is misleading and erroneous to study le-
gitimacy in a descriptive WEBERian fashion or to approach it by employing juridical-
procedural standards. Instead, it must be studied normatively; normatively in order to do 
justice to its moral nature. Correspondingly, the legitimacy criteria, which need to be 
elaborated to properly judge questions o f legitimacy, must be sought in what is provided 
by moral and political philosophy. And for legitimacy in the international realm, the 
social contract theories seem to be the most promising source. But before developing 
this further, the moral concept o f legitimacy needs to be located within IR theory first. 
1.3 Legitimacy located: normative international society theory 
Legitimacy plays almost no role in orthodox IR theory: neo-realism focuses on power 
and coercion as the guiding principles o f how states behave; and neo-liberalism focuses 
on self-interest. So, who does, for reasons o f ontology and methodology, become in-
volved in a normative approach to legitimacy; does properly respect its moral nature; 
and does possibly ground it in the idea o f a social contract? In the widest sense, it is that 
'body o f work which addresses the moral dimension o f international relations'; it is 
what is labelled normative IR theory, and its two basic characteristics are: firstly, it op-
erates ontologically within the framework o f an international society; and, secondly, it 
methodologically follows a normative approach.*' For this reason, this section is con-
structed around the dichotomy positivist international system theory versus normative 
international society theory.*^ I argue that legitimacy understood properly can only have 
Cf. G E R T R U D E E . M . A N S C O M B E , 'Modem Moral Philosophy' (1958), in her (ed.) The collected phi-
losophical papers of G. E: M. Anscombe, Vol. Ill (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981); T E R R Y N A R D I N 
A N D D A V I D R. M A P E L (eds.), Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: CUP, 1992); J A M E S 
R A C H E L S , The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986); 
S T R A U S S , 'What is Political Philosophy?', in his An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays, 
edited by H l L A l L G i L D i N (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989). 
" Cf. C H R I S B R O W N , International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992), chapter 1, citation on p. 3 [italics added]. 
'This distinction marks an academic rift which runs down the middle of international studies dividing 
(normative) international society theorists, such as Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, from (positivist) 
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its place within the latter theory; that only normative international society theory is able 
to acknowledge the moral quality o f legitimacy, is able to study it normatively, and is 
able to engage wi th moral and political philosophy for deriving proper legitimacy crite-
ria. 
Beginning with positivist international system theory - that is, orthodox IR in the forms 
o f neo-realism and neo-liberalism - the meaning and implication of an international 
system, to start wi th ontology, is best explained by introducing the idea o f an interna-
tional society first. According to H E D L E Y B U L L , an international society exists 'when a 
group o f states, conscious o f certain common interests and common values, form a soci-
ety in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set o f rules in 
their relations with one another, and share in the working o f common institutions.'*'' An 
international system is 'logically the more basic, and prior, idea'*'*, and it can exist with-
out an international society but not vice versa; it means that a group of states 'may be in 
contact wi th each other and interact in such a way as to be necessary factors in each 
other's calculations without their being conscious o f common interests or values, con-
ceiving themselves to be bound by a common set o f rules, or co-operating in the work-
ing o f common institutions.'*^ This implies that in an international system states behave 
or operate according to mechanisms completely different to that o f accepting certain 
normative ideas o f what ought to be, i.e. common interests and values and set of rules; 
those kinds o f ideas only exist in an international society. A n international system fiinc-
tions according to mechanisms different from legitimacy; here, states (must) play the 
game of coercion and self-interest. By coercion I refer to WALTZian neo-realism and to 
the idea o f systemic constraints placed upon states; to the idea that 'systemic forces 
are responsible for the remarkable similarities of foreign policy behaviour.'*' What 
international system theorists, such as Kenneth Waltz.' R O B E R T J A C K S O N , 'The Political Theory of 
International Society', in B O O T H A N D S M I T H (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, 112. 
" The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3"* edn. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 13. 
B A R R Y B U Z A N , 'From international system to international society: structural realism and regime the-
ory meet the English school'. International Organization, Vol. 47 (1993), 331. 
" B U L L , The Anarchical Society..., 13. 
For the following see B A R R Y B U Z A N , 'The timeless wisdom of realism?', in S M I T H , B O O T H A N D 
Z A L E W S K I (eds.), International theory: positivism and beyond; R O B E R T O. K E G H A N E (ed.), Neoreal-
ism and its critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); A N D R E W L I N K L A T E R , 'Neo-realism 
in Theory and Practice', in K E N B O O T H A N D S T E V E S M I T H (eds.), International Relations Theory To-
day (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); and K E N N E T H N. W A L T Z , Theory of International Politics 
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979) as his magnum opus. 
" L I N K L A T E R , 'Neo-realism in Theory and Practice', 243. 
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makes the system, i.e. the systemic forces, so powerful is its precise structure: firstly, 
anarchy as its ordering principle; secondly, the fiinctions o f the states as the primary 
units and actors; and, thirdly, the relative power o f the units and its distribution within 
the system. Defining the international system as anarchic, the units are forced by virtue 
o f the system and its structure to perform similar fiinctions, which is basically securing 
themselves against external threats; and this, importantly, despite the differences in their 
internal make-ups and constitutions. Hence, the distribution o f power among the units 
remains the sole variable. Being trapped in this 'self-help system, units worry about 
their survival and the worry conditions their behaviour'; and W A L T Z continues that 
these '[sjtructural constraints carmot be wished away, although many fail to understand 
this.'«« 
It is fairly obvious that legitimacy cannot and does not play here any role whatsoever. 
But how does this fit together with the KiSSlNGERian definition o f a legitimate order 
cited earlier? And even more puzzling must be C L A R K ' S remark that 'legitimacy is not a 
concept that belongs to any school in particular.'^^ Leaving aside the differences be-
tween realism and neo-realism worth neglecting here, K I S S I N G E R sees an order as le-
gitimate when it is accepted by all major powers. Indeed, legitimacy obviously does 
play a role, the role as a stabilizing factor; but the important point is the following: le-
gifimacy in this version is grounded or based on power - to be more precise: on a par-
ticular distribution or relation o f power among the units in the system - and does cer-
tainly not have anything to do with morality; as loosely as it is used and employed here, 
legitimacy is reduced to nothing more than a label for power - power wrapped up and 
sold as legitimacy. Where the system's structure and the distribution o f power deter-
mine and control states' behaviour, there is definitely no place (and no need) for legiti-
macy and for moral categories; the only thing that really counts for a state in the system 
are relative gains; indeed: ' I n a condition o f anarchy [ . . . ] relative gain is more important 
than absolute gain! ' '" 
The question, whether states pursue relative or absolute gains, leads to neo-liberalism, 
and its focus on self-interest as the driving force behind states' actions in the interna-
tional system. In contrast to neo-realism's focus on relative gains, neo-liberalism as-
W A L T Z , Theory of International Politics, citations on pp. 105, 109. 
" 'Legitimacy in a global order', 82. 
W A L T Z , Man. the Slate and War... ,198. 
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sumes 'that states focus primarily on their individual absolute gains and are indifferent 
to the gains o f others. Whether cooperation results in a relative gain or loss is not very 
important [ . . . ] so long as it brings an absolute gain. ' ' ' This means that here, too, states' 
behaviour does not fo l low the logic o f legitimacy; instead, it follows a much simpler 
logic, that o f benefit calculation. Despite their differences and their diametrically op-
posed historical roots, neo-realism and neo-liberalism nevertheless share some common 
ground today: they both can be seen as assimilating formations o f a state-centric rational 
choice realism focussing on an anarchic international system, which comprises of ra-
tional egoistic units, and as being descendents o f a broad and an essentially Anglo-
American liberal tradition; in addition, their methodology is underpinned by deeply 
positivist assumptions.'^ This implies that orthodox IR, when studying 'legitimacy' -
whether they 'ground' i t on coercion or self-interest - fol lows a value-free or ethically 
neutral approach; it follows an approach which LEO S T R A U S S , one o f the foremost crit-
ics o f social science positivism I w i l l soon turn to with regard to his three waves o f 
modernity'^, condemns as being 'neutral in the conflict between good and evil , however 
good and evil may be u n d e r s t o o d . A n d this belief in social science positivism is the 
reason why orthodox IR adheres to the descriptive, belief-centric WEBERian approach. 
Although, there is a light normative element to be found in neo-liberal accounts, that is, 
that they see 'the emergence of a norm of reciprocity as a critical factor in minimizing 
"cheating'" '^ the main argument remains the same: in positivist international system 
theory, for reasons o f ontology and methodology, there is definitely no place for a nor-
mative approach to legitimacy based on whatever moral grotmds. 
The situation is entirely different when fol lowing normative international society the-
ory; only within this framework - 'the idea that states are not [ . . . ] strangers to the moral 
wor ld ' ' ^ - legitimacy does contain moral worth, and this is because '[t]here exists an 
" R O B E R T P O W E L L , 'Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 85 (1991), 1303. 
C f C H R I S B R O W N , Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2002), chapter 4; and his 'Review Article: Theories of International Justice', British 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 27 (1997), 278f; S M I T H , 'Positivism and beyond', 11. 
" See 'The Three Waves of Modernity', in his An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays, ed-
ited by H I L A I L G I L D I N , 81-98. 
S T R A U S S , 'What is Political Philosophy?', 13. 
B R O W N , 'Review Article: Theories of International Justice', citation on p. 279. 
T I M D U N N E , Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (Basingstoke: Macmiilan, 
1998), 10. 
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idea o f what ought to 6e.'^^ Societies, whether it be domestically or internationally, 
have an idea o f what ought to be insofar as they acknowledge three elementary or pri-
mary goals, namely, making sure that, firstly, l i fe is secured against threats; secondly, 
agreements and promises are kept; and, thirdly, possessions are protected. 
Brought into the international sphere, these goals revolve around the ideas of self-
preservation, sovereignty and peace. In an international society, albeit anarchical as it is, 
order is the consequence not, for example, because o f a balance o f power at a certain 
time, but because o f the common interest in these primary goals. These three primary 
goals not only reflect particular ideas o f what ought to be; the 'rules prescribing behav-
iour that sustains these goals' - that is, the principles an international society is based on 
- too, are normative-laden. The point is, that states share common interests, aim at 
common goals, and fo l low rules not because o f coercion or self-interest, but because 
they perceive those norms - e.g. pacta sunt servanda or respecting others' sovereignty 
(as two o f the 'rules that play a part in the maintenance o f international o r d e r ' - as 
being legitimate. States perceive it as legitimate to 'act within a system of norms which, 
most o f the time, they regard as [even] constraining', and to voluntarily subordinate 
themselves under norms that are 'created by the states themselves'. 
Legitimacy in an international society reflects shared ideas o f what ought to be, derived 
from normative principles. The answer to F R A N C K ' S compliance question is that legiti-
macy is the driving force why states comply with certain norms without being forced by 
an overarching authority. That in an international society legitimacy is grounded in 
normative principles also becomes clear in W I G H T ' S usage o f the term. His notion o f 
international legitimacy refers not to the norms of how states ought to behave in the 
family o f nations but to the normative 'principles governing admission to, and recogni-
tion by, international society [and the] criteria for r ightful membership'."" Unti l the 
French Revolution international legitimacy was grounded in the dynastic principle, 
which basically reflects the (other) original meaning o f legitimacy 'bom in lawful wed-
lock'; since then, the principle o f international legitimacy has shifted to the popular, that 
" W I L L I A M S , Legitimacy in International Relations 3 [italics added]. 
" C f B U L L , The Anarchical Society..., chapters 1 and 4, citation on p. 63. 
" I B I D . , 65. 
C H R I S B R O W N , Understanding International Relations, 2"'' edn. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), both 
citations on p. 54. 
C L A R K , 'Legitimacy in a global order', 84. 
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is contractual, principle which is concerned with the consent o f the governed. There 
exists an idea among states how they internally ought to be constituted in order to be 
given access to the society by the others; and this is why WIGHT comments that these 
'principles o f [international] legitimacy mark the region o f approximation between in-
ternational and domestic polifics. ' '"^ Even i f the ideas o f what ought to be and their un-
derlying principles may change f rom time to time or remain constant over a longer pe-
riod, within the framework o f an international society they do exist; and it is their exis-
tence, together wi th the behaviour-constraining effects they exert on states that explains 
why it is only here, in normative international society theory, that legitimacy relates to 
its original meaning o f propriety. 
Viewed f rom the methodological perspective, the result is the same since international 
society theorists 'never bought into the positivist assumption that dominated the disci-
pl ine ' '" ' ; instead, they adhere to the strong belief that intemafional relations, and legiti-
macy, must be studied normatively. This is why positivism's dominance in IR gradually 
has declined'"'': what is referred to as the third or the post-positivist debate followed the 
first debate between realism and liberalism (or CARRian 'utopianism''"^) held in the 
1920s, 30s and 40s, and the second debate between traditional and scientific approaches 
to IR held in the 1950s and 60s. In this third 'discipline-defining debate''"^ starting in 
the late 1980s, orthodox IR, and its underlying methodological positivism, has come 
under severe attack f rom many different sides; summarized as the post-positivists, they 
have introduced the so-called post-positivist era. Diverse and different strands such as 
critical theory, historical sociology, feminism, and post-modernism, are placed under 
this umbrella. Going hand in hand with the normative international society theorists and 
political philosophers, all o f them reject making use o f positivistic methods in IR (and 
in the social sciences generally). Since positivism 'is no longer what i t desired to be 
102 
103 
104 
I OS 
Cf. 'International Legitimacy', citation on p. 153. 
S M I T H , 'Positivism and beyond', I I . 
For the following see Y O S E F L A P I D , 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a 
Post-Positivist Era', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33 (1989); S M I T H ' S 'Positivism and be-
yond', 'The Forty Years' Detour...', and 'The Self-images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of Interna-
tional Relations Theory', in B O O T H A N D S M I T H (eds.), International Relations Theory Today. 
See E D W A R D H. C A R R , The Twenty Years'Crisis, 1919-1939 (1939), 2"'' edn. (New York: Perennial, 
2001). 
' L A P I D , 'The Third Debate...', 236. 
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when Auguste Comte originated i t ' ' " ' and 'has been largely stripped o f whatever agreed 
meaning it may once have had' , here, I am not able to give a detailed account o f the 
diffuse concept o f positivism. Yet quintessentially, the normative critics reject formulat-
ing value-fi-ee and law-like if-then-relations; reject employing simply quantitative 
methods; reject mainly testing hypotheses; and reject W A L T Z ' S argument 'that a theory 
is not a statement about everything that is important in international-political life, but 
rather a necessarily slender explanatory construct''"'; they reject the idea o f a theory 
merely explaining what is, and propose, instead, the idea o f theorizing about how the 
world ought to be. In addition, they are certain that 'there is no more normative theorist 
than one who proudly boasts that he or she w i l l simply deal with "the facts". The prob-
lem with this is which "facts". '"" 
The strong turn to normative claims during the third debate, even denying the mere pos-
sibility o f non-normative theorizing, has restored what had almost vanished from the IR 
scene during the positivist era, namely, political philosophy. Besides this, two other 
factors played an important role in the 'striking revival o f political philosophy [that] has 
taken place': firstly, real-world events, particularly in connection to Vietnam and the 
Six-Days-War o f 1967 , have generated a new interest in the older philosophical ques-
tion whether wars can be just - an issue addressed in M I C H A E L W A L Z E R ' S Just and Un-
just Wars ( 1 9 7 7 ) " ' ; and, secondly, 'the return o f Grand Theory to political philosophy' 
most prominent in JOHN R A W L S ' S A Theory of Justice (1971)"'^ has placed the issue of 
international jusUce on the IR agenda ( a g a i n ) . A n d , indeed, where methodologically 
normative approaches are pursued, where scientific enquiries are made by setting and 
applying standards o f how the world ought to be, then, political philosophy must be 
near. 
S T R A U S S , 'What is Political Philosophy?', 13. 
A N T H O N Y GIDDENS (ed.), Positivism and Sociology (London: Heinemann, 1974), ix. 
Cf. K E N N E T H W A L T Z , 'Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 
44 (1990), citation on p. 32; W A L T Z , Theory of International Politics, chapter I ; B A R R Y B u Z A N , 'The 
Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered', in B O O T H AND S M I T H (eds.), In-
ternational Relations Theory Today. 
S M I T H , 'The Self-images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory', 30. 
"'3"* edition (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
Revised edition (Oxford: OUP, 1999); hereafter: Theory of Justice. 
Cf. and citations from BROWN, International Relations Theory..., pp. 9, 10. 
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By having shown the ontology and methodology of both positivist international system 
theory and normative international society theory, I must conclude that only the latter 
theory is capable o f approaching legitimacy appropriately: normative international soci-
ety theory does see legitimacy functioning in the international realm; it does acknowl-
edge its moral nature; and it does study legitimacy normatively. And since it is sympa-
thetic towards political philosophy, it is able when seeking proper legitimacy criteria to 
explore what moral and political philosophy has to offer - for instance, social contract 
theory. Legitimacy, then, has been located in normative international society theory; it 
has not only been brought together with IR theory, but also with international relations 
in general. Legitimacy means not only different things at different times but also differ-
ent things to different people; it is an extremely diverse concept. And so diverse it is, so 
powerfial is it . It does not only control the behaviour o f people, but even that o f states; in 
addition, it also determines who is a member o f the international society and who is not. 
Undoubtedly, legitimacy is needed - not only in any social relationship since social 
control definitely ought not to fo l low the logic o f the right o f the stronger, but also as an 
object o f study in IR. When studying legitimacy, jurisprudence usually equates legiti-
macy with legality; W E B E R with people's beliefs; and moral and political philosophy 
with morality. However, jurisprudence and descriptive WEBERian approaches entirely 
miss the crucial point. Legitimacy, certainly, is a moral concept through and through. It 
entails what is good and bad; what is right and wrong; ideas o f what ought to be. And 
legitimacy as a moral concept needs to be studied normatively. Yet, legitimacy, ideas o f 
what ought to be, morality, normative methodology, and political philosophy have a 
tough stand in IR; orthodox IR is almost obsessed with scientific positivism and focuses 
on coercion and self-interest as the main determinants o f how states behave. Surely, 
legitimacy needs to be studied in IR, and it needs to be studied normatively. But by 
whom? Who could possibly derive proper legitimacy criteria f rom social contract the-
ory? It must be a theory which ontologically assumes an international society and which 
methodologically prefers normative approaches. 
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2. The Social Contract and Legitimacy 
2.1 The Social Contract situated: its international significance 
When J O H N G O U G H ' S The Social Contract was published in 1936, he almost apologized 
in his introductory words for writing a book-length study about the historical develop-
ment o f the social contract; GouGH wrote that although ' for all o f the accoutrements of 
liberty [...the social contract] is perhaps the most outworn, the most derided by critics, 
the least likely to serve it to-day in its struggle for existence [...but] it w i l l not be a 
waste o f time i f we study anew the part played by the social contract in the struggle for 
popular freedom.'' Only a few decades later, f rom the 1970s onwards, such an apology 
has not been necessary anymore; the social contract tradition, definitely having its glory 
days - but not its origins - in the seventeenth and eighteenth century and closely associ-
ated with the names JOHANNES A L T H U S I U S ^ , T H O M A S H O B B E S \ S A M U E L F R E I H E R R VON 
PUFENDORF' ' , J O H N LocKE^ J E A N - J A C Q U E S R O U S S E A U ^ , and I M M A N U E L K A N T ^ has 
managed to get both feet back on the ground again - ground which it has lost during the 
nineteenth century. Mainly responsible for this come-back are the works (or 'con-
tracts') o f 'the new contractarians' R A W L S ^ , R O B E R T N O Z I C K ' ° , and J A M E S M . 
' The Social Contract: A critical study of its development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), citation on p. 
1. 
^ See The Politics of Johannes Althusius (1603), translated by F R E D E R I C K S. C A R N E Y (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1965); hereafter: Politica Methodice Digesta.... 
•* See Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill (1651), 
revised student edn., edited by R I C H A R D T U C K (Cambridge: CUP, 1996); hereafter: Leviathan. 
^ See De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (1672), translated by C. H . O L D F A T H E R A N D W. A. 
O L D F A T H E R (Oxford: OUP, 1934) and De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem Libri 
Duo (1673), translated by F R A N K G . M O O R E (Oxford: OUP, 1927); hereafter: De Jure Naturae et 
Gentium, De Officio Hominis et Civis. 
' See Two Treatises of Government (1690), edited by P E T E R L A S L E T T (Cambridge: CUP, 1960); hereaf-
ter: Two Treatises, First Treatise, Second Treatise. 
* See 'Of the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right' (1762), in his The Social Contract and other 
later political writings, edited by V I C T O R G O U R E V I T C H (Cambridge: CUP, 1997); hereafter: Control 
Social. 
' See 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch' (1795) and 'The Metaphysics of Morals' (1797) in his 
Political Writings, 2"^ enlarged edn., edited by H A N S R E I S S (Cambridge: CUP, 1991); hereafter: 
Perpetual Peace, Metaphysics of Morals. 
' C f , e.g., G O U G H , The Social Contract...; P E T E R K O L L E R , 'Die neuen Vertragstheorien', in K A R L G R A F 
B A L L E S T R E M A N D H E N N I N G O T T M A N N (eds.), Politische Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderis 
(MUnchen: Oldenbourg, 1990); D A V I D G . R I T C H I E , 'Contributions to the History of the Social Con-
tract Theory', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 6 (1891), 
' See Theory of Justice and The Law of Peoples; with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" (Cambridge, 
MA: HUP, 1999); hereafter: Law of Peoples, Public Reason Revisited, respectively. 
28 
Chapter 2. The Social Contract and Legitimacy 
B U C H A N A N " , with each o f them following KANTian, L o C K E i a n , and HoBBESian foot 
steps, respectively;'^ the social contract tradition owes the widespread attention it has 
regained essentially to these three Anglo-American writers. 
Yet, the social contract tradition is much less straightforward than these opening re-
marks may suggest; wi th its roots dating back to the Greek sophists, it is characterized 
by great diversity. Many different people have 'writ ten' many different 'contracts' with 
many different names. One finds, for instance, a 'social contract proper' or 'contract o f 
society'; a 'contract o f government' or 'contract o f submission'; an 'original contract'; 
an ' implici t contract'; an 'explicit contract'; a 'tacit contract'; a 'hypothetical contract'; 
a 'political contract'; and, even, an 'utilitarian contract'. Instead o f contract, one finds 
the use o f covenant or pact or compact. And all o f this has grown out o f so-called civi l , 
constitutional, integrated, moral, and philosophical contractarianism, and, not to men-
tion, contractualism. To put it short: social contract does not equal social contract; there 
is not one or the social contract. 
When it is said that legitimacy was based on a social contract, one question instantly 
comes into mind: which social contract? Its diversity, its long history, and its almost 
disappearance especially during the nineteenth century make the next section so indis-
pensable; it explores the social contract tradition and predominantly deals, firstly, with 
the ideal-types o f the social contract, how each o f them works, and how they are interre-
lated; secondly, with the flaws and main lines o f criticism (e.g. B E N T H A M ' ' , E D M U N D 
B U R K E ' " * , G E O R G W . F . H E G E L ' \ D A V I D H U M E ' ^ ) launched against them; and, thirdly. 
See Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
'' See Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago: CUP, 1975). 
For the label(s) see ScOTT G O R D O N ' S more critically driven review 'The New Contractarians', Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 84 (1976), and K O L L E R , 'Die neuen Vertragstheorien'. Additionally note-
worthy and important in this context are: J A M E S M . B U C H A N A N A N D G O R D O N T U L L O C K , The Calcu-
lus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan Press, 1962), D A V I D G A U T H I E R , Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 
G E O F F R E Y R . G R I C E , The Grounds of Moral Judgement (Cambridge: CUP, 1967), and T H O M A S M. 
S C A N L O N , 'Contractualism and utilitarianism', in A M A R T Y A S E N A N D B E R N A R D W I L L I A M S (eds.), 
Utilitarianism and beyond {CamhnAgf. CUP, 1982). 
" See A Fragment on Government (1776), edited by F. C. M O N T A G U E (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891); 
hereafter: Fragment on Government. 
See Reflections on the Revolution in France... (1790), edited by C O N O R C. O ' B R I E N (London: Penguin, 
1986). 
See Philosophy of Right {\i2\), translated by T. M. K N O X (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942). 
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where the idea o f a social contract historically derives f rom and how it has developed 
from ancient Greece through the middle ages until now. This provides a better under-
standing for the selection and the 'contracts' o f H O B B E S , R O U S S E A U , K A N T , and R A W L S . 
But before this investigation and the actual selection o f these four social contract theo-
rists takes place, it has to be clarified why the criteria for legitimacy in IR must be de-
rived f rom a social contract theory at all. In this section I argue that the social contract 
provides a proper source for legitimacy criteria since it already is a well-established idea 
in IR; its international significance speaks for the social contract. 
The social contract plays an important role when constituting an international society 
and in questions o f international ethics. Among legal positivism, natural law tradition, 
KANTian ethics, and cosmopolitanism, contractarianism is one o f the philosophical an-
gles" which pro-actively enquires into the constitution o f and into the 'basic principles 
governing [...an] intemafional society''*. K A N T ' S foedus pacificum is definitely a fine 
example o f a genuine contractarian theory o f international society;'^ it is established, 
founded, and constituted by a social contract among the participating states, by an inter-
national social contract. When states form a society, this naturally raises the question o f 
which states are entitled to membership of this society and which are not. And this latter 
aspect leads directly to W I G H T ' S notion o f international legitimacy. As already men-
tioned, roughly at the end o f the eighteenth century, the popular principle substituted the 
dynastic, hereditary dogma, and the internal, contractual arrangement o f states became 
the admission ticket for membership. Two international constitutions, namely, the 
Covenant o f the League o f Nations and its successor, the Charter o f the United Nations, 
are profotmdly influenced by the popular principle, since 1919 better known as national 
self-determination.'^" The consent o f the governed was supposed to be the solution to all 
international problems; in what could be W O O D R O W W I L S O N ' S words: 'Liberal democ-
racy replaces the irrational desire to be recognized as greater than others with a rational 
See 'Of the Original Contract' (1752), in his Essays: Moral. Political, and Literary, Vol. 1, edited by T. 
H . G R E E N A N D T . H . G R O S E (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1898); hereafter: Of the Original 
Contract. 
" See D A V I D R. M A P E L A N D T E R R Y N A R D I N (eds.). International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives 
(Princeton: PUP, 1998). 
" D A V I D R . M A P E L A N D T E R R Y N A R D I N , 'Introduction', in T H E I R (eds.) International Society: Diverse 
Ethical Perspectives, 3. 
Cf. C H R I S B R O W N , 'Contractarian Thought and the Constitution of International Society', in M A P E L 
A N D N A R D I N (eds.). International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, 136-7. 
Cf. W I G H T , 'International Legitimacy'. 
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desire to be recognized as equal. A world made up o f liberal democracies, then, should 
have much less incentive for war, since all nations would reciprocally recognize one 
another's legitimacy.'^' This classical liberal, WiLSONian perspective is also a question 
o f international ethics (and, not to mention, practical politics). And any idea about what 
ought to be and not, or what is right and wrong, or moral and immoral, or just and un-
just in international affairs draws, in one way or another, explicitly or implicitly, 'on 
established traditions o f ethical discourse [of international relations]'^^, that is, on moral 
and political philosophy; here, on social contract theory. 
However, international ethics is frequently equated with international justice. And here, 
the ' o ld ' contractarians must be somewhat distinguished f rom the contemporary; the 
latter argue predominantly that there is 'greater scope for principles o f justice in interna-
tional society than has frequently been thought.'^'^ In general, social contract theorists 
presume 'that principles o f justice are determined, or perhaps legitimated, by an agree-
ment freely entered into under ideal conditions by the parties concerned.'^'' Addition-
ally, they tend to equate justice wi th distributive justice. Justice usually has a proce-
dural-formal notion focussing on 'impartial rules impartially applied'^^ 'irrespective o f 
what the substantive content o f the rules may be'^^. Theories o f distributive justice, in 
contrast, do 'focus on outcomes rather than the rules which have generated those out-
comes.'^^ Contemporary contractarians' belief in international justice together with their 
preference for distributive justice lets them, in the case o f R A W L S for instance, 'focus 
more directly on specific issues in international ethics such as [ . . . ] global [or interna-
tional] distributive justice.' Interestingly, 'virtually no one is happy with Rawls's rea-
soning on this issue', wi th him, the 'most influential modern contractarian'.^' Without 
^' F R A N C I S F U K U Y A M A , The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Perennial, 2002) , xx. 
" T E R R Y N A R D I N , 'Ethical Traditions in International Affairs', in N A R D I N A N D M A P E L (eds.), Traditions 
of International Ethics, 1. 
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D A V I D R . M A P E L , 'The Contractarian Tradition in International Ethics', in N A R D I N A N D M A P E L (eds.), 
Traditions of International Ethics, 181. 
B R O W N , 'Review Article: Theories of International Justice', 287. 
^' I D E M , Sovereignty, Rights and Justice..., 167. 
^* B U L L , The Anarchical Society..., 76. 
" B R O W N , Sovereignty. Rights and Justice..., 167. 
^' M A P E L , 'The Contractarian Tradition in International Ethics', 191. 
B R O W N , Sovereignty, Rights and Justice..., 170; B R O W N , 'Review Article: Theories of International 
Justice', 287. 
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going into detail now, C H A R L E S B E I T Z is one o f the contractarians profoundly rejecting 
R A W L S ' S idea o f two contracts, one domestic contract producing the difference principle 
and one international contract which does not.'" Be it as it may, social contract theory 
plays an important role in the field o f international justice theories. Within international 
ethics - what is right and wrong? - the Reagan Doctrine is another example o f the sig-
nificant role o f the social contract."" This doctrine allows for provision o f military aid to 
insurgents rebelling against repressive, non-democratic regimes, but does not in cases 
where rebellion takes place against democratic regimes. L L O Y D N . C U T L E R explicitly 
refers to L o C K E (and, implicit ly, to his social contract) in order to legitimize this policy: 
'Our Declaration o f Independence, influenced by Vattell, Locke and other apostles o f 
the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, proclaimed the right o f any people to rebel by 
force against a tyrannical regime. This principle has inspired many such revolutions'; 
and he continues: 'Is there a parallel right to rebel against a democratic regime that 
gives all its people the opportunity to vote in free elections open to any candidate? John 
Locke thought not.' '^ 
The social contract is, so to speak, not new in IR. But it is not only not new, it is also 
already well-established. I t is employed when constituting an international society, and 
it also has its say in international ethics; therefore, to jus t i fy social contract theory as the 
source for legitimacy criteria is fairly straightforward. A n international society is a 
complex creation and almost everything it involves, i.e. its constitution, its membership 
principle, its guiding norms, its concern for international justice, etc., 'mark[s] the re-
gion o f approximation between international and domestic polities'. Considering the 
significance and status the social contract has in the domestic context, the utilization o f 
social contract theory for legitimacy criteria in IR makes even more sense; and makes 
the use o f this kind o f thought even more defensible. In addition, social contract theory 
per se is theorizing about what is right and wrong; it per se inherits the notion o f moral-
ity, which is important since legitimacy is a moral concept. The basic idea behind a so-
cial contract is that o f ' po l i t i ca l obligation [ . . . ] as a contractual obligation'. This is not a 
mistaken view, but i t is too narrow. The diff icul ty o f social contract theory is 'to deter-
C f C H A R L E S R. B E I T Z , Political Theory and International Relations, 2"'' edn. (Princeton: PUP, 1999); 
B R O W N , 'Contractarian Thought and the Constitution of International Society', 138; D A V I D M I L L E R , 
'The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice', in M A P E L A N D N A R D I N (eds.), International Society: Diverse 
Ethical Perspectives, 170-1. 
" C f M A P E L , 'The Contractarian Tradition in International Ethics', 195-6. 
" 'The Right to Intervene', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64 (1985), 102-3. 
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mine precisely what the nature of such a contract is'"'^, that is, what the 'proper ingredi-
ents'^'' are. Yet still, despite its diversity, social contract theorists do share some com-
mon ground, namely, 'that no one has rightful political authority and no one is morally 
obliged to yield political obedience except in consequence of a social contract.'^^ This 
illustrates the two major components the involved agents are primarily contracting 
about: firstly, about the legitimation of coercive political power, that is, turning political 
power into political authority; and, secondly, about the nature and origins of morality. 
These two constituents are solidly interrelated insofar as 'the state exists to enforce the 
most important rules necessary for social living, while morality consists in the whole set 
of rules that enhance social living.'''^ The answer to social contract theories' ever pre-
sent underlying question, how governments can justly have and exercise coercive power 
over free individuals, is that they exclusively 'derive their just powers from the consent 
of the governed.'"'^ Social contract theories are so promising as source for legitimacy 
criteria since they recognize 'that morality is deeply implicated in the very notion of 
agreement, and vice versa, so that whether an action is right or wrong must depend on 
whether the act accords with or violates principles that are, or would be, the object of a 
suitable agreement between equals.'''* At this point, an important distinction between 
contractarians and contractualists must be introduced: both understand the 'principles of 
right conduct as the object of a rational agreement'; however, contractarians, such as 
HOBBES and GAUTHIER , see moral principles as a result of 'rationally self-interested 
bargaining', whereas, contractualists, such as ROUSSEAU, KANT , and RAWLS assume 
'the relevant agreement as governed by a moral ideal of equal respect, one that would be 
inconsistent, indeed, with bargaining over fundamental terms of association in the way 
contractarianism proposes.'^' 
" V I C E N T E MEDINA, Social Contract Theories: Political Obligation or Anarchy? (Savage: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1990), 5. 
HARRO HOPFL AND M A R T Y N P. THOMPSON, 'The History of Contract as a Motif in Political Thought', 
American Historical Review, Vol. 84 (1979), 922. 
P. F. B R O W N S E Y , 'Hume and the Social Contract', The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 28 (1978), 132. 
R A C H E L S , The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 128 [italics omitted]. 
" K. G R E E N A W A L T , 'Promissory Obligation: The Theme of Social Contract', in R A Z (ed.), Authority, 
269. 
" STEPHEN D A R W A L L , 'Introduction', in his (ed.) Contractarianism/Contractualism (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2003), 1. 
" C f IBID., citations on p. 4. 
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Considering that legitimacy is a moral concept; that it must be studied normatively; and 
that international legitimacy can only have its place in normative international society 
theory, the task of this section was to argue that legitimacy criteria must be sought in 
social contract theory. It is the idea of a contract between free and equals which is not 
only already well-established in IR, but also in the domestic context; in addition, the 
social contract does also represent the proper source for morality. Now, the social con-
tract must be investigated more thoroughly, focussing on its ideal-types and history. 
2.2 The Social Contract investigated: ideal-types and history 
Beginning with the ideal-types'*", I start with the distinction between 'contract of soci-
ety' and 'contract of government'; turn then to the three sub-categories 'original con-
tract', 'implicit contract', and 'hypothetical contract', thereby taking into account the 
major lines of criticism; and finish the section by briefly exploring the historical devel-
opment of social contract theory. This provides the necessary background for the selec-
tion of HOBBES, ROUSSEAU, KANT , and RAWLS , and the examination of their 'con-
tracts'. 
The central question for social contract theorists of 'how governments can justly have 
and exercise coercive power over free individuals' implies that a society must exist 
which is to be governed. This explains why two contracts, the 'contract of society' and 
the 'contract of government', are required: 'the first to bring the state into existence, the 
second to regulate its government.''" The former is a 'contract of each with all' that 
provides the origin and foundation of a society; in order to create 'a State in the sense of 
a political society'"* ,^ individuals, irrespective of their motivations, enter into a contrac-
tual agreement with each other to leave a pre-societal state of nature - irrespective 
whether this be, for instance, a HoBBESian war of all against all or a LoCKEian 'perfect 
freedom'''^. This is where the name 'contract of society' (or 'social contract proper'. 
For the following cf. G O U G H , The Social Contract... ; K A R L G R A F B A L L E S T R E M , 'Vertragstheoretische 
Ansatze in der Politischen Philosophic', Zeitschrift fur Politik, Vol. 30 (1983); BROWNSEY, 'Hume 
and the Social Contract'; LESSNOFF, Social Contract; MEDINA, Social Contract Theories...; HENNING 
OTTMANN, 'Politik und Vertrag. Bine Kritik der modemen Vertragstheorien', Zeitschrift fur Politik, 
Vol. 33 (1986); PATRICK R I L E Y , Will and Political Legitimacy (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1982); 
RITCHIE, 'Contributions to the History of the Social Contract Theory'. 
GOUGH, The Social Contract..., 3. 
E R N E S T B A R K E R ' S note on p. 48 in O T T O G I E R K E , Natural Law and the Theory of Society: 1500 to 
1800 {\9\3), translated by E R N E S T B A R K E R (Cambridge: C U P , 1950) for both citations. 
Second Treatise, § 4. 
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Gesellschaftsvertrag, pacte d'assocation, pactum sociale) derives from; in K A N T ' S 
words, a contract 'by which a large group of men unites to form a society'''''. The other, 
second ideal type contract, the 'contract of government' (or 'contract of submission', 
'contract of rulership', Herrschaftsvertrag, pacte de gouvernement, pactum subjec-
tionis), is a contract made not between 'each with all ' but between the ruler and the 
ruled; it 'creates a State in the sense of a government.'''^ It builds on the foundation the 
first one has laid down; or better: might have laid down, since these two contracts are 
'logically independent. Neither contract implies or presupposes the other'"*. A society 
must exist to make a 'contract of government' possible, but this society does not neces-
sarily have to be founded by a 'contract of society'. However, PUFENDORF , as a picture 
perfect example, demands the consecutive use of the two contracts: in order 'to establish 
a new state, it is necessary for the future citizens, as the first step, to enter into an 
agreement [.. .] that they are desirous of entering into a single and perpetual group', and 
he continues, that, in a second step, 'after such a group [. . .] has been formed by the pact 
mentioned, it is yet ftxrther necessary for a decree to be passed upon the form of gov-
ernment that shall be introduced [...and this will be done] by [.. .] agreement'.''^ 
Confusingly, the term social contract is often used when speaking of either the 'contract 
of society', or the 'contract of government'; this distinction is as important as it is inter-
esting since the 'contract of government', as logically postQv'xox as it is, appeared his-
torically earlier, i.e. in the middle ages, than the 'contract of society'.''* In addition, irre-
spective of its label - i.e. covenant, pact, compact, ybec/w5, pactum, or pactio - the gen-
eral idea is the same; these terms can, to the regret of many critics, be regarded as being 
synonymous.''^ Yet, a social contract confers legitimacy to the state in the two senses 
just mentioned only i f all individuals of this 'state' as free and equals either have con-
sented to it, or are repeatedly consenting to it, or could and would consent to it; this cor-
responds to the ideas of an 'original contract', 'implicit contract', and 'hypothetical con-
tract', respectively. 
'"' 'On the Common Saying: "This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'" (1793), in 
his Political Writings, edited by H A N S R E I S S , part I I , 73; hereafter: On the Common Saying.... 
B A R K E R ' S note on p. 48 in G I E R K E , Natural Law and the Theory of Society: 1500 to 1800. 
MEDINA, Social Contract Theories..., 6. 
DeJure Naturae et Gentium, bk. Vll.ii.7. 
Cf. H O P F L AND THOMPSON, 'The History of Contract as a Motif in Political Thought', 924; GOUGH, 
The Social Contract..., 2-3. 
C f IBID. , 4-6; R J T C H I E , 'Contributions to the History of the Social Contract Theory', 665. 
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The main characteristic of the 'original contract' (or Urvertrag, contractus origimrius) 
is its unambiguous requirement of the contractors' explicit consent to it. They must 
have consented to it; hence, it is often labelled 'explicit contract'. Probably the most-
cited and best example of an 'original contract' is the Mayflower Compact the Pilgrims 
entered into on their way to Massachusetts in 1620: 'We do solemnly and mutually, in 
the presence of God and of one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a 
civil body politic.'^" And for L O C K E , it is this 'original compact, whereby he [man] with 
others incorporates into one society'; it is 'by consenting with others to make one Body 
Politick under one Government' that creates and legitimizes a state; and he continues, 
trying to underline the practical relevance, that one 'must shew a strange inclination to 
deny evident matter of fact [.. .] that the beginning of Rome and Venice were by the 
uniting together of several Men fi-ee and independent one of another, amongst whom 
there was no natural Superiority or Subjection.'^' 
There were, and still are, people having such 'strange inclinations' since the idea of an 
'original contract' faces at least three lines of criticism; sure of the triumph over the 
'original contract', BENTHAM writes that 'this chimera had been effectually demolished 
by Mr. HuME.'^^ The first problem lies in the fact that the mere existence of such con-
tracts cannot be proven since they were, as HUME remarks, not 'written on parchment, 
nor yet on leaves or barks of trees.'^ ^ A second strand of criticism, closely connected to 
and similarly history-related as the first one, contests that states have their origins in 
contracts; more the contrary is the case: 'Almost all the governments, which exist at 
present, or of which there remains any record in story, have been founded originally, 
either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent, or vol-
untary subjection of the people.'^'' And even i f it were so that states evidently are 
founded on a contract - for HUME an 'idea far beyond the comprehension of savages' -
the 'original contract' still cannot solve its third, main dilemma, also seen by L O C K E 
himself and BENTHAM : supposing 'the consent of the fathers to bind the children' .For 
the critics, an 'original contract' must head into complete failure: either because of its 
GOUGH, The Social Contract..., 2. 
" Second Treatise, §§ 97, 102 [italics omitted]. 
" Fragment on Government, chap, l.xxxvi. 
" Of the Original Contract, 445. 
IBID., 447. 
IBID., 445, 447; Cf. Second Treatise, § 116; Fragment on Government, chap. I.xlvii. 
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historical irrelevance; or because, even i f such a contract was to exist, it stumbles over 
the question whether future generations would be bound by it. 
Struggling not to get caught in the traps laying ahead of the 'original contract', the con-
struction of the 'implicit contract' leaves the demand for an explicit, one-time consent 
aside, and makes the legitimacy of a state dependent on the repeated consent; more gen-
erally: dependent on the existence of the possibility to give it or withhold it for any in-
dividual within this territory. This type of contract is primarily based on the idea of, 
what L O C K E calls, 'tacit Consent', in contrast to 'express Consent' - a fairly common 
distinction that follows HOBBES'S assertion that 'Signes of Contract, are either Expresse 
or by Inference.LOCKE'S tacit consent is to a certain extent comparable to 
ROUSSEAU'S 'universal silence'", and it assumes that consent for obedience to any gov-
ernment's jurisdiction is given by 'every Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, 
of any part of the Dominions of any Government [ . . . ] during such Enjoyment'; whether 
it be 'possessing land' or 'lodging for a week' or 'travelling on a highway' or, impor-
tantly, just the 'very being on the territory', as long as one does not make use of his 
'liberty to go', one is bound to submission, and repeated consent, hence, legitimacy, is 
inferred.^* 
Although the 'liberty to go', i.e. the right to emigrate^^, ought neither to be treated with 
disdain nor to be underestimated, HUME, quite rightly, ridicules the idea that legitimacy 
could solely depend on whether one 'goes' or not: 'Can we seriously say', he asks, 'that 
a poor peasant or artizan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no for-
eign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small wages which he ac-
quires?' And, appropriately, against this backgroimd, HUME , not denying his scorn and 
derision, continues that '[w]e may as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, 
freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while 
asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her.'^° The much 
weightier problem, probably the biggest, is the 'implicit contract's' logical circularity. 
This revolves, especially, around the idea of tacit consent, but also around the 'right to 
Second Treatise, § 119; Leviathan, chap. xiv. 
" Contrat Social, hk. Il.i. 
Second Treatise, § 119-122 
59 
60 
Cf. also PUFENDORF, that 'in such a pact the individuals usually reserve to themselves the privilege of 
emigration.' DeJure Naturae et Gentium, bk. VII.ii.7. 
Of the Original Contract, both citations on p. 451. 
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emigrate': it should be indubitable that only in free and open societies consent can be 
inferred from 'universal silence'. Independent from the puzzling question whether 'uni-
versal silence' could stand for either tacit consent or tacit dissent, the possibility to ex-
press consent or dissent presupposes the existence of a more or less open society with 
all the social institutions that guarantee the right to do so or the 'right to emigrate' i f one 
dissents. This is the criticism that the 'implicit contract' (and all others, too) is flawed: 
either because it mistakenly assumes the existence of certain rights and 'contracts' 
without having the required social institutions and legal systems; or because, according 
to H E G E L ^ ' , it presupposes what it is about to create - hence, a logical circularity. 
Where the 'original contract' fails on historical grounds, and where the 'implicit con-
tract' is unpersuasive for practical reasons and completely circular in its argument, it is 
left to the 'hypothetical contract' to overcome these dilemmas; by detaching the contract 
from reality, it makes the legitimacy of a state dependent on the consent that could and 
would be given; the contract becomes an as-if-construction. Even though BENTHAM 
believes that the 'indestructible prerogatives of mankind have no need to be supported 
upon the sandy foundation of a fiction'- fictional, hypothetical elements shine 
through in, for instance, HoBBES, PUFENDORF , and ROUSSEAU^^ it is K A N T who ex-
plicitly states and accepts the fictional, and only fictional character of the social con-
tract. He says that 'we need by no means assume that this contract [...] actually exists as 
a fact, for it cannot possibly be so. [. . .] It is in fact merely an idea of reason, which 
nonetheless has undoubted practical reality'; for K A N T the social contract 'can oblige 
every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by 
the united wi l l of a whole nation, and to regard each subject [. . .] as if he had consented 
within the general wil l . '^" It seemed that the days of this as-if-contract, the 'sandy foun-
dation', were numbered; it seemed that the 'season of Fiction is now over'^^; but 
BENTHAM was wrong: this was proved not only by KANT'S idea of reason, roughly two 
*' C f G E O R G W . F . H E G E L , 'Uber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, seine Stelle 
in der praktischen Philosophic und sein Verhaltnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften', in his 
Werke H: Jenaer Schriften 1801-1807 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 447. 
Fragment on Government, chap. I.xxxvi. 
" Cf. G O U G H , The Social Contract..., 107, 154; P U F E N D O R F , De Jure Naturae et Gentium, bk. ll.ii.4. 
" On the Common Saying..., part II, 79 [italics added]; cf also Perpetual Peace, 99. 
" Fragment on Government, chap. I.xxxvii. 
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decades later, but also by RAWLS'S idea of an 'original position' roughly two centuries 
later. 
One argument that applies negatively to all types of the social contract operates on the 
very nature of what a contract is: it is the fact that contracts are the product of 'the par-
ties' purely arbitrary will '**. For H E G E L , it is almost absurd that one 'reduces the union 
of individuals in the state to a contract and therefore to something based on their arbi-
trary wills'; the 'intrusion' of a contractual relationship between individuals and the 
state is erroneous; it is erroneous to 'have transferred the characteristics of private prop-
erty into a sphere of a quite different and higher nature', the state.*^ This is the argument 
that undoubtedly follows to a certain extent B U R K E , namely, that the state is much more 
'than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some 
other such low concern' and must not 'be dissolved by the fancy of the parties'; it is of a 
different and higher quality: it is a partnership - a partnership in 'all science', in 'all 
art', in 'every virtue', and in 'all perfection', a partnership 'not only between those who 
are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to 
be bom.'** 
The accusation of the contract's arbitrariness shines through best in the 'hypothetical 
contract'. Here it all depends on the fijndamental assumptions about anthropology and 
the state of nature: whether one assumes (or believes in) the ARiSTOTLEian zoon 
politikon, or in the HOBBESian 'wo l f , or in the RousSEAUian 'noble savage', or in the 
KANTian animale rationabile, or in the RAWLSian fairness and rationality of human 
beings; whether one assumes the state of nature as being a 'State of Peace, Good Will , 
Mutual Assistance, and Preservation' or as being a 'State of Enmity, Malice, Violence, 
and Mutual Destruction'*^, it is virtually possible to legitimize anything, any time, any 
place. Depending on the seed, the harvest ranges from a HOBBESian power of the sword 
state to a RAWLSian liberal welfare state. While still being served as the fillet from the 
menu of many contract theorists, for the critics the 'hypothetical contract' has a bad 
taste; or better, it has no taste at all and it never had one, because it is not being served 
at all; it is only said, in each case, to be good. The contract, and everything it entails, is 
66 H E G E L , Philosophy of Right, § 75. 
" Cf. IBID. , § 75 and part Ill.iii, citations from §§ 75, 258. 
Reflections on the Revolution in France..., 194-5. 
Second Treatise, § 19, for both citations. 
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a fiction; it is hypothetical and it, therefore, fails all along the line: ' JVhat is rational is 
actual and what is actual is rational.'^^ So, i f at all - for H E G E L definitely not - in order 
to confer real legitimacy to a real state it needs real people having real wills with real 
consent in a real contract. But a real contract, then, is exactly the kind of contract where 
it has all started from, namely fi-om the 'original contract'. And this is a vicious circle 
par excellence. 
Yet still, despite being in one way or the other so unhistorical, almost not provable, 
highly illogical, completely circular, fully fictional, and dangerously arbitrary, the social 
contract tradition, nevertheless, can claim deep roots. The philosophical theory of the 
social contract, that is so closely associated with modernity, 'had already been antici-
pated by the Greek Sophists' and, more generally, by Greek political thought.^' Con-
tractual thinking, both societal and governmental, surfaces, for instance, with 
LYCROPHON and his assertion that law simply arises out of a contract; and with 
GLAUCON and his view that it is in the interest of all, especially of the weaker, to enter 
into a law-creating contractual agreement in order to escape the injustices in the state of 
nature.'^ However, the Greek origin is probably best represented in SOCRATES'S dia-
logue with CRITO : being imprisoned and facing the cup of hemlock, SOCRATES , reject-
ing his friend's help for fleeing prison, indicates what the laws of the city were to tell 
him: 'Consider, Socrates, i f we are speaking truly, that in your present attempt you are 
going to do us a wrong. For, having brought you into the world, and nurtured and edu-
cated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good which we had to 
give, we further proclaim to any Athenian by the liberty which we allow him, that i f he 
does not like us, the laws, when he has become of age and has seen the ways of the city, 
and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him.' 
And the laws continue: 'But he who has experience of the manner in which we order 
justice and administer the state, and still remains, has by so doing entered into an im-
™ H E G E L , Philosophy of Right, Preface, 10. 
" Cf. GouGH, The Social Contract..., chapter 11; and, RITCHIE, 'Contributions to the History of the Social 
Contract Theory', citation on p. 656. 
" Cf. E R N E S T B A R K E R , Greek Political Theory: Plato and his predecessors (London: Methuen, 1918), 
159; PLATO, Republic, translated by ROBIN W A T E R F I E L D (Oxford: OUP, 1998), 359a. 
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plied contract that he will do as we command him.'''^ The laws' argument mirrors ex-
actly L O C K E ' S tacit consent. 
When turning to the middle ages, one must quasi-stumble over MANEGOLD OF 
LAUTENBACH who explicitly expresses, wherein the social contract theories real roots 
lie, namely, ' in the popular consciousness of medieval society.'^'' Although he was not 
the only one in his days, roughly the eleventh century, writing about contractual rela-
tionships with regard to the state, MANEGOLD was the first 'to offer a general contrac-
tual theory of political authority'^^ His thoughts must be (but must not only be) seen in 
the context of the Investiture Contest, where he, a priest from Lautenbach in Alsatia, 
unsurprisingly, stood up against the Emperor, Henry IV, in support of the Pope, Greg-
ory VI I . MANEGOLD'S metaphor of the swineherd summarizes his views about the rela-
tionship between the ruler and the ruled; he is concerned with a 'contract of govern-
ment': ' I f a man has given his swine for a suitable wage into the charge of a swineherd, 
who, in place of keeping them safe, steals, slays, or loses them, he wil l refuse to pay the 
wage, and wil l dismiss him from his service.' This means, that for the ruled the duty to 
submission ends exactly there, where an Emperor, elected by them via a contract, begins 
to act like a tyrant destroying justice and peace .MANEGOLD was an 'innovator' as for 
him monarchy was 'elective and conditional, and erected on that basis a definitive the-
ory of popular sovereignty. 
As close as the Greek antique is associated with GLAUCON and SOCRATES ' s death, and 
the middle ages is with MANEGOLD , the Reformation period is with ALTHUSIUS , 'the 
greatest of the Calvinist contract theorists' . Although there is a thick bond between 
Calvinism and contract theory, it would be wrong to assume that it was only tied to Cal-
vinist thinkers; in fact, quite the opposite is true. But Calvinism set the ground for the 
social contract's success in the subsequent seventeenth and eighteenth century. It is 
ALTHUSIUS who enjoys 'epoch-making importance in the history of political thought. 
" PLATO, 'Crito', in his The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I, 4'*' edition, edited by B. J O W E T T (Oxford: OUP, 
1953), 51c. 
R I T C H I E , 'Contributions to the History of the Social Contract Theory', 656. 
" L E S S N O F F , Social Contract, 12. 
C f R.W. C A R L Y L E AND A.J. C A R L Y L E , A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, Vol. Ill 
(London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1915), 160-9, citation on pp. 166-7. 
" GOUGH, The Social Contract..., 29. 
^' L E S S N O F F , Social Contract, 35. 
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and of the social contract in particular'; in addition, he is the one who first 'created a 
real theory of the social contract'.'' He employs not only the 'contract of government', 
but also the 'contract of society'. Similarly to PUFENDORF roughly 50 years later, the 
latter contract is used to set up the society, while the former is used to set up the gov-
ernment governing this society. For ALTHUSIUS a civil society is an 'association of 
lesser associations'^^: having five different associations - i.e. the family, the fellowship, 
the local community, the province, and the state - each association must contract into 
the next higher association until the state is finally created. Any kind of human associa-
tion follows, for ALTHUSIUS , 'the principle of contract, tacit or expressed, as the funda-
mental juridical basis'*' in order to contract out 'whatever is useftil and necessary for 
the harmonious exercise of social life.'*^ With ALTHUSIUS it ends now, but of course, 
not for the social contract. Roughly half a century later its heyday begins with the writ-
ings of HOBOES, PUFENDORF, BENEDICT DE SPINOZA" , and L O C K E , and, then, in the 
eighteenth century, reaching its peak with RoussEAU, JOHANN G . FICHTE*' ' , and KANT, 
who, as GOUGH said in 1936, 'brings us within sight of the end of the history of the con-
tract theory' - indeed, a rather premature statement in the light of the success of the 
theories of a group with whom this chapter has started: the 'new contractarians'. 
2.3 The Social Contracts selected: Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls 
The preceding section, with its investigation into the ideal-types, crificisms, and history 
of the social contract, has shown that even when focussing on only this particular tradi-
tion, the quest for the proper source for legitimacy criteria is still problematic: there are 
too many social contract theories available to choose from. Necessarily, a selection must 
be made. Before diving into the contracts of HOBBES, ROUSSEAU, KANT , and RAWLS , it 
is now time not only to face the question: Why them?, but also Why them schemed as 
pessimists and optimists? HoBBES and ROUSSEAU are pessimists because they lack an 
" GOUGH, The Social Contract..., both citations on p. 72; cf also H O P F L AND THOMPSON, 'The History of 
Contract as a Motif in Political Thought', 935. 
' " I B I D . , 935. 
" GOUGH, The Social Contract..., 72. 
Politica Methodice Digest a..., 12. 
83 
See 'Theologico-Political Treatise' (1670) and ' A Political Treatise' (1677) , in his The Chief Works of 
Benedict de Spinoza, Vol. 1, translated by R. H . M . E L W E S (New York: Dover, 1951). 
84 
See The Science of Rights (1796), translated by A . E . K R O E G E R (London: Routledge, 1970). 
" The Social Contract..., 173. 
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international social contract in their contract theory. And what they also lack is the idea 
of an international society. For them legitimacy remains in the domestic sphere. K A N T 
and RAWLS are optimists because they do employ a social contract on the international 
level. They operate within the framework of an international society and for them le-
gitimacy is of greatest importance beyond borders. Trying to derive legitimacy criteria 
fi-om them seems promising since the social contract is an essentially modem phenome-
non. And HoBBES, ROUSSEAU, K A N T , and R A W L S are thoroughly modem as well. Even 
more importantly, all of them are well-established figures in I R . 
The social contract has its roots in ancient Greece, but its glory days in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century. It certainly is an idea closely associated with modernity. How-
ever, and the following analogously holds true for the social contract tradition, 
'[njothing is more characteristic of modernity than the immense variety and the fre-
quency of radical change within it ' , hence, STRAUSS speaks of 'three waves of moder-
nity'.** These three waves are more than a labelling instrument for justifying the selec-
tion of the four theorists; instead, they have significant implications both for social con-
tract theory and hence for the meaning of legitimacy. 
HOBBES is the important figure of the first wave. It was he who - what was done before 
him by NiccoLO MACHIAVELLI*^ - 'rejected all earlier political philosophy as funda-
mentally insufficient and even unsound'; this is an attitude archetypical for the first 
wave, and also for the project of modernity itself which implies 'not to hope for life in 
heaven but to establish heaven on earth by purely human means'; or put differently: 
'Modemity started from the dissatisfaction v^ dth the gulf between the is and the ought, 
the actual and the ideal'. By putting moral and political philosophy on scientific foun-
dations (more geometrico), criticising the classic's Utopias, HOBBES, self-declaredly, 
was the first real and true political philosopher*'. He provided philosophically and po-
litically the most impressive and innovative social contract theory'^ in his Leviathan, 
86 
See STRAUSS, 'The Three Waves of Modernity', citation on p. 83. 
" See, e.g.. The Prince (1532), edited by Q u E N T i N SKINNER AND R U S S E L L P R I C E (Cambridge: CUP, 
1988). 
STRAUSS, 'The Three Waves of Modernity', citations on pp. 83-4, 82, 91 [italics added]. 
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'one of the great books of the world' ' ' . (T)his 'masterpiece of English political 
thought''^, made him for some the first true liberal, for others the greatest apostle of 
absolutism. Whether these are true or false, fair or unfair descriptions of a man who 
'always stood on his own legs', who 'possessed boundless self-confidence' and an ' in-
tellect of extraordinary power, sharp as a razor', one thing is certain: the 'Leviathan was 
burned at Oxford in 1683, but it proved impossible to put out the flame.'^^ And this 
flame is still flickering, probably more intense than ever before. The 'new contractarian' 
BUCHANAN draws heavily on HOBBES , and HOBBEsian language, such as homo homini 
lupus or bellum omnium contra omnes, is often spoken in IR; this combined with the 
way of thinking exemplary for the first wave of modernity, namely, 'to bring the ought 
nearer to the is by lowering the ought''^'*, makes it not hard to see why 'Hobbes has now 
become the rival of Machiavelli in lending his name to a distinct tradition of thought''^ 
in IR, that is, realism. 
ROUSSEAU is no less modem, nor less prominent in IR; but a much more fascinating 
figure. He inaugurates the second wave of modernity. It was he who 'changed the moral 
climate of the west as profoundly as Machiavelli', and, instead of lowering the ought, 
showed 'how the gulf between the is and the ought can be overcome'; namely, by his 
concept of the volonte generate - the general will that cannot err.'*^ But one can err 
about ROUSSEAU , the dreamer of Geneva, the 'contradictory thinker''^, the ' proto-
totalitarian'^*, the apostle of Jacobinism, the apostle of freedom^', the 'deepest of the 
R e a l i s t s ' t h e neo-realist'°', the realist and rationalist and revolutionist'"^, the 'uto-
" G . P. G O O C H , Hobbes (London: Humphrey Milford, 1939), 17. 
Editor's introduction to Leviathan, ix. 
" GooCH, Hobbes, citations on pp. 6, 1,40. 
STRAUSS, 'The Three Waves of Modernity', 91. 
DAVID BOUCHER, Political Theories of International Relations (Oxford: OUP, 1998), 145. 
^ STRAUSS, 'The Three Waves of Modernity', 89 [italics added], 91. 
" C A R R , The Twenty Years'Crisis. 1919-1939, 176. 
BOUCHER, Political Theories of International Relations, 291. 
C f MEDINA, Social Contract Theories..., ATi. 
S T A N L E Y HOFFMANN AND DAVID P. F I D L E R (eds.), Rousseau on International Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), Ixxvii. 
Cf. W A L T Z , Man, the State and War..., chap. vi. 
'"^  C f MARTIN WIGHT, International Theory: The Three Traditions, edited by G A B R I E L E WIGHT and 
BRIAN PORTER (London: Leicester University Press, 1994), chaps. 1,12. 
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plan', the 'most famous of [all] social contract t heo r i s t s 'One can easily err about the 
declared disciple of HoBBEs'"'', a label that probably would have hurt ROUSSEAU most 
since he speaks of 'the horrible system of Hobbes', of 'his absurd doctrine', of 'the error 
of Hobbes and of the philosophers [...] to conftise natural man with the men they have 
before their eyes' '°^; they fail to see what natural man in the state of nature really is: not 
a wolf but a noble savage. Indeed, ROUSSEAU'S 'ambiguity that surrounds many of his 
most important doctrines''"^ invites one to err, to get lost in him. However, among all 
the certain uncertainties about him, with regard to international relations, 'it is hard to 
see Rousseau as an o p t i m i s t . ' H O B B E S and ROUSSEAU are put under the pessimist's 
umbrella. 
I leave it open whether KANT , the great admirer of ROUSSEAU , is the 'greatest of all 
theorists of international relations''"*. But it is quite clear that he - like HOBBES , but on 
a very different side - acts as a father-figure in I R , namely, for the 'Kantian or univer-
salist tradition''"^ or the 'Revolutionists'"", for the 'cosmopolitans'"', and for 'Utopi-
ans'"^. And as much as he admired ROUSSEAU, he did oppose HOBBES whose proposi-
tions K A N T found 'quite terrifying.'"-' KANT , like ROUSSEAU , belongs to the second 
wave of modernity and what makes him, among many other things, so interesting, is 
that his social contract is 'for the first time cleariy and explicitly [...] not an actual 
event, but a regulatory ideal'"'*, i.e., an idea of reason. Additionally, he brings into be-
ing a contractual theory of international society in his Perpetual Peace. K A N T is also the 
'"^  LESSNOFF, Social Contract, 74. 
C f G E O R G J E L L I N E K , 'Die Politik des Absolutismus und die des Radikalismus. (Hobbes und Rous-
seau.)', in his Ausgewdhlte Schriften und Reden, Vol. II (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1970), 13. 
'The State of War' (c. 1755-6), (hereafter: State of War) in his The Social Contract and other later 
political writings, citations on pp. 163-4. 
BOUCHER, Political Theories of International Relations, 291. 
CHRIS BROWN, T E R R Y NARDIN AND NICHOLAS R E N G G E R (eds.), international Relations in Political 
Thought (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 386. 
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apostle for the second image view"^ and for liberalism: 'The republican constitution 
[...] offers a prospect of attaining the desired result, i.e. a perpetual peace'"*, he says. 
This democratic peace theory shines through, for instance, in FUKUYAMA when he 
speaks of the 'fundamentally un-warlike character of liberal societies'"^ and, similarly 
prominent, also in RAWLS when he says that 'when liberal peoples do go to war, it is 
only with unsatisfied societies, or outlaw states'"*. 
As the first wave of modernity is associated with HoBBES, and as the second wave is 
associated with RoussEAU and KANT , the third wave of modernity is with FRIEDRICH 
NIETZSCHE ; he has his entry later when defending legitimacy against the post-modem 
challenge. RAWLS , definitely, belongs to the second wave and his indebtedness to KANT 
is made obvious when he introduces his Law of Peoples, his contractual theory of inter-
national society, with the remark that its 'basic idea is to follow K A N T ' ; when he be-
lieves ' K A N T ' S hypothesis of a foedus pacificum' to be 'correct' and thinks it 'under-
writes the Law of Peoples as a realistic Utopia.'"' It is RAWLS , the chief 'new contrac-
tarian', who is mainly responsible for the renaissance and reawakening of social con-
tract theories. In contrast to HOBBES and ROUSSEAU , the 'contracts' of K A N T and 
RAWLS , then, will be more closely examined under the label optimists. 
In order to verify this taxonomy of pessimists and optimists, and to underpin my argu-
ment that K A N T is the most promising source for legitimacy criteria in IR, all four social 
contract theorists are approached similarly. Each first sub-section deals with, so to 
speak, the domestic social contract and focuses on its cmcial ground premises, espe-
cially anthropology; its stmcture follows the 'argumentative t r i a d ' s o significant for 
seventeenth and eighteenth century social contract theory, arguing from the state of na-
ture via the social contract to political society. Each second sub-section deals with the 
social contract theory's implication for the international sphere and, in KANT'S and 
RAWLS'S case, with the intemational social contract. 
C f W A L T Z , Man, the State and War..., chap. iv. 
Perpetual Peace, 100. 
' The End of History and the last Man, 262. 
^^"^ Law of Peoples, §5 .2 . 
IBID., Introduction, § 5.4. 
W O L F G A N G KERSTING, 'Kant's Concept of the State', in HOWARD W I L L I A M S (ed.). Essays on Kanfs 
Political Philosophy (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1992), 144. 
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Before beginning to explore into the 'contracts', this is an ideal place to sum up the ar-
gument thus far: legitimacy is powerful and it must have its place in I R ; it needs to be 
studied normatively and its moral nature must be properly respected; within I R theory 
such an endeavour is only possible for normative international society theorists; only 
they are able to become involved with moral and political philosophy, and in particular 
with social contract theory; legitimacy criteria must be sought in this tradition; since 
social contract theory is as complex and diverse as legitimacy, and there is not the social 
contract, I argued in this section for seeking the criteria in HOBBES, ROUSSEAU, KANT, 
and RAWLS - the four theorists who are divided into two groups, pessimists versus op-
timists. 
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3. The Pessimists: Legitimacy limited, in an international system 
3.1 Hobbes - Leviathan makes peace, Leviathan perpetuates war 
3.1.1 Wolves, the state of war, and the 'mother of Peace' 
HOBBES is anything but a suitable source for legitimacy criteria. Surely, he is deeply 
modem, a well-known figure in both political philosophy and IR, and a distinguished 
social contract theorist; but to him, international relations simply is a state of war - and 
will ever be. To derive legitimacy criteria from his social contract theory only makes 
sense i f one wants to legitimize the right of the stronger; it certainly makes no sense 
when understanding legitimacy as set out thus far, namely, as a moral concept for an 
intemational society. He is a pessimist: legitimacy is only a question within the domes-
tic, not in the intemational sphere - hence, legitimacy limited. This section illustrates 
the role of the social contract and legitimacy domestically, and why and how the Levia-
than makes peace; the next section shows why this Leviathan perpetuates war interna-
tionally. 
HOBBES'S political philosophy - mainly presented in his three works De Corpore Poli-
tico, or The Elements of Law, De Give, and Leviathan^ - invites the reader to many in-
terpretations. In general, HOBBES'S reception in the twentieth century can be seen as 
two-fold: one strand, comprising of the 'new contractarians', follows (some more, some 
less) the liberal elements of his contract theory; the other strand, represented for in-
stance by C A R L SCHMITT^, remains faithful to HOBBES'S anti-liberal thoughts. Addition-
ally, HOBBES 'is variously seen as a foremnner of both utilitarianism and contractarian-
ism.'^ In IR there seems to exist only one interpretation: it essentially emerges from 
HOBBES'S pessimistic assertion that the nature of the 'relations between common-
wealths' is equal to 'Man is a wolf to Man.''* It may not be wrong to speak of a clear-cut 
and also powerful 'HOBBEsian tradition' in IR which regards HOBBES as its 'spiritual 
' C f L A U R E N C E BERNS, 'Thomas Hobbes', in L E O STRAUSS AND JOSEPH C R O P S E Y (eds.). History of Po-
litical Philosophy, 3"* edition (Chicago: CUP, 1987); see HOBBES's 'De Corpore Politico, or the Ele-
ments of Law'(1640), in his The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. IV, hereafter: De Corpore 
Politico; his On the Citizen (1642/51), edited by RICHARD T U C K (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), hereafter: 
De Cive; and his Leviathan. 
^ See his The Leviathan in the state theory of Thomas Hobbes: meaning and failure of a political symbol 
(1938), translated by G E O R G E SCHWAB AND E R N A HILFSTEIN (London: Greenwood, 1996). 
' See R U S S E L L HARDIN, 'Hobbesian Political Order', Political Theory, Vol. 19 (1991), citation on p. 156. 
" De Cive, Epistle dedicatory. 
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father'^ and that IR sees him as 'the quintessential realist'^. However, when encounter-
ing HOBBES, one faces at least two particular problems. Firstly, HOBBES himself has not 
written extensively on international relations; indeed, 'what he has to say about relations 
among states does not occupy more than a small cupboard.'^ Hence, it is quite surpris-
ing how HOBBES has managed to exert such a huge influence within IR theory. The sec-
ond problem is that 'the reading of Hobbes as the supreme realist of (at least) interna-
tional political theory rests on a handful of his most striking phrases arbitrarily lifted out 
of a very carefully crafted and interdependent whole .The first problem is a given fact, 
the second may be overcome by considering the 'whole'. Here, a good starting point is 
the criticism some of HoBBES's contemporaries^ delivered to the 'Monster of Malmes-
bury 'namely , that he is 'a man who questions basic assumptions'". 
HOBBES ' s radical break with the past, so archetypical for the first wave of modernity, 
shines through both in his geometrical method, and in his questioning of ARiSTOTLEian 
thinking. The two major influences on H O B B E S ' S political philosophy were the English 
Civil War'^, and the natural science revolution taking place on the Continent and, to 
HOBBES , exemplified by G A L I L E O . ' ' ' In saying that 'what moral Philosophers have writ-
ten up to now has contributed nothing to the knowledge of truth', he rejects their mere 
'rhetorical discourse';''* Scholastic philosophers, and especially ARISTOTLE, produced 
not more than 'hasty and superficial opinions' and were never able to 'end the war of 
the sword and the war of the pens';'^ therefore, HOBBES thought to find truth, certainty, 
* D O Y N E D A W S O N , 'The Origins of War: Biological and Anthropological Theories', History and Theory, 
Vol. 25 0996), 4. 
^ D O N A L D W . H A N S O N , 'Thomas Hobbes's "highway to peace'", International Organization, Vol. 38 
(1984), 329. 
' H E D L E Y B U L L , 'Hobbes and the International Anarchy', 5oc/a/ Research, Vol. 48 (1981), 717-8. 
' H A N S O N , 'Thomas Hobbes's "highway to peace'", 332. 
' For contemporary criticism (17''' century) on H O B B E S see, e.g., J O H N B O W L E , Hobbes and his Critics 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1951); S A M U E L I. MlNTZ, The Hunting of Leviathan (Cambridge: CUP, 
1962). 
M l N T Z , The Hunting of Leviathan, v i i . 
" B O W L E , Hobbes and his Critics, 13 [italics added]. 
See H O B B E S ' S 'Behemoth: the History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England' (1679), in his The 
English H^orks of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. VI. 
Cf. TOM S O R E L L , Hobbes (London: Routledge, 1986), 1. 
De Cive, Preface to the Readers. 
" I B I D . , Epistle dedicatory. 
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and exactness in geometry, the 'Mother of all Naturall Science'.'^ Arguing that 'a thing 
is best known from its constituents' - be it an 'automatic Clock', a 'commonwealth', or 
'men'; be it either artificial or natural - it is necessary to analyse or resolve the whole 
into its constituent components; this reveals the causes of its properties and the relations 
among them; once the causes and relations are discovered, one is enabled, starting from 
the constituents, to recompose the whole." By employing this Galilean resoluto-
compositive method, combined with relying on experience'^, HOBBES sought to arrive 
at incontestable conclusions. 
HOBBES's political philosophy more geometrico is the foundation for his attacks on 
classic ARiSTOTLEian ideas; he attacks, firstly, that man 'by nature [is] a political ani-
mal' ( Z O O M politikon), and, secondly, that political associations (polis) are part of 'the 
class of things that exist by nature'.'^ HOBBES challenges A R I S T O T L E ' S image of a natu-
ral political association full of natural political animals; he reduces man to a deeply a-
political animal and focuses on the artificial character of political associations. He in-
sists that 'all men [...] are bom unfit for society' and is certain that '[c]loser observation 
of the causes why men seek each other's company and enjoy associating with each 
other, wil l easily reach the conclusion that it does not happen because by nature it could 
not be otherwise, but by chance'.^" While to ARISTOTLE the political association natu-
rally and logically is prior to man for the reason that the 'whole is necessarily prior to 
the part'^', for HoBBES, instead, the political association is (some critics, for instance 
H E G E L and B U R K E , would say: is reduced to nothing more than) 'a voluntary arrange-
ment'^l 
Typically for all social contract theorists, he profoundly rejects natural explanations for 
political associations. The 'commonwealth' is merely manufactured by men: it is an 
artefact; the product of a social contract. Denying the ARiSTOTLEian ideas of the zoon 
Leviathan, chap, xlvi; Cf. G R E G O R Y S. K A V K A , Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton: 
PUP, 1986), chap. 1. 
Cf. and citations from De Cive, Preface to the Readers; C f I B I D . 
" C f D A V I D P. G A U T H I E R , The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford: OUP, 1969), 3. 
" Both citations from A R I S T O T L E , Politics, translated by E R N E S T B A R K E R (Oxford: OUP, 1998), bk. l.ii 
(1252''27, 1253'2). 
De Cive, chap. l.ii. 
^' Politics, bk. l.ii(1253°18). 
De Cive, chap. l.ii. 
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politikon and the natural political association and, instead, proposing the a-political 
character of men and the artificial quality of the 'commonwealth', HOBBES follows the 
'argumentative triad' so typical for social contract theories. Certainly, 'all civil societies 
must have grown out of presocial and prepolitical states of nature, i.e., the state of na-
ture must have existed among the progenitors of all men now living in civil society.'^^ 
So closely connected the state of nature is to any social contract theory, so closely in-
terwoven is it with anthropology. HOBBES ' s image of the state of nature and its underly-
ing anthropology are pessimistic. And since his social contract is hypothetical, where it 
all depends on the ground premises, it is crucial to examine his state of nature; and it is 
even more crucial since the international state of nature closely resembles the logic of 
the domestic state of nature. 
In order to compose or to manufacture the right and proper state, HOBBES begins, by 
applying the resoluto-compositive method, with resolving the political association into 
its components, the individuals; '[t]o describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, [com-
monwealth,] I wil l consider First, the Matter thereof, and the Artificer, both which is 
Man.'^^ And, indeed, it is human nature that determines the character of the state of na-
ture. Man is solely driven by passions. HoBBES calls them desire, when it is 'towards 
something Good'; and what is good is a matter of personal preference. Hence, good and 
evil are words 'ever used with relation to the person that useth them'.^^ This subjectivity 
implies that 'there is no such [...] Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in 
the Books of the old Morall Philosophers'. Hereby rejecting another essential ARISTOT-
LEian idea, HOBBES , instead, proposes that: 'Felicity is a continuall progresse of the 
desire'. What is of greatest importance for the domestic and international is that 'the 
object of riaans desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to as-
sure for ever, the way of his future desire.' In short: men are steadily and unendingly 
striving for 'procuring' and 'assuring' objects of their desire.^^ This makes it not hard to 
see why HOBBES'S anthropology traditionally is brought in connection with psychologi-
cal egoism, the 'doctrine that all human action is selfishly motivated.'^'' 
" B E R N S , 'Thomas Hobbes', 399. 
Leviathan, The Introduction. 
" Cf. and citations from Leviathan, chap. vi. 
Cf. and citations from I B I D . , chap. xi. 
" K A V K A , Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, 29. 
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Assuming such an image of man, the way from this particular HOBBESian anthropologi-
cal premise to defining the prepolitical state of nature as a bellum omnium contra omnes 
is not very far. The state of nature is a 'condition which is called Warre; and such a 
warre, as is of every man, against every man'^*. Since men are driven by their passions, 
always seeking to satisfy their desires, they need to acquire power; only by having 
power are they able to 'obtain some future apparent Good.'^^ And, for this reason, 
power becomes the end itself; becomes the 'desired good' which is steadily sought by 
all men. It is exactly this logic that underlies H O B B E S ' S proclamation: 'So that in the 
first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse de-
sire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.' Indeed, the desire for power 
becomes restless because only the acquisition of more and more power secures both 
one's present power, and a contented life now and in the future.^*' 
However, this does not necessarily imply war; it needs another HOBBESian assumption 
to fiilly reach the state of war, namely, the natural equality of men. 'Nature hath made 
men [...] equall', HOBBES says; this is seen in the fact that 'the weakest has strength 
enough to kill the strongest'. It is this equality of abilities which makes men become 
bitter enemies; they fear and 'endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another'. HOBBES 
explains this, at (first sight odd) step from equality of men to war, by stating that only 
the equality of abilities leads to the 'equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends'. The 
ends, the desired goods, become realistically attainable for all, i.e. become worth fight-
ing for. This makes men diffident to each other. In this struggle one has no greater thing 
to fear than the superior power of the others. This makes it one's end to restlessly obtain 
more and more power; to 'master the persons of all men he can, so long, t i l l he see no 
other power great enough to endanger him'. For these reasons, HOBBES sees the compe-
tition among men about desired goods, their diffidence among each other, and the ever-
present striving for glory inherent in the human nature as the 'three principall causes of 
quarreir in the state of nature, the state of war. However, according to HOBBES , remain-
ing in such a state of nature would mean to act in contradiction to one's overall desire, 
because 'no one believes that the war of all against all, which naturally belongs to such 
a state, is good for him.' And it is the passions - 'fear of violent death' and 'Desire of 
^' Leviathan, chap. xiii. 
" I B I D . , chap. x. 
Cf. and citation from I B I D . , chap. xi. 
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commodious living' - as well as the 'Dictate of right Reason' that leads men out of the 
state of nature into 'civil Society', into peace."" HOBBES speaks of a 'general rule of 
Reason': firstly, 'to seek Peace'; and secondly, to 'defend ourselves by all means'. The 
first part of this rule corresponds to the first and fundamental law of nature {lex natu-
ralis), while the latter part resembles the right of nature (ius naturale) which is 'the Lib-
erty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of 
his own Nature'; from this HOBBES deduces that in the state of nature 'every man has a 
Right to every thing; even to one anothers body'; as long as this 'right to everything' is 
claimed by men, war is perpetual and security becomes a mere impossibility.''^ 
In order to gain peace and security, the second law of nature requires men to 'be willing, 
when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall 
think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and to be contented with so much 
liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe'; however, 
when the others are not willing to do so, from man is not expected the irrationality of 
voluntarily giving away his right since this means he must 'expose himselfe to Prey'. 
Indeed, to lay down a right - whether it be by renouncing or transferring - which in 
consequence obliges one 'not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or aban-
doned, ft-om the benefit of i t ' , is a voluntary act; and indeed, for man it is irrational to do 
what is not 'Good to himselfe'. It is only consequent that HOBBES declares certain rights 
as unalienable; these rights are subsumed under the umbrella-like right of self-
preservation; and it is this right which stands not only in the centre of the domestic, but 
also of the international context.''^ 
'The mutuall transferring of Right', then, is what HOBBES calls a contract. Yet although 
the third law of nature demands from men 'to stand by their agreements' in the state of 
nature contracts are nothing more than empty words since 'the bonds of words are too 
weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions'; since 'most men are 
of evil character'.^'' And HOBBES sees exactly men's passions as the only and most-
promising exit from the entire dilemma. There are two possibilities to secure that men 
" C f De Cive, chaps. I.xiii and l.xv, citation from l.xiii; C f also Leviathan, chap. xiii. 
C f and citations from Leviathan, chap, xiv; C f also De Cive, chap. Il.i-ii. 
C f and citations from Leviathan, chap, xiv [italics omitted]; Cf. also De Cive, chap. Il.iii-iv. 
C f Leviathan, chap, xv and also De Cive, chap. IH.i.; first two citations from Leviathan, chap, xiv, last 
one from De Cive, chap. Il.xi. 
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keep their contracts: firstly, by 'fear of the consequence of breaking i t ' ; and secondly, 
by 'gaining glory for not being in the need to break i t ' . Since the latter passion is 'too 
rarely found', the only passion that can be utilized remains nothing but fear.^ ^ By fear, 
HOBBES means the 'fear of some coercive power'; it coerces men equally to pacta sunt 
servanda by 'the terrour of some punishment' which must be greater than the antici-
pated benefit of violating their contractual obligations. Yet, such a coercive power does 
not exist in the state of nature, before 'the erection of a Common-wealth'; what also 
does not exist in the state of nature is justice: where justice is attached to the third law 
of natiire, i.e. it arises from 'keeping contracts', there cannot be justice when there is no 
assurance that this imperative is kept; hence, 'before the names of Just and Unjust can 
have place, there must be some coercive Power', i.e. a 'commonwealth'. This leads 
HOBBES to the assertion that 'where there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Un-
just.'^^ 
Again, for the 'hypothetical contract' it is the ground premises that really count and, 
unsurprisingly, HOBBES deduces his political conclusion from his anthropology and the 
image of the state of nature. Men are evil, selfish, driven by passions, and wolves to 
other men. This leads him to draw a pessimistic and depressing picture of the state of 
nature. The state of nature is a condition not of injustice, but a condition without any 
justice or injustice; the only 'rule' that exists is the right of self-preservation. This is not 
acceptable to HOBBES and it is via a social contract that man can escape his fate. 
HOBBES now constructs or composes - artificial as states are to him in contrast to his 
great opponent ARISTOTLE - his saviour, the great Leviathan^'. 
This 'coercive power' is erected by a 'hypothetical contract'; however, this contract 
does not simply create the Leviathan in the two senses of a 'contract of society' and a 
'contract of government', but does also confer legitimacy to him. The HOBBESian social 
contract is a contract 'o f every man with every man' in such a way 'as i f every man 
should say to every man' - this only underlies the hypothetical character - that ' / 
Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man. or to this Assembly 
of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Ac-
" Cf. and citations from Leviathan, chap. xiv. 
Citations from I B I D . , chap. xv. 
" On the origins of the name Leviathan see SCHMITT, The Leviathan in the state theory of Thomas 
Hobbes..., chap. I. 
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tions in like manner.' From this collective transfer of all the rights and power to 'this 
man or assembly of men', which merges all the individual wills into one wil l , results the 
'commonwealth'; the 'Mortall God' called Leviathan, which is the 'Multitude so united 
in one Person'. And whoever this person represents or embodies is the sovereign; the 
holder of absolute and sovereign power over each man who then is nothing more than 
the sovereign's subject. Since in HOBBES's case, the sovereign himself has not con-
tracted with 'every men or the whole multitude', leaving him outside the contractual 
arrangement, the sovereign is capable of acting completely unconstrained by it. Whether 
one likes the HOBBESian Leviathan, or not, is not important here; what is important, is 
the fact, that the Leviathan derives his legitimate power from the 'consent of the gov-
erned'. This means, that he has rightftil political authority and the subjects are morally 
obliged to obey. Important, too, is the fact, that i f the ground premises were different, 
there would be no absolute Leviathan, but possibly a republic. Yet still, the HOBBESian 
contract erects such Leviathan and provides his legitimacy; however, by all his absolut-
ism, there was a purpose behind the contract. Therefore, the legitimacy of him being the 
sovereign power, however, ends exactly at this point where he fails to provide his only 
duty, that is, bring 'Peace at home', security and protection 'against other men' and 
TO 
their 'enemies abroad'. 
Saying that the Leviathan must provide security against external enemies, leads from 
domestic to international relations. The way how and why the Leviathan, 'the mother of 
Peace'^^, is legitimized and erected within the domestic sphere with his duty to protect, 
to protect, and only to protect, is precisely the dilemma for IR. Ironically, it leaves all 
these many mothers of peace remaining in the bellum omnium contra omnes - with the 
consequence of there being no place for anything such as legitimacy in the international 
realm. And this is why HOBBES , as pessimist, would be a rather bad source for seeking 
legitimacy criteria. The next section aims to show the HOBBESian logic behind the al-
leged absence and impossibility of legitimacy in international relations. 
" Cf. I B I D . , chaps, xvii, xviii, xxi, citations from chap, xvii; C f also De Give, chaps. V , V I . 
Leviathan, chap. xlvi. 
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3.1.2 Leviathans and the war of all against all 
HOBBES did not enquire at length into international relations. The centre of his interest 
was to 'show us the highway to peace'"" domestically, to reveal the 'royal road'*" to 
civil society. Nevertheless, HOBBES'S impact on IR has been enormous and everything 
that HOBBES (or his interpreters) has to say on international relations entirely derives 
from the 'whole', his method, anthropology, state of nature, and the social contract. 
Paradoxically, (t)his immense influence is grounded in no more than a very few, 
throughout his writings scattered, and short - yet probably most-cited and most-famous 
- remarks. However, it does not need many words for HOBBES to explain what interna-
tional relations look like since he simply equates the relations among states with the 
relations among men in the state of nature, an anarchical condition. 
HOBBES declares that 'the state of commonwealths towards each other is a natural state, 
i.e. a state of hostility''*^; he not only thinks international relations to be equal with the 
state of nature, but also makes explicit what the consequences are, namely, that the rela-
tions among states must be inescapably war-like. HOBBES is certain that ' in all times. 
Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in con-
tinuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons point-
ing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon 
the Frontiers of their Kingdoms; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours, which is a 
posture of War.''*'' And to all those who deny his words he self-confidently says - this 
emphasizes his methodological reliance on experience - that states simply 'admit by 
their actions what they deny in their words.' To HOBBES , it is a matter of fact 'that all 
commonwealths, even i f they are at peace with their neighbours, still defend their bor-
ders with garrisons of soldiers, their cities with walls, gates and guards' and he, there-
fore, ironically asks: 'What would be the point of this i f they had nothing to fear from 
their neighbours?''*'' 
From The Author's Preface to the Reader of H O B B E S ' s 'Philosophical Rudiments concerning Govern-
ment and Society' ( 1 6 5 1 ) , in his The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. I I . This text is a transla-
tion of the original, Latin version of De Cive and is commonly and confusingly also referred to as De 
Cive. Cf. A. P. M A R T I N I C H , Hobbes: A Biography (Cambridge: CUP, 1 9 9 9 ) , 118 . 
De Cive, Preface to the Readers. 
*^ De Cive, chap. Xlll.vii. 
Leviathan, chap. xiii. 
De Cive, Preface to the Readers. 
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The proper starting point for elucidating HOBBES ' s logic, that states - like men in the 
state of nature before their creation of a commonwealth - necessarily end up in a war of 
all against all, is to show where the general selfishness of states and their egoistic inter-
ests and motives come from. Instead of following a summum bonum, states, egocentric 
as they are, permanently pursue what they regard as to their greatest benefit with being 
their 'private Appetite the measure of Good, and Evil l ' ' '^ The greatest benefit is to fol-
low the duty HOBBES ascribes to a commonwealth's sovereign, i.e. that ''the safety of the 
people is the supreme law''*^ and that they must secure a contented life for their sub-
jects. These duties derive from the domestic social contract as set out in the last section. 
With 'safety' being synonymous for national security and 'contented life' synonymous 
for economic well-being, these 'greatest benefits' or 'desired goods' resemble what is 
usually referred to as the national interest of a state. In order to achieve these self-
centred objectives, states need to obtain power; and power itself becomes a 'desired 
good'. This is identical to the domestic sphere and, similarly, HOBBES ' s 'three principall 
causes of quarrell', i.e. competition, diffidence, and glory, leave their mark in intema-
tional relations, too. The competition for the 'desired goods' - as incompatible and 
scarce as they often are internationally - still would not necessarily lead to war, unless 
the states were not of 'equal ability' in their means; and only this equality leads then to 
the equality of their chances in 'attaining the ends'. Here, according to BEITZ, HOBBES'S 
analogy between the domestic and the international seems to fail: contemporary interna-
tional relations would clearly show that states are not of equal abilities, i.e. equal power; 
quite the contrary, he argues, is the case: states do vary greatly in their capabilities. 
B E I T Z also rejects GAUTHIER'S counter-argument, that the spread of nuclear weapons 
around the globe makes nations 'dreadfully equal', as 'too simple'; it is simply not a fair 
description of international relations 'that all or most states are developing or will de-
velop operational nuclear arsenals.''*' 
Both arguments may be true, but they certainly miss HOBBES'S own point. He made it 
explicitly clear, that men do differ in their capabilities but that this could be neglected 
since everybody was still be able to kill everybody - one must add: to somehow kill 
everybody; even the weakest has enough strength to kill the strongest. According to 
Leviathan, chap. xv. 
De Give, chap. Xlll.ii 
47 
C f and citations from B E I T Z , Political Theory and International Relations, 41; cf G A U T H I E R , The 
Logic of Leviathan, 207. 
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HOBBES this is possibly to be done 'either by secret machination, or by confederacy 
with others'"^^. Hence, the question of the equality of abilities, i.e. the equal abilities to 
kill , whether it be of men or of states, does not rest solely on actual physical means, but 
includes other means, such as allying with partners, as well. It is generally possible for 
weaker states to somehow ' k i l l ' stronger ones; HOBBES'S analogy here does not seem to 
be flawed at all, and it can be continued. It is the competition among states for their de-
sired goods, in combination with their equal abilities, that leads to diffidence; every 
state constantly has to fear, precisely because of this equality, that the others might use 
all their power in order to gain most in this struggle: and this fear 'converts potential 
enmity into actual enmity'"*^. Competition and diffidence is joined by the ever-present 
striving for glory; states permanently try to gain recognition and to avoid undervalua-
tion by others. 
It is easily recognizable that these three HOBBESian causes of war, competition, di f f i -
dence, and glory, resemble THUCYDIDES'S three motives profit, fear, and honour, re-
spectively. And HOBBES follows him also in their order of significance; to use 
THUCYDIDES'S words: states fight wars 'chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for 
p rof i t 'Accord ing ly , it is primarily their diffidence or fear - their 'rational apprehen-
sion of fiiture insecurity' - that leaves states with no other choice than to enter the race 
for power. They must seek power after power in order to secure themselves the neces-
sary means for obtaining their ends, mainly security.^' However, since an increase in 
security for one state goes hand in hand with increasing the insecurity for the other, 
states find themselves soon trapped in an action-reaction pattern: a condition which 
HOBBES describes as the 'known disposition to fight' and which today would be re-
ferred to as a cold war.^ ^ HOBBES deduces the bellum omnium contra omnes between 
states entirely from the domestic state of nature. He concludes that in the international 
sphere one is 'not to expect [...] peace between two nations'" since '[e]ven when the 
fighting between them stops, it should not be called Peace, but an intermission during 
•** Leviathan, chap. xiii. 
G A U T H I E R , The Logic of Leviathan, 2 0 8 . 
^° T H U C Y D I D E S , 'The History of the Grecian War', translated by THOMAS HOBBES, in his The English 
Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. VIII, bk. 1.75. 
" Cf. B U L L , 'Hobbes and the International Anarchy', citation on p. 7 2 1 . 
" Cf. G A U T H I E R , The Logic of Leviathan, 2 0 8 . 
" Citation on p. 7 of HOBBES's, 'A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws 
of England' ( 1 6 8 1 ) , in his The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. VI. 
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which each watches the motion and aspect of its enemy and gauges its security'^'' - this 
being, after all and to close the circle, 'a posture of War'. 
After having drawn such an analogy thus far, it would be plausible to expect HOBBES to 
develop his domestic argument further and apply it to the international sphere. This 
would involve introducing a peace-making social contract between all the common-
wealths, in order to escape this - what he domestically thought to be so intolerable -
state of war. One would expect him to create a World-Leviathan. However, HOBBES 
will not do so, will not even say anything about it, and stops here: he cannot think of the 
'idea of a [...contract] among sovereigns [...or] consider the possibility of a contract of 
world government among all individual persons in the world'^^; he cannot think of an 
international social contract and an international society. International legitimacy is nei-
ther needed, nor possible. 
Two lines of arguments seem to be important why HOBBES does not do this leaving the 
states inescapably trapped in the state of war: one is historical, the other logical.^^ In 
seventeenth century England, any plea away fi-om national power in favour of a supra-
national sovereign must have been seen as both ridiculous and even dangerous; and the 
horrors of the English Civil War directed the attention of HOBBES , and most of his con-
temporaries, to the establishment of an effective, national govenunent. Hence, HOBBES 
entirely ascribed himself to the theme of 'domestic security' since 'the greatest incon-
venience that can happen to a commonwealth, is the aptitude to dissolve in to civil 
war';^' and he did not attach any great importance to international relations. Addition-
ally, HOBBES was certain that the state of nature states are facing is, in comparison, 
qualitatively less 'horrible' than the natural condition men are exposed to. He thought 
the price for being in such a 'posture of war' worth paying in order to achieve the 
greater goal, i.e. inner security and well-being: 'But because they uphold thereby [i.e. 
De Cive, chap. Xlll.vii. 
" B U L L , 'Hobbes and the International Anarchy', 726. 
" For the historical line cf R O B I N S O N A . G R O V E R , 'Hobbes and the Concept of International Law', in 
TlMO A I R A K S I N E N A N D M A R T I N A . B E R T M A N (eds.), Hobbes: War among Nations (Aldershot: Ave-
bury, 1989), 79-80; for the logical argument cf B O U C H E R , Political Theories of International Rela-
tions, 161-2; B U L L , 'Hobbes and the International Anarchy', 726; and B E R N A R D WiLLMS, 'World-
State or State-World: Thomas Hobbes and the Law of Nations', in AlRAKSlNEN A N D B E R T M A N (eds.), 
Hobbes: War among Nations, 133-4. 
" De Corpore Politico, II.v.8. 
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'posture of war'], the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that mis-
ery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.'*^ 
However, this is not sufficient to explain H O B B E S ' S lack of enthusiasm for a World-
Leviathan erected via an international social contract. The great Leviathan has been 
contractually set up in order to escape the state of nature, a condition of war, which 
stands diametrically opposed to the people's desired goods, i.e. self-preservation and 
contented life. The sovereign's duty, therefore, was to provide 'peace at home' and pro-
tection 'against enemies abroad'. Hence, the duty of a World-Leviathan would also in-
volve to secure against internal and external threats. However, in such a case, there 
would be no external enemy existent any longer the World-Leviathan could provide 
security against. Therefore, the reason for its creation is missing. For HOBBES , reasoning 
that international relations equal the state of nature and denying for states any possibil-
ity of escape from this state of war, it follows, that '[i]ronically, states remain in a war 
of all against all at the international level because the state has successftilly eliminated 
that war at the domestic level.''^ Thus, one can easily see the interplay between the do-
mestic and the international sphere as well as the implications the legitimacy of the Le-
viathan has for both international relations, and international legitimacy. In short: the 
Leviathan makes peace domestically and perpetuates war internationally; his legitimacy 
domestically causes the lack of legitimacy internationally. 
In the domestic context, HOBBES used the social contract to confer legitimacy on the 
sovereign. The legitimacy of the Leviathan rests on the 'hypothetical contract' made 
between free and equals in order to flee the state of war. And while the state of nature is 
a moral vacuum, it is only by contracting into the civil state when moral categories such 
as justice and injustice are bom. Peculiar for HOBBES , once the contractual arrangement 
has taken place, the sovereign decides what justice and injustice means: 'Legitimate 
kings therefore make what they order just by ordering it, and make what they forbid 
unjust by forbidding it.'^'* 
Yet, there are limits. The sovereign lacks legitimacy when he fails to provide either the 
purpose of his creation, i.e. to provide security, or when he demands obedience to or-
ders that contradict men's inalienable right of self-preservation. Although HOBBES 
" Leviathan, chap. xiii. 
M A P E L , 'The Contractarian Tradition in International Ethics', 188. 
'° De Cive, chap. XII.i. 
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draws an analogy between the domestic and the international, the result with regard to 
legitimacy is anything but analogous. States not only find themselves being in a state of 
war, but worse, they find themselves being trapped in this. HOBBES never conceived of 
them entering into a contractual agreement creating a World-Leviathan. Paradoxically, 
only the logic behind the domestic legitimacies of all the contractually generated Levia-
thans create and uphold a global environment without anything even close to interna-
tional legitimacy possible. There can never be an international social contract, and there 
can never be an international society. HOBBES leaves the states in a world where any 
sense of what ought to be is missing, where states 'are strangers to the moral world'. In 
their relations states are guided not by a summum bonum, but by their 'selfish private 
appetites', which are their 'measures of good and evil '; by 'force and fraud' which are 
their 'two Cardinall virtues'^'; by their fears and by their striving for glory and profit. 
States follow the Law of Nations, which declares that 'every Soveraign hath the same 
Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procur-
ing his own safety'^^ - one must add: to procure his safety by all means. 
Considering such an international state of nature, HOBBES , unsurprisingly, suggests 
states be permanently 'forwamed' by collecting intelligence, and 'forarmed' by main-
taining sufficient military resources.^ ^ And even i f HOBBES does not deny the potential 
value of a contract between states to establish a League of Commonwealths, this has 
nothing to do with international legitimacy. This League must be a farce since HOBBES 
considers it as perfectly reasonable and acceptable to withdraw from this contract as 
soon as states do not benefit from such a society anymore, or it becomes more advanta-
geous to act unconstrained. '^* Hence, even i f such a League of Commonwealths were to 
exist (for a certain period of time), again, its guiding principle is not legitimacy, but 
simply power and self-interest. HOBBES ascribes every commonwealth the 'absolute 
Libertie, to doe what it shall judge [.. .] most conducing to their benefit.'^' Indeed, 
HOBBES is a pessimist. He operates in the framework of an international system and 
since no international social contract is employed, legitimacy remains limited to the 
Leviathan, chap. xiii. 
" I B I D . , chap. xxx. 
" C f De Give, chap. Xlll.vii-viii. 
^ Cf. B O U C H E R , Political Theories of International Relations, 159, and Leviathan, chap. xxii. 
" I B I D . , chap, xxi [italics added]. 
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domestic sphere. At this point, I must conclude that HOBBES certainly is not a social 
contract theorist who provides a good source for legitimacy criteria in IR. 
3.2 Rousseau - from nature to society, from 'society' to nature 
3.2.1 Noble Savages, their corruption, and the volonte generate 
ROUSSEAU is a pessimist, too. Like HOBBES , he certainly is not a suitable source for 
legitimacy in I R ; and like HOBBES, ROUSSEAU is deeply modem, well-established in IR, 
and a distinguished social contract theorist. He does not take the necessary step to bring 
legitimacy into the international sphere; no contract theory of intemafional society is 
produced, and legitimacy remains within state borders; again: legitimacy limited. While 
domestically ROUSSEAU uses the social contract, i.e. a 'hypothetical contract', to bring 
men from nature into society, internationally he does the opposite: states ought to take 
the road from an alleged society back to nature. This section deals not with wolves, a 
brutish state of nature, and a Leviathan, but with noble savages, a peaceful state of na-
ture, and the volonte generale. The next section deals with the alleged brotherhood of 
the nations of Europe, the plea for independence, and explains why legitimacy does not 
play any role in international relations. 
ROUSSEAU is not only puzzling in political philosophy, but also with regard to IR. While 
HOBBES'S interpretation as the realist finds almost universal acceptance, the causa 
ROUSSEAU is less straightforward. This, however, could not entirely prevent associating 
him with this particular tradition, and it is said to be his general pessimism about inter-
national relations in general 'why Rousseau has been routinely placed in the realist 
camp.'^^ And while some authors, indeed recognising ROUSSEAU'S pessimism - but not 
to the extent comparable with that of HOBBES - only see him being part of a milder real-
ism^^, or as a 'reluctant realist'^^, others do offer essentially 'flrA?r/-realist'^' interpreta-
tions. These interpretations range from putting ROUSSEAU in the tradition of 'historical 
69 
' T O R B J 0 R N L . K N U T S E N , 'Re-reading Rousseau in the Post-Cold War World', Journal of Peace Re-
search, Vol. 31 (1994), 248. For this realist interpretation are largely responsible: I A N C L A R K , The 
Hierarchy of States (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), chap. 4; H O F F M A N N A N D FiDLER (eds.), Rousseau on 
International Relations, Introduction; S T A N L E Y H O F F M A N N , The State of War (London: Pall Mall 
Press, 1965), chap. 3; and W A L T Z , Man, the State and War..., chap. vi. 
' Cf. S T E V E N FORDE, 'Classical Realism', in N A R D I N A N D M A P E L (eds.). Traditions of International 
Ethics, 78. 
' CHRISTINE J. C A R T E R , Rousseau and the Problem of War (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987), 205. 
BROWN, N A R D I N A N D R E N O O E R (eds.). International Relations in Political Thought, 386. 
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reason' together with H E G E L and M A R X ; ' ° to placing him together with KANT in the 
Utopian comer;'' to appreciating him as the one 'who provides the basis for a pro-
foundly critical theory of international politics.''^ When someone is being 'read' (both 
in political philosophy and IR theory) as differently and diversely as it is in ROUSSEAU'S 
case, two possibilities naturally arise why this is so: firstly, interpreters accuse 
ROUSSEAU as being 'notoriously ambiguous'; secondly, it is largely due to the short-
comings of the interpreters themselves why one 'may err about Rousseau'. 
The latter explanation seems to be more convincing since most of the ROUSSEAU-
scholars perceive his thoughts anything but ambiguous, but instead, incredibly coher-
ent;'^ nevertheless, '[m]any thinkers have suffered at the hands of commentators, but 
few have had to endure as much as Rousseau.'''' Whether ROUSSEAU is a realist is in 
doubt. Realist readings, it is said, are nothing but highly mistaken interpretations, which 
are 'based upon a series of conceptual, methodological and philosophical errors'.'^ 
Without being able to ultimately assess this particular point of view, it, therefore, may 
be appropriate to recognise certain pessimistic elements in ROUSSEAU'S thoughts and, 
despite labelling him, to appreciate that he 'offers a unique, altemative, approach.''^ As 
was the case with HOBBES , instead of picking out small pieces here and some bits there, 
one only understands ROUSSEAU when appreciating that his works form an intertwined 
whole. Therefore, to understand the social contract, and to understand why there is no 
international social contract, one must explore into four of his major and interconnected 
writings: Discourse on the Sciences and Arts (1750)"; Discourse on the Origin and 
Foundation of Inequality among Men (1755)'^; Emile (1762)'^; and Contrat Social 
™ C f B O U C H E R , Political Theories of International Relations, chap. 12. 
" C f J O N A T H A N H A S L A M , NO Virtue like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since 
Machiavelli (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2 0 0 2 ) . 
M I C H A E L C . W I L L I A M S , 'Rousseau, Realism, and Realpolitik\ Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 18 ( 1 9 8 9 ) , 186. 
C f R O U S S E A U , The Social Contract and other later political writings. Editor's Introduction, x. 
E R N S T C A S S I R E R , The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau ( 1 9 3 2 ) , edited by P E T E R G A Y (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1 9 5 4 ) , Editor's Introduction, 4. 
" W I L L I A M S , 'Rousseau, Realism, and Realpolitik\ 185 . 
K N U T S E N , 'Re-reading Rousseau in the Post-Cold War World', 2 4 8 . 
" Hereafter: First Discourse, in J E A N - J A C Q U E S R O U S S E A U , The Discourses and other early political 
writings, edited by V I C T O R G O U R E V I T C H (Cambridge: CUP, 1 9 9 7 ) . 
'^ Hereafter: Second Discourse, in R O U S S E A U , The Discourses and other early political writings. 
" Translated by B A R B A R A F O X L E Y (London: Dent, 1 9 6 9 ) . 
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(1762).*° ROUSSEAU in his Contrat Social presents a 'hypothetical contract', like 
HOBBES . The necessary basic premises, anthropology and the image of the state of na-
ture, must be sought in his First and Second Discourse. 
ROUSSEAU'S First Discourse won the prize of the Academy of Dijon on the question 
'whether the restoration of the Sciences and Arts has contributed to the purification of 
morals'; this is his entree into political philosophy, and made him not only famous 
overnight, but also provides more or less the basis for all his other writings. ROUSSEAU 
introduces the second wave of modernity, where the modem project becomes more and 
more self-reflective. It is the positive portrait drawn by most of his contemporaries, his 
fellow encyclopaedists and philosophes, that is the source of his revolution in political 
thought, namely, his attack on the Enlightenment.*' 'The ancient politicians forever 
spoke of morals and of virtue; ours speak only of commerce and money'*^, ROUSSEAU 
protests, and makes the sciences and arts responsible for this present state of moral de-
cay. Unlike HOBBES , who sought his philosophical well-being in the exactness of ge-
ometry, ROUSSEAU , on the contrary, shows that 'the progress of the sciences and the arts 
has added nothing to our genuine felicity'*''. And it gets worse: 'our souls have become 
corrupted in proportion as our Sciences and our Arts have advanced toward perfec-
tion'*"! 
This moral corruption is not primarily a phenomenon of the eighteenth century, but one 
which 'has been observed at all times and in all places.'*^ In the end, this is not simply a 
historical fact for ROUSSEAU ; he goes further and proves that it is not historically coin-
cidental, but that a 'necessary connection' between the promotion of sciences and arts 
and moral cormption of men does exist. However, the First Discourse almost entirely 
lacks the philosophical base of his radical, often polemic, attack on the spirit of the 
Enlightenment: 'Of all the works, I ever wrote', ROUSSEAU admits, 'this is the weakest 
Cf. C A R T E R , Rousseau and the Problem of War, 1-2; R O G E R D. M A S T E R S , The Political Philosophy of 
Rousseau (Princeton: PUP, 1968), Preface. 
Cf. A L L A N B L O O M , 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau', in S T R A U S S A N D C R O P S E Y (eds.). History of Political 
Philosophy, 560. 
" First Discourse, part I I , 18. 
" I B I D . , part I I , 26. 
" I B I D . , part I, 9. 
Cf. I B I D . , part I , 9-11, citation on p. 9. 
'Preface to Narcissus', in R O U S S E A U , The Discourses and other early political writings, 97. 
See, especially. First Discourse, part I I . 
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8 8 
in reasoning' . On the occasion of another question proposed by the Academy about 
the 'Origin of Inequality among Men', ROUSSEAU, then, did endow his thoughts with 
the necessary philosophical foundation. In his Second Discourse, the 'work of greatest 
importance', ROUSSEAU 'boldly traced the history' of mankind, he 'confounded the piti-
ful lies of men', and 'dared to unveil their nature' - only proving once again the self-
made moral decay of men: '"Madmen! know that all your evils proceed from your-
selves!'"^^ 
ROUSSEAU sees two inequalities among men: one physical, which is basically natural 
because of variations in age, health, and body strength, but also mind and soul; and one 
moral or political inequality, which is conventional, i.e. 'established [...] by Men's con-
sent', and 'consists in the different Privileges [. . .] some enjoy to the prejudice of the 
others'. He is primarily concerned with the latter form of inequality, and since this ine-
quality is not natural to men, ROUSSEAU in fact explores into the very question about the 
origin of civil society; and for a social contract theorist necessarily, the origins of soci-
ety must be sought in the state of nature. What ROUSSEAU has to offer here are 'hypo-
thetical and conditional reasonings'.^" 
When ROUSSEAU declares: ' [h]ere is your history such as I believed I read it, not in the 
Books by your kind, who are liars, but in Nature, which never lies'^', these 'wicked 
books' metaphorically stand especially for the thoughts of ARISTOTLE and, even more 
so, for HOBBES. ROUSSEAU'S anthropology and the state of nature look quite different to 
that of HOBBES ; chiefly addressing him, ROUSSEAU claims that 'all of them, continually 
speaking of need, greed, oppression, desires, and pride[,] transferred to the state of Na-
ture ideas they had taken from society; They spoke of Savage Man and depicted Civil 
man.' Only ROUSSEAU went back far enough and reached the state of nature, in order to 
investigate into the human nature of 'Savage Man'; this is why he introduces this dis-
course with the words: ' I t is of man that I am to speak'.^ ^ 
" The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (London: William Glaisiier, 1918), bk. VIII, 280; hereafter: 
Confessions. 
Cf. and citations from Confessions, bk. VIII, 312. 
'° Cf. and citations from Second Discourse, Exordium. 
" I B I D . 
I B I D . 
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Savage man, according to RousSEAU, wandered the forests alone and nourished him-
self; was without any foresight, curiosity, education, reason, nor any contact; was com-
pletely independent; was concerned only with his self-preservation, and envisioned only 
the most basic needs; showed pity and compassion for the sufferings of others and had 
no desire to harm them whatsoever.^^ This distances him clearly from both ARISTOTLE, 
since savage man is definitely not a zoon politikon, and from HOBBES , since he also is 
far from being a wolf ROUSSEAU accuses HOBBES failing to recognise 'that the same 
cause that keeps Savages from using their reason [...] at the same time keeps them from 
abusing their faculties'; and he argues 'that Savages are not wicked precisely because 
they do not know what is to be good'. This leads to the rejection of depicting the state of 
nature as a HOBBEsian bellum omnium contra omnes. Contrary to HOBBES , for 
ROUSSEAU it follows that this natural state - by virtue of being inhabited by noble sav-
ages, who only know self-preservation and pity - was a state of pure freedom and per-
fect equality. The natural physical inequalities had no effect on men's lives; indeed, 
equality came from freedom. Hence, it is not civil society but the state of nature that 
'was the most conducive to Peace and the best suited to Mankind'. 
ROUSSEAU gave an explanation in his First Discourse of why present society is flawed. 
However, he must walk the historical path fiirther 'that must have led man from the 
Natural state to the Civil state''^ in order to explain what has happened between this 
perfect state of nature and the corrupt civil society. ROUSSEAU'S 'history of mankind' is 
primarily the history of decay and is split into five po^r-state-of-nature periods.^^ Here, 
the crucial factor is the notion of independence, to be more precise: the loss of inde-
pendence. It stands in the centre of ROUSSEAU'S analysis of moral corruption and ine-
quality; and it plays an important part in his thoughts on international relations. This 
loss of independence which is largely caused by the loss of self-sufficiency had two 
effects: firstly, men began more and more to compare themselves to each other causing 
the development of men's self-love (amour-propre), i.e. the relative sentiment that ' in-
spires men with all the evils they do one another'^^; secondly, the physical inequalities 
" Cf. I B I D . , part I . 
I B I D . , part 1, 151. 
' M B I D . , part I I , 186. 
Cf. I B I D . , part I I ; For a lengthy discussion of these five periods see M A S T E R S , The Political Philosophy 
of Rousseau, chap. I V . 
" Second Discourse, Rousseau's Notes, n. xv. 
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among men, which were existent in the state of nature but had no effect, now became, 
by way of the division of labour, an integral part of men's life. The loss of independ-
ence inaugurated the beginning of the end of the equality of men since 'the cleverer or 
the stronger now enjoy advantages at the expenses of the duller or weaker'^*. 
The greatest advantages enjoyed by the former stemmed from the foundation of private 
property. 'From the [professional and surplus-oriented] cultivation of land, its division 
necessarily follows', ROUSSEAU reasons; and goes on: 'The first man who, having en-
closed a piece of ground, to whom it occurred to say this is mine, and found people suf-
ficiently simple to believe him, was the true founder of civil society.'^' The physical 
inequalities quasi-automatically created a situation of a few 'haves' and many 'have-
nots'; predictably, this lead to the state of war. The 'haves' found themselves soon in a 
position of struggle against the poor, 'and under the pressure of necessity' they were 
clever enough to even utilize the poors' power to their own benefit; in order to leave this 
unsatisfying state of war, fiilly conscious of the permanent threats to their properties, 
one among the 'haves' suggested a social contract: 'Let us unite', one 'have' proposed, 
'to protect the weak from oppression, restrain the ambitious, and secure for everyone 
the possessions of what belongs to him: Let us institute rules of Justice and peace', and 
he continued: 'instead of turning our forces against one another, let us gather them into 
a supreme power that might govern us according to wise Laws'.'"" Since these 'wise 
laws' were then exclusively set up by the 'haves' in order to favour only the 'haves' at 
the expense of the poor, ROUSSEAU rightly argues that inequality among men, 'almost 
nonexistent in the state of Nature, owes its force and growth to the development of our 
faculties and the progress of the human Mind, and finally becomes [even] stable and 
legitimate by the establishment of property and Laws.'"" 
This is the short sketch of ROUSSEAU'S history of mankind, i.e. the evolution from the 
state of nature, where the noble savage is equal and free, to the civil society, where this 
equality and freedom is 'legitimately' taken away from men; the 'worst that can happen 
to one', indeed, gradually has taken place, namely, 'to find himself at the other's discre-
" Editor's introduction, xxii, in R O U S S E A U , The Discourses and other early political writings. 
^ Second Discourse, part II, 169, 161. 
100 
101 
Cf. and citations from Second Discourse, part II, 172-73. 
Second Discourse, part II, 188. 
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tion'.'"^ And certainly, ROUSSEAU did prove to the 'Madmen' that all the evils proceed 
only from themselves. 
The corrupt society, which is in fact the HoBBEsian state of nature, cannot be satisfac-
tory for ROUSSEAU . It needs, so to speak, a 'real' social contract to provide for men a 
proper society; this involves the idea of the volonte generale. ROUSSEAU'S Emile and 
the Contrat Social seem to be two completely different endeavours; yet in fact, they are 
clearly interwoven with the two Discourses but also with each other. In short, Emile is 
more than a treatise about proper education for men; facing the historical facts of the 
history of mankind presented in his two Discourses - 'God makes all things good; man 
meddles with them and they become evil''""' - it is RousSEAU's attempt to show the 
natural education which could create the natural man. It is a treatise on 'how can the 
Natural Man be formed?''"'', and RousSEAU, here, traces not only the history of man-
kind, but the history of natural man. Emile's Emile is the invented noble savage of pre-
sent times.'°^ However: ' I had perceived everything to be radically connected with poli-
tics, and that, upon whatever principles these were founded, a people would never be 
more than that which the nature of the government made them''"^, ROUSSEAU realisti-
cally admits; and while in Emile he attempted to create the good man, in the Contrat 
Social he attempts to create the corresponding good society. Why 'Men is bom free and 
everywhere he is in chains' ROUSSEAU provides historical-analytical evidence for in his 
two Discourses, and in making the 'detour' via the Emile, he is to answer in the Contrat 
Social the question: 'What can make it legitimate?''"'' Since the aspiration to enter into a 
civil society is bom out of necessity, namely, to flee the state of war; and since entering 
into society means for men surrendering freedom which in tum is equivalent to surren-
dering his inbom quality; the essential aim for ROUSSEAU is to '"find a form of associa-
tion that will defend and protect the person and goods of each associate with the full 
'"^ Second Discourse, part II, 176. 
Emiie, bk. I, 5. 
I B I D . , Introduction, vi. 
Cf. M A S T E R S , The Political Philosophy of Rousseau, chap, I. 
Confessions, bk. IX, 326. 
'"^ Contrat Social, both from bk. l.i. 
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common force, and by means of which each, uniting with all, nevertheless obey [sic] 
only himself and remains as free as before.'"'"^ 
In order to accomplish this, RousSEAU uses a social contract which involves the con-
struction of the volonte generale. The terms of this contract are its striking force: every-
one entirely 'alienates' all of his rights to the whole; everyone gives everything; the 
condition is equal to all; no one reserves any rights; no one is superior to others and no 
one inferior; at last, everyone 'puts his person and his full power in common under the 
supreme direction of the general w i l l ' ' " ' . The volonte generale is the sovereign's will 
and is the will that is willed by all. However, what is willed by all is not the sum of all 
volontes particulieres (i.e. the particular wills of men), which only produces the volonte 
de tous (i.e. the wil l of all); only the residue after, so to speak, having passed all the vo-
lontes particulieres through a sieve is the volonte generale - and it reveals itself through 
laws."° Obeying to laws in a civil society, which one has given himself, is to be remain-
ing as free as before. Hence, it is the volonte generale that 'can make it legitimate'. 
Here another crucial difference to HOBBES becomes apparent: while HOBBES'S Levia-
than was bound by the right to self-preservation, ROUSSEAU'S volonte generale has no 
extra-territorial limitations. It is pure, man-made wi l l ; it does itself contain morality and 
this morality solely originates from man's freedom - man makes morality.'" 
ROUSSEAU'S , like H O B B E S ' S , 'hypothetical contract' is in no need of two consecutive 
contracts - one 'contract of society', then 'contract of goverimient'; it establishes not 
only civil society but also its government."^ Yet, it does more: it confers legitimacy, 
and man is morally obliged to obey the volonte generale. It is not hard to see why, to 
ROUSSEAU , '[e]very legitimate Government is republican', for only a Republic provides 
freedom and equality, the essential idea behind the construction of the volonte ge-
nerale."^^^ While providing security stands behind legitimacy in HOBBES, S O does free-
dom and equality in ROUSSEAU. Seeing that men cannot go back to the good state of 
nature, ROUSSEAU showed the 'Madmen' the way from the corrupt into the good soci-
Cf. I B I D . , bk. l.iv, vi; citation from bk. l.vi. 
I B I D . , bk. l.vi [italics omitted]. 
C f I B I D . , bk. Il.iii, vi. 
"' C f I B I D . , bk. l.iv, vi, viii. 
112 
C f I B I D . , bk. l.vi. 
" Citation from IBID., bk. Il.vi [italics added]. In fact, R O U S S E A U defines a republican government as a 
'government guided by the general will'. IBID., Fn. 
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ety, from nature into society. Internationally, he recognizes a corrupt society, i.e. the 
alleged brotherhood of nations, too. However, he does not propose an international so-
cial contract to make this corrupt society good; instead, states must go from society 
back to nature. 
3.2.2 The 'brotherhood' of nations and the plea for independence 
It is fairly difficult to understand RousSEAU's view on legitimacy in international rela-
tions when not considering his notion of the good life domestically. Following the gen-
eral approach, and by having laid down ROUSSEAU'S anthropology and the image of the 
state of nature as the two basic premises for the creation of the contractual state, the 
focus must now shift to the question why he does not employ an international social 
contract; why he is a pessimist. While HOBBES was more or less uninterested in interna-
tional relations, ROUSSEAU, on the contrary, showed great interest in the problem of war 
and peace. In the last chapter of the Contrat Social, he recognises that '[ajfter setting 
down the true principles of political right and trying to found the State on its basis, it 
would remain to buttress the State by its external relations', and concludes, almost 
apologizing, with the very last sentence: 'But all this forms a new object too vast for my 
short sight; I should always have fixed it nearer to myself '"" But certainly, interna-
tional relations were not too vast for him; had ROUSSEAU succeeded in finishing his 
Institutions Politiques^^^ - his planned magnum opus, where the Contrat Social had 
been only one part of it - his thoughts on international relations, interesting and coher-
ent as they are, would simply have not been presented as scattered and fragmented."^ 
Nevertheless, this section aims to illustrate the following: like HOBBES, ROUSSEAU does 
not do what one would expect him to do, namely, to propose an international social con-
tract. HOBBES wanted nothing more than to release men from the state of nature, to him, 
the state of war, in order to give them peace. However, while the creation of the Levia-
than brought peace domestically, it is paradoxically all these Leviathans that must per-
petuate an international state of nature; while he uses the social contract to bring peace 
domestically, there is no corresponding international social contract. ROUSSEAU denied 
the possibility of men going back to the state of nature - to him a state of peace; there-
"'' l B i D . , b k . iv.ix. 
See Confessions, bk. IX, 326. 
C f . HOFFMANN AND F i D L E R (eds.) , Rousseau on International Relations, x i i . 
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fore, he sought freedom and peace in his volonte generale-state. Yet internationally, he 
exactly proposes the solution which was impossible domestically, namely, returning 
from the corrupt society to the state of nature. They both suggest internationally the 
complete opposite of what they put forward domestically. Both do it by drawing on dif-
ferent cause-and-effect logics. Like HOBBES, ROUSSEAU is deeply pessimistic about 
legitimacy functioning in international relations. They go along different routes, yet 
arrive at the same destination: legitimacy limited, in an intemational system. 
The following remark made by ROUSSEAU is a fairly good description and summary of 
his thoughts on intemational relations: 'The historic union of the nations of Europe has 
entangled their rights and interests in a thousand complications; they touch each other at 
so many points that no one can move without giving a jar to all the rest; their variances 
are all the more deadly, as their ties are more closely woven', and he argues 'that the 
powers of Europe stand to each other strictly in a state of war, and that all the separate 
treaties between them are in the nature rather of a temporary truce than a real peace'. 
Basically too much dependence, too little independence, must be blamed for the misery 
among nations. 
This is a harsh attack on the very idea of liberal Enlightenment philosophers a la ADAM 
SMITH, DAVID RICARDO , and, above all, KANT , that interdependence is the guarantor for 
harmony and peace. ROUSSEAU pleas for independence. The 'historic union of the na-
tions of Europe' is nothing but a farce to RoussEAU; one must only look behind the cur-
tains to realize what the reality of this so-called society - 'united by identity of religion, 
of moral standard, of intemational law; by letters, by commerce, and finally by a species 
of balance [of power]' - is: one will observe wars, robberies, usurpations, revolts, mur-
ders; one wil l listen to 'fair speeches' and witness 'abominable acts'; one will consider 
the 'boundless humanity of our maxims' and spot the no less 'boundless cmelty of our 
deeds'; one will catch a glimpse of even more paradoxes, ironies, and absurdities, so 
that ROUSSEAU rhetorically asks whether 'this alleged brotherhood of the nations of 
Europe is anything more than a bitter irony to denote their mutual hatred.'"* 
'Abstract and Judgement of Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace' (1756) in H O F F M A N N A N D 
F I D L E R (eds.), Rousseau on International Relations; hereafter either Abstract Saint-Pierre or Judge-
ment Saint-Pierre; citation from Abstract Saint-Pierre, 60. 
' " I B I D . , 56, 59. 
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Merely a product of the Peace of Westphalia - whose treaty, ROUSSEAU says, 'wi l l per-
haps for ever remain the foundation of our international system'' - the newly, and by 
the states themselves cemented, concept of sovereignty has led the 'alleged brother-
hood' into fragmentation and anarchy. The ensuing balance-of-power mechanism and 
international law are both judged negatively, too. ROUSSEAU acknowledges the func-
tioning of the balance-of-power, and recognises that even ' i f it were to break for a mo-
ment on one side, it would soon restore itself on another'. However, and here arguing 
against realist assumptions, it causes instability and its effects are meaningless; it is nei-
ther usefiil to the states, nor to the system. ROUSSEAU compares the shocks that are pro-
duced by the balance-of-power mechanism to 'waves which forever trouble the surface 
of the sea without ever altering its l e v e l . ' A n d international law is a chimera anyway 
since 'its decisions are respected only as long as self-interest confirms them.''^' Unsur-
prisingly, ROUSSEAU - once he has unmasked the 'brotherhood of Europe', the balance-
of-power mechanism, and the 'mass of contradictory rules' - paints for international 
relations no less pessimistic picture than HOBBES : states find themselves in a state of 
war; the only law is the 'right of the stronger'; and 'states are boimd to obey the prompt-
ings of self-interest-which, in itself, would make war inevitable, even i f all parties de-
sired to be just.''^^ And for RousSEAU, it is obvious: as with the domesfic context, the 
state's loss of independence must be blamed for this international state of war. 
ROUSSEAU clearly favoured independence among men more than everything else: inde-
pendence is the prerequisite for freedom. For the reasons mentioned, especially natural 
catastrophes and division of labour, man has lost this independence, and freedom was in 
danger. ROUSSEAU thought it impossible for men to return to a state of true independ-
ence; therefore, a form of civil society was needed that offers men, i f not perfect inde-
pendence, 'at least' freedom. The social contract state with the volonte generale was 
needed in order to eliminate the defects that the loss of independence had generated. 
ROUSSEAU spots all these defects at the international level as well: more and more inter-
dependence enhances inequality and fiiels amour-propre. While the inequalities among 
men are set to 'natural bounds', the inequalities among states can potentially 'grow end-
' " I B I D . , 65. 
IBID., 62, 65. 
State of War, 163. 
C f and citations from Abstract Saint-Pierre, 60. 
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lessly'. Since the state is an artefact, it is without 'determinate measure' and without 
'definite proper size'. This variability continually forces each state 'to compare itself in 
order to know itself. Moreover, the state 'depends on everything around it, and has to 
take an interest in everything happening around it ' : states feel weak as long as stronger 
states are in sight. According to ROUSSEAU , this must lead to a chain reaction: each 
state, in order to secure itself, wishes to 'make itself more powerful than all of its 
neighbors.''" 
ROUSSEAU follows HOBBES in recognizing a 'perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power 
after power'. However, while HOBBES sought to find an explanation in the equality of 
abilities among states, ROUSSEAU holds the inequalities among states responsible. And 
with increasing inequality comes also increasing amour-propre. ROUSSEAU, when pre-
senting the history of mankind, made it clear on many occasions that amour-propre is 
not natural to men; it must be sharply distinguished from amour de soi, the inborn and 
unproblematic love of oneself In the domestic context, amour-propre was fuelled, and 
in a sense institutionalized, by private property; in the international domain, the corre-
sponding role is played by sovereignty. And like private property, the concept of sover-
eignty has not come from nowhere: it is man-made, i.e. the outcome of the Treaty of 
Westphalia which guaranteed each sovereign 'protection against foreign invasion' and 
that his 'authority shall be upheld against the rebellion of his subject.''^'' The problem 
with amour-propre is, that it bewilders reason; it takes away from the sovereign the 
capacity to 'distinguish [...] between real and apparent interests'; and for RousSEAU the 
depressing consequences are: 'The whole life of kings, or of those on whom they shuf-
fle off their duties, is devoted solely to two objects: to extend their rule beyond their 
frontiers and to make it more absolute within them.' And he continues to stress that 
these objects are the two guiding principles lying behind any action or policy.'^^ 
Via the instability of balance-of-power politics; the worthlessness of international law; 
the ever-present 'right of the stronger'; the self-created interdependence; the intense 
inequality; and the aggressive character of amour-propre, we see ROUSSEAU'S frighten-
ing road from the 'brotherhood of Europe' to the state of war. This reflects - i f not the 
way, but certainly the end - HoBBES's portrayal of international relations as a bellum 
Cf. and citations from State of War, 169. 
Ab.-itract Saint-Pierre, 81. 
C f and citations from Judgement Saint-Pierre, 89-90. 
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omnium contra omnes. And with ROUSSEAU'S version of the intemational state of war, 
and especially the way it has come about, one has at the same time also presented all the 
causes and reasons why, to him, legitimacy plays no role in intemational relations. All 
the causes can be reduced to the simple fact, that ROUSSEAU considers states as simply 
too cormpt to be able to conceive and pursue a common interest, to share an idea of 
what ought to be. 
This reason for the rejection of any legitimacy ever possible shines through best in his 
criticism of the A B B E DE SAINT-PIERRE'S Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in 
Europe (1713)'^^. In fact, ROUSSEAU ridicules the A B B E ' S idea of creating an 'European 
Society' by a voluntary agreement among the potential members. The 'very princes' 
guided solely by amour-propre 'would resist with all their might any proposal for its 
creation' and 'they will as infallibly throw obstacles in the way of its establishment'.'^^ 
Moreover, he denies any possibility of 'universal solutions' to the intemational di-
lemma.'^* This must undoubtedly lead to the conclusion that ROUSSEAU shakes hands 
with HOBBES in seeing any notion of legitimacy as neither functioning, nor ever being 
possibly derived from anything close to an intemational social contract. 
Yet, they are pessimists of different quality. HOBBES viewed the price of being in a state 
of war worth paying for the sake of domestic security and well-being; he ascribed each 
state the right 'to doe whatever it shall judge most conducing to its benefit'. ROUSSEAU, 
quite contrary, regards this state of war as the 'worst state possible''^^ - more: as a 
'moral scandal''''"- which is not worth paying but simply must be paid. He sees the po-
tential value and merits of a contractual arrangement between states. With regard to the 
A B B E ' S idea, ROUSSEAU says: it must fail 'not because it is Utopian', but because 'men 
are crazy';'^' it 'was too good to be adopted.''"'^ Surely, this does neither alter the condi-
tion states find themselves in, nor ROUSSEAU'S argument. Yet, it makes a difference, not 
only of tone or style, but of ethics to acknowledge, praise, and universalize the 'right of 
See B R O W N , N A R D I N A N D R E N G G E R (eds.), International Relations in Political Thought, 394-8. 
Judgement Saint-Pierre, 89. 
C f H O F F M A N N A N D F I D L E R (eds.), Rousseau on International Relations, ix. 
State of War, 163. 
H O F F M A N N A N D F I D L E R (eds.), Rousseau on International Relations, xlix. 
Abstract Saint-Pierre, 88. 
Judgement Saint-Pierre, 100. 
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the stronger', i.e. the HOBBESian logic, or, as ROUSSEAU seems to do, honour the bene-
fits of a true international society'^'' whilst recognising that it can never be realized. 
Although the international environment cannot be altered, ROUSSEAU at least 'consid-
ered a number of mechanisms whereby conflict and hostility could be reduced.''^'' In-
deed, the likelihood of an international social contract between states ever being set up 
almost equals zero. But states, which are not yet too corrupt, can be saved from the 
'public calamities 'Considering ROUSSEAU'S enthusiasm for freedom, it should not 
be surprising that he suggests these few states to become both republican volonte ge-
nerale-states, and independent.'"'^ States ought to focus on agriculture since this is the 
only means for securing independence;'"'' they ought to keep their territories small in 
size and compact since small states are proportionately stronger than larger ones;'^ * they 
ought to maintain a militia since they are 'the best and most reliable troops' and 'wi l l 
cost the republic little';'^^ and they ought to uphold a spirit of patriotism: 'A single 
thing suffices to make it impossible to conquer [a state], namely love of country and of 
liberty, animated by the virtues inseparable of that love.''"*" 
In the domestic context, ROUSSEAU recognized the impossibility for men to return to the 
state of nature, and therefore sought to gain freedom and peace through the volonte ge-
nerale-state. However, his suggestions for states only prove that ROUSSEAU , in the in-
ternational realm, proposes exactly the opposite: he 'advocated for nations a return to an 
isolation'''" similar to the state of nature - to a state where legitimacy would not be 
needed. This is a noble idea. But still, it cannot rescue ROUSSEAU from being an unsuit-
able source for legitimacy criteria in IR. He still remains a pessimist, and it is still justi-
fied to put him, together with HOBBES , imder the pessimist umbrella. Both reject the 
Cf. B O U C H E R , Political Theories of International Relations, 302. 
BROWN, N A R D I N A N D R E N G G E R (eds.), International Relations in Political Thought, 387; see espe-
cially R O U S S E A U ' S 'Constitutional Project for Corsica' ( 1765) and his 'Considerations on the Gov-
ernment of Poland' (1772) , both in H O F F M A N N A N D F i D L E R (eds.), Rousseau on International Rela-
tions; hereafter either Corsica or Poland. 
Stale of War, 163. 
Cf. H O F F M A N N A N D F i D L E R (eds.), Rousseau on International Relations, Ixii. 
C f Corsica, 145; Poland, 176. 
Cf. State of War, 170; 
Corsica, \45; Poland, 184. 
Poland, 191. 
H O F F M A N N A N D F i D L E R (eds.), Rousseau on International Relations, Ixvii. 
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possibility of an international society and both reject the possibility of an international 
social contract. Ontologically, they remain in the framework of an international system 
where legitimacy remains limited within state borders. They certainly are the wrong 
place to look for legitimacy criteria. All this will be different when turning to KANT and 
RAWLS , to the optimists. 
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4. The Optimists: Legitimacy >vithout borders, in an international society 
4.1 Kant - 'There shall be no war', reason tells us 
4.1.1 The contractus originarius: a product of reason 
It is almost a must, after having discussed HOBBES and ROUSSEAU , to turn the attention 
now to KANT . Similarly to the two pessimists, KANT , too, follows the 'argumentative 
triad', arguing from the state of nature via the social contract to political society and, not 
to mention, its legitimacy; similarly to them, he is profoundly modem, a philosopher of 
notable rank, and well-established in IR. 
Yet K A N T is no pessimist, but an optimist. He goes one step further in his political phi-
losophy. In writing the 'most famous peace project'', his Perpetual Peace, he brings 
into being an international social contract; he takes legitimacy beyond borders into an 
international society. K A N T , together with ROUSSEAU , belongs to the second wave of 
modernity and with him one sees not only the end of the contractarian era coming (be-
fore its revival in the twentieth century), but one reaches also the 'intellectual climax of 
European Enlightenment'^, To KANT, 'Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-
incurred immaturity', while immaturity is 'the inability to use one's own understanding 
without the guidance of another'; hence, his message is clear, impressive, and demand-
ing alike: the 'motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere audel Have courage to use 
your own understanding!'"' Another reason, why K A N T is a must, has to do with his af-
finity to ROUSSEAU . He once admitted himself: 'Rousseau brought me into the right 
shape'"*; indeed, the 'boring' KANT , leading a highly habitual and customary life, even 
forgot about his obligatory afternoon-walk when he lost himself in the Emile of the ec-
centric ROUSSEAU .^ However, with regard to IR theory it is suggested that the 'struggle' 
between the two orthodoxies realism and liberalism is in the end nothing more than a 
' B R O W N , Understanding international Relations, 140. 
^ O T T F R I E D H O F F E , Immanuel Kant, translated by M A R S H A L L F A R R I E R (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1994), 1. 
' 'An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?"' (1784) , in his Political Writings, edited by 
H A N S R E I S S , 54; hereafter: What is Enlightenment?. 
* From P I E R R E H A S S N E R , 'Immanuel Kant', in S T R A U S S A N D C R O P S E Y (eds.), History of Political Phi-
losophy, 585. 
' C f Editor's introduction to K A N T , Political Writings, edited by H A N S R E I S S , 4; for an authoritative and 
extensive biography of K A N T see E R N S T C A S S I R E R , Kant's Life and Thought (1918), translated by 
J A M E S H A D E N (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). 
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'profound dialogue' between RousSEAU, the 'deepest of the Realist', and KANT , the 
'most profound of the Liberals'.^ So questionable this judgement of ROUSSEAU seems to 
me, so unquestionable is the judgement of KANT . But still, both remain poles apart by 
their views on the possibility of an international social contract. 'There shall be no war', 
K A N T tells us; and this could also be ROUSSEAU'S words. Yet, the way to accomplish 
this is very different. Domestically, K A N T employs the contractus originarius, and in-
ternationally, the foedus pacificum is based on a social contract, too. And importantly: 
both contracts are products of reason. 
This section deals with domestic legitimacy; the next with international legitimacy. 
What makes K A N T a promising source for legitimacy criteria in IR is his refusal to ac-
cept a MACHiAVELLian 'decoupling of morality and politics'^; therefore, it is by com-
parison with HOBBES and ROUSSEAU even more important to start with his moral phi-
losophy. Indeed, K A N T ' S 'theory of morals provides the foundation for his political phi-
losophy, including its international dimension.'* 
It is suggested that we can summarize K A N T ' S political philosophy in the phrase: 're-
publican government and international organization'^; its foundation, his moral philoso-
phy, could well be headlined with: 'Reason replaces nature''°. K A N T almost radicalizes 
the belief in reason. Rejecting any conception that grounds morality in natural law, the 
pursuit of happiness, or religion, the KANTian theory of morality must be located dia-
metrically opposed to utilitarianism or any other form of consequentialism. To him, 'it 
is clear that all moral concepts have their seat and origin in reason completely a pri-
or/'". 
A priori refers to K A N T ' S idea, which he developed in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781)'^ within the context of philosophy of science; and this idea, self-declaredly. 
* H O F F M A N N A N D F I D L E R (eds.), Rousseau on International Relations, Introduction, chap. v. 
^ K E R S T I N O , 'Kant's Concept of the State', 143. 
' T H O M A S D O N A L D S O N , 'Kant's Global Rationalism', in N A R D I N A N D M A P E L (eds.), Traditions of Inter-
national Ethics, 136. 
' H A S S N E R , 'Immanuel Kant', 581. 
S T R A U S S , 'The Three Waves of Modernity', 92. 
" 'Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals' (1785), edited by THOMAS E . H i L L , J R . A N D A R N U L F 
Z W E I G (Oxford: OUP, 2002) , chap. II.xx [italics added]; hereafter: Groundwork. 
See Critique of Pure Reason (1781/87) , edited by P A U L G U Y E R A N D A L L E N E. W O O D (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1998). 
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comes close to the Copernican revolution'"': in order to understand both the phenomenal 
and noumenal world, universally-valid principles are needed that exist prior to and in-
dependent of the experience of it, so-called 'a priori principles' or 'ideas of reason'. It 
is left to his Groundwork, Metaphysics of Morals, and the second Critique, his Critique 
of Practical Reason (1788)'", where K A N T fully applies this method to the noumenal 
world. For K A N T , the 'categorical imperative' and the 'autonomy of the wil l ' are the 
two comerstones for his theory of morality. Only a free wi l l , stripped off from any natu-
ral inclinations, allows to make moral decisions. In addition to the pre-requisite of a free 
wil l , a criterion is needed against which certain actions, or altematives of actions, can be 
judged, in order to assess their moral quality; that is to distinguish between right and 
wrong. This criterion is the 'categorical imperative' - for K A N T the 'supreme principle 
of morality', or the 'general moral law'; yet one essential qualification must be made: 
'For i f any action is to be morally good, it is not enough that it should conform to the 
moral law-it must also be done for the sake of that /mv.''^ This categorical imperative 
provides the answer to men's basic question what ought I do?; it is formal, universally-
valid, good without any qualification, and independent from experience. Hence, it is 
'reason completely a priori', and requires us to "'[a]ct only on that maxim by which 
you can at the same time wil l that it should become a universal law.'" '^ 
Having in mind that K A N T ' S political philosophy is based on his moral philosophy, it is 
easily conceivable what role the social contract plays for K A N T . It takes on exactly the 
same role the categorical imperative plays with regard to morality; the social contract, 
never actually happened to occur in history, is simply an a priori idea of reason, that 
makes civil society comprehensible and 'allows us to say something about the kind of 
state which ought to exist'. 
" Cf. I B I D . , Preface to the second edition. 
Edited by M A R Y G R E G O R (Cambridge: CUP, 1997). 
" Groundwork, Preface [sic]. 
I B I D . , chap. II.xxv. 
" Citation from Editor's introduction to K A N T , Political Writings, 28; C f I B I D . ; H O F F E , Immanuel Kant, 
chaps. 8-9; H O W A R D L. W I L L I A M S , Kant's Political Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 
chap. 2. 
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As closely as KANT'S political philosophy is founded on his moral theory, so is it also 
based on his 'philosophy of history''^. What had been done before him by ROUSSEAU 
and has strongly influenced FiCHTE, H E G E L , FRIEDRICH W . J. SCHELLING , and MARX 
after him, is the attempt to create a 'universal history of mankind'. K A N T proposes a 
'hidden plan of nature''^ which unfolds itself progressively towards a telos, i.e. 'from 
the guardianship of nature to the state of freedom'^", from men's 'unsocial sociability' 
and the state of war to 'a perfect civil union of mankind'^'. K A N T sets himself the task 
to dig out 'a purpose in nature' which lies beneath the apparently 'senseless course' of 
historical events.^ ^ In the nine propositions of his Universal History, he exposes an a 
priori principle guiding this teleological historical progress, i.e. the 'progress of law', 
the 'progress of legal or political justice'. And K A N T sees this progress as being carried 
by men's 'natural capacities which are directed towards the use of his reason'?^ 
Here, it becomes apparent why KANT'S anthropology differs sharply from that of both 
HOBBES and ROUSSEAU . Man in the state of nature is depicted neither as driven by pure 
instincts and egoism, nor as a lonely but noble wanderer. Instead, man is 'the only ra-
tional creature on earth'^ "*, and it is nature that 'gave man reason, and freedom of will 
based upon reason'^^. However, this does not mean that man is necessarily good. 
ROUSSEAU considered the natural man, due to lack of reason, as being unable to distin-
guish between good and bad; in contrast, KANT'S animale rationabile is perfectly able 
to make this distinction: he is able to behave morally, but also immorally. 
K A N T also sees an 'antagonism' at work within men; he speaks of the 'unsocial socia-
bility' of men - ARISTOTLE'S zoon politikon and ROUSSEAU'S noble savage, somewhat 
combined. On the one hand, human nature inclines men to 'live in society', and to ac-
tively seek and enjoy the company of others; on the other hand, he wants to 'live as an 
individual', and isolates himself from his fellow men as far as possible, 'wanting to di-
See his What is Enlightenment?, 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose' (1784) 
(hereafter: Universal History), 'Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History' (1786) (hereafter: 
Human History), and 'The Contest of Faculties' (1798), all in his Political Writings. 
Universal History, Eighth Proposition. 
^° Human History, 226. 
^' Universal History, Ninth Proposition. 
" IBID., Introduction. 
" IBID., Second Proposition; C f HOFFE, Immanuel Kant, chap. 10. 
Universal History, Second Proposition. 
" IBID., Third Proposition. 
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rect everything in accordance with his own ideas.'^ ^ K A N T breaks with ROUSSEAU'S 
idea of men's natural predisposition to individuality insofar as it is exactly this 'unso-
ciability' that leads not to a RousSEAUian state of nature, which is 'most conducive to 
Peace and best suited to Mankind', but, quite contrary, to a HOBBESian state of war. 
Since each man has his own opinion of what is right and wrong and actively seeks to 
pursue 'what seems right and good to him'^^, self-interest soon becomes the dominant 
guiding principle. Since this guiding principle is not constrained by any rule or law 
whatsoever in this anarchic condition, men do solely follow their 'own desires' and try 
to steadily increase their power in order to reduce the uncertainty inherent in this state 
of nature. Since there are no enforceable rules that could guarantee and secure the prop-
erty man has acquired so far, the fellow men pose a permanent threat to it. In 
ROUSSEAU'S words, only 'particular wills' reign in this entirely law-less state where 
each man is the sole interpreter of justice and the sole judge in his own case. For KANT, 
it is fairly obvious that the state of nature, albeit inhabited by rational animals, is in no 
way a state of peace and happiness, but rather a state of war. What makes him follow 
HOBBES even more closely, is his assertion that 'even i f it does not involve active hos-
tilities, it involves a constant threat of their breaking out'^^; and when men do fight, 
'they tend to fight among themselves until an external coercive legislation super-
venes.'29 
This KANTian version of anthropology and the state of nature seems to fit perfectly into 
the general arguments of previous social contract theorists, i.e. into the 'argumentative 
triad'. However, K A N T must be careftiUy distinguished from them: the justification of a 
state must not be derived from experience or historical circumstances; it must not be 
derived from a certain view - be it a HOBBESian or RousSEAUian - of how the state of 
nature might have looked like and why it needs to be escaped. For KANT , it is wrong to 
make the state a product of certain presumed motives such as fear and diffidence, put 
forward by HOBBES , or inequality and amour-propre, put forward by ROUSSEAU. The 
state must strictly be rationally justified completely a priori; hence, for KANT , the state 
of nature cannot be anything but an a priori idea of reason itself, too. So when K A N T 
Cf. and citations from I B I D . , Fourth Proposition. 
" Metaphysics of Morals, § 44. 
^' Perpetual Peace, Introduction to Second Section. 
Metaphysics of Morals, § 44. 
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describes the state of nature as a HoBBESian bellum omnium contra omnes, he does not 
intend to justify the escape from this unacceptable condition by such motives of fear, 
etc. Instead, he uses this a priori idea of reason, i.e. the state of nature, in order to pro-
vide the fictional story about a law-less pre-societal stage. And since this story is told by 
reason, it is also reason that tells us why we are in need of a state. To KANT , the state 
must not be justified by any pragmatic motives, but instead solely and a priori by its 
legal necessity.^" He justifies the state, as no social contract theorist had done before, 
exclusively by reason. K A N T must be distinguished from HOBBES and ROUSSEAU (and 
other contractarians) insofar as they simply provide good and understandable reasons 
for escaping the state of nature. In sharp contrast to them, he stresses the obligatory 
character of the need - grounded in legal necessity - to do so; he has in mind 'men's 
duty to civil society'. This is the peculiarity of K A N T as a social contract theorist. He 
does not follow his predecessors in grounding the state in 'individual arbitrariness' and 
rejects this voluntaristic approach to the state. This KANTian 'anti-voluntarism' seems to 
be in line with the criticism of H E G E L and B U R K E . Instead of reducing the state as sim-
ply being a product 'based on individual's purely arbitrary wills' , compared to his fel-
low contractarians, K A N T 'awards a higher value and greater significance to the state'.^' 
It is legal necessity that 'forces' men to leave the state of nature and to enter into a 'civil 
state, regarded purely as a lawful state'•'^ ; legal necessity alone drives men into this 
'lawful state'. This leads to K A N T ' S assertion that 'as hard as it may sound, the problem 
of setting up a state can be solved even by a nation of devils'; it does not need 'angels', 
but men - no matter how wicked they might be - who possess 'understanding', i.e. rea-
son.''^  And it is also legal necessity that 'forces' men into a contractual agreement, 
which is 'based on a coalition of the wills of all private individuals in a nation to form a 
common, public will for the purposes of rightful legislation'; this social contract is what 
K A N T calls the contractus originarius?'^ 
However, when K A N T speaks of an 'original contract', he does not mean that anything 
close to a contract has ever taken place in history. He concedes, going hand in hand with 
Cf. W I L L I A M S , Kant's Political Philosophy, chap. 7. 
'^ Cf. and citation from K E R S T I N G , 'Kant's Concept of the State', 145-7. 
On the Common Saying..., part I I , 74; Cf. Universal History, Fifth Proposition. 
Cf. and citation from Perpetual Peace, Second Section, First Supplement. 
Cf. and citation from On the Common Saying..., part I I , 79; Cf. also Metaphysics of Morals, § 44. 
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the critics of the 'original contract', that it would need 'authentic record' or 'legal in-
struments', either in 'writing' or 'orally', to prove that such a contract was conducted; 
and, in a second step, to prove that it could bind men to 'pre-existing civil societies'. 
Hence, the KANTian contractus originarius must neither be confused with the 'original 
contract' in the historical sense, nor with a 'hypothetical contract' in the sense of 
HOBBES and ROUSSEAU . Instead, K A N T ' S social contract is of 'exceptional nature': it 
sets up the state in the form as it establishes 'a union of an aggregate of men under 
rightful laws'"'^ but it is unhistorical since ' i t is in fact merely an idea of reason'. Yet it 
nonetheless has 'undoubted practical reality'."'^ The social contract being merely an idea 
of reason or an a priori principle has practical purpose insofar as it 'enables us to con-
sider [any state] valid in terms of right'"'^; no matter how states historically have been 
established, their legitimacy must be exclusively judged against the normative a priori 
idea of a contractual foundation. 
There is no doubt to K A N T that 'this idea can serve as an internal guide {norma) for 
every actual case where men unite to form a commonwealth.' And having K A N T ' S 
moral philosophy in mind, it becomes clear: the social contract is the logical pendant of 
the categorical imperative. K A N T lends more weight to the social contract than HOBBES 
and ROUSSEAU since this idea of reason also functions as a tool to assess the justice of 
laws, i.e. their legitimacy.^^ In this way, the KANTian contractus originarius becomes 
not only the 'test' {Probierstein; engl. touchstone) of the legitimacy of the state as such, 
but it is also 'the test of the rightfulness of every public law.' Considering the social 
contract as the 'test' of the legitimacy of laws, it is obvious that it 'oblige[s] every legis-
lator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united 
wil l of a whole nation, and to regard each subject [.. .] as i f he had consented within the 
general w i l l ' : a law is just only when a people could and would possibly consent to it. 
Yet such an assessment is left only to the 'judgement of the legislator''"', and this has 
striking consequences. 
" IBID., § 4 5 . 
Cf. and citation from On the Common Saying..., part II , 7 3 , 7 9 . 
" Metaphysics of Morals, § 4 7 . 
" IBID., § 4 5 . 
Cf. L E S S N O F F , Social Contract, 9 2 . 
Cf. and citations fi-om On the Common Saying..., part II, 7 9 . 
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That K A N T speaks of a 'general wi l l ' shows only his indebtedness to RousSEAU; it 
seems that he 'finds particularly persuasive ROUSSEAU'S account of the role played by 
the general wil l in the social contract''". However, since it is impossible for KANT to 
conceive of a people reaching consensus and unanimous agreement in any question, he 
proposes that 'majority decisions' must be sufficient.''^ While speaking of a 'general 
wi l l ' , it seems that K A N T follows not ROUSSEAU'S volonte generate, but instead 
'merely' a form of the volonte de tous. And this has been entirely insufficient for 
ROUSSEAU as a base for legitimacy. Yet still, K A N T leaves the judgement of a potential 
consent of the people in the hands of the legislator. And this means nothing different 
than renouncing the right of resistance. ROUSSEAU and HOBBES consider it as entirely 
legitimate to disobey the sovereign as soon as he fails to act according to the social con-
tract; K A N T does not: 'even i f the power of the state or its agent, the head of state, has 
violated the "original contract" by authorising the government to act tyrannically, and 
has thereby, in the eyes of the subjects, forfeited the right to legislate, the subject is still 
not entitled to offer counter-resistance.''*^ This would seem utterly absurd to ROUSSEAU. 
And it is this unquestioning obedience that makes KANT'S political philosophy for some 
'strongly authoritarian.''*'* 
However, one must not forget that K A N T attaches, throughout his writings, great(est) 
importance to fi-eedom. The social contract as an a priori idea, which assesses the le-
gitimacy of a state and its laws, is certainly not an empty formula. Quite on the contrary, 
K A N T explicitly bases the civil state on three a priori principles: firstly, 'freedom as a 
human being'; secondly, 'equality as a subject'; and, thirdly, 'independence as a citi-
zen'.''^ This means that the contractus originarius shapes the 'structural characteristics' 
of the civil state as much as it does its 'constitutional norm'.''^ Taken these three a priori 
principles together - which K A N T regards as the 'inseparable rights of every citizen' -
" H O W A R D W I L L I A M S , 'Kant on the social contract', in B O U C H E R A N D K E L L E Y (eds.), 7"/ie Social Con-
tract from Hobbes to Rawls, 134. 
Cf. On the Common S a y i n g . I I , 79. 
I B I D . , part I I , 81. 
G O U O H , The Social Contract..., 172. 
On the Common Saying..., part I I , 74-9; Metaphysics of Morals, § 46, 
K E R S T I N G , 'Kant's Concept of the State', 150. 
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he has no alternative but to allow no other constitutional form to be derived from the 
contractus originarius than a 'republican constitution'.''^ 
Finishing this section on KANTian domestic legitimacy here, I must conclude that not 
only his moral philosophy deserves being headlined with 'Reason replaces nature'; his 
political philosophy certainly deserves this soubriquet, too. Indeed, K A N T uses the so-
cial contract in a peculiar way, and i t must be sharply distinguished from that of 
HoBBES and RoussEAU. Like them, he follows the 'argumentative triad' so typical for 
any social contract theory, but he clearly has a different understanding of the social con-
tract. It is neither the product of certain experiences, nor of practical motives; very much 
on the contrary, the contractus originarius is a product of reason, pure reason. And, 
now turning to international relations, the contract which K A N T employs for his foedus 
pacificum is a product of reason, too. 
4.1.2 The foedus pacificum: a product of reason, too 
HOBBES and ROUSSEAU come to halt with their social contracts at the border to the in-
ternational sphere; K A N T certainly does not: he 'does produce a contractarian theory of 
international society'''^ and takes the social contract beyond state borders; he does use 
an international social contract for constituting an international society and for setting 
out its basic governing principles. The two pessimists argue that such a venture is nei-
ther desirable nor possible; KANT , on the other hand, is sure that ' i t is necessary to es-
tablish a federation of peoples in accordance with the idea of an original social con-
tract''*^. Bearing in mind the suggestion to summarize KANT'S political philosophy with 
the phrase 'republican government and international organizafion', this section aims to 
illustrate how K A N T arrives at the idea of 'international organizations' and how this 
intermingles with 'republican government'; here, 'international organizations' must be 
understood in the light that '[ajfter the First World War, Kant's idea [of a foedus pacifi-
cum] became godfather to the League of Nations'^". Yet again: K A N T is an opfimist. 
Legitimacy remains not limited to the domestic; instead, it becomes an issue in an inter-
national society. A l l this clearly separates him from HOBBES and ROUSSEAU . Moreover, 
Perpetual Peace, First Definitive Article. 
B R O W N , 'Contractarian Thought and the Constitution of International Society', 136. 
Metaphysics of Morals, § 54. 
H O F F E , Immanuel Kant, 187 . 
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it was he who 'took political philosophy beyond the borders of states and saw its fore-
most object in the "highest political good" of a just order of world peace.'^' Indeed, in 
contrast to the pessimists, K A N T is a fairly good source for legitimacy criteria in IR. 
However, before K A N T speaks of an international social contract and world peace, he 
draws, as did HoBBES and ROUSSEAU , a gloomy-looking picture of international rela-
tions. K A N T somewhat equates the international state of nature with the state of nature 
men find themselves in;^^ and this does not mean a natural state in the RousSEAUian 
sense. Contrary, this condition among states resembles the HoBBESian state of war 
(which was, of course, also seen so by ROUSSEAU) . When K A N T says that this interna-
tional state of nature is a state of war and says that it does not mean permanent warring 
but 'involves a constant threat of its outbreak', his contentions are in no way different 
from HOBBES'S when he spoke of a 'Warre of every man against every man' and of a 
'known disposition to fight'. Yet to KANT , the presence of this international state of 
nature is, put mildly, a paradox: the (supposedly) civilised peoples consider a situation 
where savages - who 'prefer freedom of folly' to 'freedom of reason' - prefer living in 
a state of nature as 'barbarism', 'coarseness', and 'brutish debasement of humanity'. 
Yet paradoxically, with regard to the international state of nature, 'each state sees its 
own majesty [...] precisely in not having to submit to any external legal constraint'. 
Similar to HoBBES, it is the creation of the state which brings about a condition 
'whereby each commonwealth, in its external relations (i.e. as a state in relation to other 
states), is in a position of unrestricted freedom''; and because of this 'freedom', K A N T 
suggests that each state 'must accordingly expect from any other [state] precisely the 
same evils which formerly oppressed individual men'.^ "* In agreement with HOBBES and 
ROUSSEAU , the international state of nature is a state of war; is a state 'devoid of right'; 
is a condition where the only rule seems to be the 'right of the stronger'. 
Yet, one significant qualification must be made. It was HOBBES ' s view that any means 
either man, or state employs to achieve a certain goal would be just because 'where 
there is no Common-wealth', i.e. wherever there is no law, 'there nothing is Unjust'. 
W O L F G A N G K E R S T I N G , 'Politics, freedom, and order: Kant's political philosophy', in P A U L G U Y E R 
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: C U P , 1999), 362. 
" C f Perpetual Peace, Second Definitive Article. 
" Cf. and citation from I B I D . 
Universal History, Seventh Proposition. 
Metaphysics of Morals, § 54. 
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Surely, such a line of argument must be rejected by K A N T : the state of nature, domesti-
cally or internationally, is a law-less condition for 'law-less savages'; and precisely be-
cause there exists no law, this 'state is itself one of injustice'Accordingly, K A N T pro-
poses that states 'ought to abandon' this condition as soon as possible by entering into a 
condition which is 'governed by law' ." K A N T must think it absurd to leave the states, as 
HOBBES does, in such a hostile environment; he must think the RoussEAUian way to be 
equally flawed, who suggests the few uncorrupted states to return to the noble state of 
nature; K A N T must reject, what ROUSSEAU does as well, the European balance-of-power 
system as a 'pure illusion'**. K A N T must also reject the approaches to international law 
put forward by the so-called 'sorry comforters' - he explicitly names HUGO GROTIUS, 
PUFENDORF , and EMMERICH VON V A T T E L L - whose legal 'codes' are invoked when 
'justifying military aggressions', but which 'cannot have the slightest legal force' since 
states as such are not even 'subject to a common external constraint'.*^ And by a 'com-
mon external constraint' K A N T does not mean to establish something like a 'world 
state', but to institute 'the rule of law among nations within the context of a properly 
organized confederation based upon agreement'^"; that is, in other words, to set up a 
foedus pacificum by an international social contract. 
The driving force that leads states out of this deprived state of nature is nothing else but 
war. It is the 'wars', the 'tensions', the 'unremitting military preparations', and the 're-
sultant distress' why states find it a necessity to leave behind such a 'lawless state of 
savagery' and to enter into a federation ' in which every state, even the smallest, could 
expect to derive its security and rights not from its own power or its own legal judge-
ment, but solely fi-om this great federation'. However, to K A N T , these motives only lead 
merely to 'initially imperfect attempts'.^' And here, reason enters the stage again. Simi-
larly to the domestic context, he does not deduce from the experience of states the rea-
sons why they must leave the international state of nature. Again, K A N T uses this as a 
I B I D . , § 60. 
" I B I D . , § 6 1 . 
On the Common Saying..., part Hi, 92. 
" Perpetual Peace, Second Definitive Article. 
^ B O U C H E R , Political Theories of International Relations, 269. 
*' Cf. and citations from Universal History, Seventh Proposition. 
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'rhetorical device' in order to put into words the problem states are confronted with." 
Hence, the driving force is not experience, i.e. not the experience of war etc.; instead, it 
is solely reason. 
However, this type of reason must not be confiised with HOBBES'S 'Dictate of right 
Reason', i.e. reason based on experience. It must be seen strictly in the non-empirical 
sense which is so typical for KANT : it is rigorously reason a priori. And being as such 
'the highest legislative moral power', reason a priori 'absolutely condemns war'*^; it 
'pronounces the following irresistible veto: There shall be no war'^'*. And at this point, 
KANT'S philosophy of history comes to surface again: the historical progress towards a 
'perfect civil union of mankind' is not yet finished with the establishment of a 'perfect 
civil constitution', i.e. the republican constitution; indeed, the telos cannot have been 
reached since the problem of 'establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to 
the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be 
solved unless the latter is also solved'^^ This then is another peculiarity of KANT : the 
domestic well-being is dependent upon the international (and not only vice versa). For 
KANT , 'all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely' only after the 
creation of an 'internally-and for this purpose externally-perfect civil constitution'.^^ 
Thus, the telos is reached when the problem of international relations is solved; the 'end 
of history' is reached when the 'supreme political good'^^ is attained - and this is 'per-
petual peace'. 
This KANTian peace project has 'the form of a contract describing the legitimacy and 
principles of the voluntary union of all nations which reason demands.' KANT'S 
'highway to peace', to speak in HOBBES'S phrase, sketched out in his Perpetual Peace, 
leads over six Preliminary and three Definitive Articles. The division into these two 
" Cf. C H I A R A B O T T I C I , 'The Domestic Analogy and the Kantian Project of Perpetual Peace\ Journal of 
Political Philosophy, Vol. 11 (2003). 
" Perpetual Peace, Second Definitive Article. 
*^ Metaphysics of Morals, Part I I : Public Right, Conclusion. 
" Universal History, Seventh Proposition [italics omitted]. 
I B I D . , Eighth Proposition [italics omitted]. 
" Metaphysics of Morals, Part I I : Public Right, Conclusion. 
H O F F E , Immanuel Kant, 187. 
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categories must be understood in an evolutionary sense*^ ^ leading basically to two dif-
ferent types of international societies'". The former six articles contain the norms that 
states ought to see as first steps towards peace and are merely 'codes for imperfect 
times'"; they do not rule out the possibility of war under certain circumstances. The 
latter three articles, evolutionary in themselves, are qualitatively of a higher value: they 
are grounded in the a priori postulate of reason 'that all men who can at all influence 
one another must adhere to some kind of civil constitution' in the sense of a 'legal con-
stitution'.''^ While the first six articles constitute an international society based merely 
on these 'imperfect codes', the three Definitive Articles do so by an international social 
contract. KANT'S three Definitive Articles are not only that extra-something because 
they involve the social contract. Much more, they stand for KANT'S closure of the sepa-
ration between the domestic and the international sphere: K A N T operates in 'the unique 
domain of right'.'"' He ascribes to each of these three articles a particular type of consti-
tution: the first article corresponds to the constitution based on ius civitatis; the second 
to the constitution based on ius gentium; and the third to the constitution based on ius 
cosmopoliticum. And these three forms of rightful constitutions are clearly interwoven: 
' i f even only one of these [constitutions]', K A N T says, 'lacks a principle which limits 
external freedom by means of laws, the structure of all the rest must inevitably be un-
dermined, and finally collapse.''" 
According to the First Definitive Article, 'The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be 
Republican'. This form of civil constitution derives solely from the contractus origi-
narius, and 'offers a prospect of attaining perpetual peace': while the 'heads of states 
can never have enough of war''^, an assertion resembling ROUSSEAU'S view, K A N T con-
siders it as 'very natural' that citizens reject declaring war. In case their consent was 
required in such a matter, they would never give it for 'this would mean calling down 
on themselves all the miseries of war'. However, this first article must not be under-
*' Cf. G E O R G C A V A L L A R , Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 1 9 9 9 ) , chaps. 2 , 8. 
™ C f Brown, 'Contractarian Thought and the Constitution of Internationa! Society', 136. 
I B I D . ; see Perpetual Peace, First Section. 
" Perpetual Peace, Introduction to Second Section, Fn. 
" Cf. B O T T I C I , 'The Domestic Analogy and the Kantian Project of Perpetual Peace', 407. 
Metaphysics of Morals, § 43. 
" Perpetual Peace, Introduction. 
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stood as the solution to gain 'the desired result'; as K A N T himself made clear, it only 
'offers a prospect'. Hence, a republican constitution is the first, albeit indispensable, 
step towards the formal institution of the state of peace, i.e. perpetual peace.'^  
This naturally leads to the Second Definitive Article, proposing that 'The Right of Na-
tions shall be based on a Federation of Free States'. Peace is not simply the product of a 
republicanization of states, even i f achieved throughout the world; it can only be the 
result of 'a general agreement between them', forming a foedus pacificum. Only this 
'particular kind of league', which must be established according to the idea of an 'origi-
nal social contracf^^ - thereby conferring legitimacy to this federation - 'would seek to 
end all wars for good'. Only states with republican constitutions, that naturally are tend-
ing to seek peace, are entitled to membership of this federation; and since this 'idea of 
federalism is extending gradually to encompass all states', perpetual peace, indeed, is 
feasible, yet only possible, in such an international society. What would be unthinkable 
to HoBBES and ROUSSEAU , states do form an international society in the sense that they 
shzire a common idea of what ought to be; and this idea is institutionalized by an agree-
ment, i.e. by an international social contract. They share not only the idea that 'There 
shall be no war' but that 'there shall be peace'; peace becomes a duty and the rights of 
each are reciprocally acknowledged and secured within this form of constitution. K A N T 
prototypically uses the social contract as a tool to constitute an international society, and 
derives from this contract the legitimacy not only of this society itself, but also that of 
its guiding principles. Importantly, KANT'S foedus pacificum is not the 'same thing as an 
international state or world republic' which would lead, as ROUSSEAU argues as well, to 
the 'most fearful despotism''^ and would stand in contradiction to the spirit of republi-
canism; it must be viewed solely as a 'lawful federation under a commonly accepted 
international r i g h t ' - yet without having a common coercive power residing over the 
states.*" 
KANT , in addition to the ius civitatis and the contractus originarius as well as the ius 
gentium and the international social contract, envisions also a ius cosmopoliticum; and 
Cr I B I D . , First Definitive Article. 
Metaphysics of Morals, § 54. 
78 
I B I D . 
On the Common Saying..., part III , 90. 
79 , 
C f Perpetual Peace, Second Definitive Article. 
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this, posed in the Third Definitive Article, 'shall be limited to Conditions of Universal 
Hospitality'. However, K A N T does not employ anything such as a cosmopolitan social 
contract. Instead, he derives the cosmopolitan right from the 'spirit of commerce'. In 
stark contrast to ROUSSEAU , he ascribes a positive function to it as it 'cannot exist side 
by side with war', thereby facilitating peace.*' Since he bases the cosmopolitan right on 
every man's 'right to communal possession of the earth's surface', it is obvious why 
K A N T ascribes to every man the right 'not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on 
someone else's territory.' And the right of a stranger to hospitality is the sole right 
which can be derived from this third article. It is therefore fairly conceivable that 
KANT'S cosmopolitanism is not of 'radical kind' since he left state sovereignty un-
touched;*^ that it is 'far more limited than some modern Kantians would wish'*"'. Never-
theless, this is the third and last of the 'three interdependent pillars of peace'***, and it is 
only by virtues of them why K A N T thinks 'can we flatter ourselves that we are continu-
ally advancing towards a perpetual peace.'** 
With regard to international relations, K A N T does persistently speak of morality, of an 
international and cosmopolitan right, of an international social contract, of a foedus 
pacificum, of a 'universal union of mankind', and of perpetual peace. Certainly, this 
must sound fairly ridiculous to HoBBES and ROUSSEAU , the two pessimists who cannot 
even imagine the most primitive form of an international society. To them, there cannot 
exist a common idea among states of what ought to be; legitimacy plays no role in the 
international domain, an international system; it remains and will ever remain in the 
domestic sphere. This makes them such an inappropriate source for deriving proper le-
gitimacy criteria. With KANT , the matter is entirely different. As shown, he has all that it 
takes to be an appropriate source. Yet, he has more to offer: K A N T is neither naive, nor a 
fantasist; he definitely does not dream of establishing a 'community of brotherly love 
and harmony.'*^ This shines through when considering his Perpetual Peace as an evolu-
tionary project, when considering that he sees the foedus pacificum not as an undertak-
" I B I D . , Second Section, First Supplement. 
" Cf. B O U C H E R , Political Theories of International Relations, 270. 
" B R O W N , International Relations Theory..., 37. 
W A D E L . H U N T L E Y , 'Kant's Third Image: Systemic Sources of the Liberal Peace', International Stud-
ies Quarterly, Vol. 40 (1996), 49. 
" C f and citations from Perpetual Peace, Third Definitive Article. 
H O F F E , Immanuel Kant, 198. 
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ing which can be accomplished over-night, but more as a phenomenon based on a cer-
tain kind of time-consuming chain reaction among states. Moreover, for KANT , ' i t is no 
longer a question of whether perpetual peace is really possible or not'; what is impor-
tant, and here, one must bear in mind his moral philosophy, is, that 'even i f the ful f i l -
ment of this pacific intention were forever to remain a pious hope, we should still not be 
deceiving ourselves i f we made it our maxim to work unceasingly towards i t ' ; and 
K A N T makes it explicitly clear that ' i t is our duty to do so'.^ ^ It is KANT'S 'realism' 
which I consider to make a major contribution to the task of defending him as a proper 
source for legitimacy criteria in IR. And indeed, it is his idea of a foedus pacificum 
which RAWLS self-admittedly closely follows in his Law of Peoples, a 'realistic Utopia'. 
4.2 Rawls - the veil of ignorance unveils justice 
4.2.1 The original position: creating a just society 
RAWLS faithfully steps into KANTian footsteps; especially because of the utilisation of 
an international social contract. Like KANT , he brings the social contract and legitimacy 
into the international sphere; not into an international system, but into an international 
society. He may not be as well established in IR as K A N T (and HOBBES and ROUSSEAU), 
yet still, he is a contemporary philosopher, who has had immense impact: RAWLS'S 
Theory of Justice, his magnum opus, is 'very widely considered the most important 
work in political philosophy and perhaps even in moral philosophy since the end of 
World War IF and many conceive it to be the 'most important work in political phi-
losophy since the writings of John Stuart Mil l . '^^ There are certainly several reasons for 
RAWLS'S impact; among these, there is a 'historical' explanation, which needs to be 
addressed very briefly: with KANT , the end of the contract era was (thought to be) 
reached; but it was also reached the peak of the belief in reason as the guiding principle 
of what men ought to do. While in the first wave of modernity, especially with 
MACHIAVELLI and HOBBES , the ought was derived from the is, i.e. from human nature, 
the second wave, especially with KANT , sought not to derive 'moral and political ideals' 
from the is, but derived the ought from reason: men became, so to speak, 'radically lib-
" Metaphysics of Morals, Part II: Public Right, Conclusion. 
Both citations from B U R T O N D R E B E N , 'On Rawls and Political Liberalism', in S A M U E L F R E E M A N (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: C U P , 2003), 316. 
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erated from the tutelage of nature'*^; K A N T made it clear that no longer 'the ought has 
no basis whatever in the is.'^° 
Simply asserting that RAWLSian thinking belonged to the second wave of modernity, 
would mean to undervalue him. One must not forget modernity's third wave; here, and 
closely coimected with the writings of NIETZSCHE , a quite different understanding of the 
sentiment of existence, namely, the experience of 'terror and anguish' rather than the 
second wave's of 'harmony and peace', arose. '^ In addition, one must not forget that 
modem moral philosophy has been mostly preoccupied with utilitarian theories, and 
that political philosophy has somewhat faded away since it lost the struggle against its 
powerful opponents positivism and historicism'^. And with regard to his Law of Peo-
ples, the extension of his Theory of Justice to the international realm, one must not for-
get, that since K A N T history has - with the Napoleonic wars, the colonialism of most of 
the European states competing among themselves for a place in the sun, the First World 
War and the failure of the League of Nations, and World War I I with the Holocaust -
certainly not painted an optimistic picture of world affairs. It is under these historical 
circumstances, R A W L S ' S Theory of Justice, the book 'he became so world famous for'^^, 
must be viewed: he not only reawakens the 'familiar theory of the social contract as 
found, say, in Locke, Rousseau and Kant'^ "*; not only offers an 'alternative systematic 
account of justice that is superior [...] to the dominant utilitarianism of the tradition'^^; 
not only presents a theory that 'is highly Kantian in nature'^^; and not only brings back 
the writing of a Grand Theory to political philosophy. Moreover, RAWLS revitalized the 
question of justice in international relafions. 
It is this topic that he later develops further in his Law of Peoples; here, in KANTian 
fashion, he 'extends the idea of a social contract to the Society of Peoples, and lays out 
the general principles that can and should be accepted by both liberal and nonliberal 
" S T R A U S S , 'The Three Waves of Modernity', 9 2 . 
I B I D . 
" Cf. I B I D . , 9 4 . 
C f S T R A U S S , 'What is Political Philosophy?', 3 -24 . 
" D R E B E N , 'On Rawls and Political Liberalism', 3 1 7 . 
Theory of Justice, § 3 . 
" I B I D . , Preface. 
I B I D . 
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[...] societies as the standard for regulating their behaviour toward one another.'^' In-
deed, RAWLS can claim to have merits on several fi-onts and while the next section deals 
with R A W L S ' S international social contract, the remainder of this section lays down its 
prerequisites. Here, the focus must be on Theory of Justice^^ and on his 'much-
neglected' Political Liberalism (1993).^' It seems appropriate to begin straight away 
with RAWLSian anthropology and his version of the state of nature, i.e. with the two 
constituent parts not only for HoBBES, ROUSSEAU , and K A N T (and in essence any social 
contract theory), but also for RAWLS'S peculiar utilization of an 'original contract'. In-
stead of applying the 'original contract' in order to leave a state of nature, in order to 
'enter a particular society' or to 'set up a particular form of government', the 'guiding 
idea' of his Theory of Justice is 'that the principles of justice for the basic structure of 
society are the object of the original agreement.''°° 
It is unavoidable not to begin with criticism. Any social contract must live with the ac-
cusation of being a highly arbitrary enterprise. It is simply the anthropological ground 
premises - whether it be ARISTOTLE'S zoon politikon or HOBBES'S wolf or ROUSSEAU'S 
noble savage - that determine, via the deduction of a particular state of nature, the par-
ticular form of the social contract, and therefore, the particular state that evolves. And 
the allegation of arbitrariness especially applies to RAWLS - much more than to HOBBES 
and ROUSSEAU ; for the reasons mentioned, K A N T must be left out here. 
While HOBBES'S and ROUSSEAU'S anthropology and the image of the state of nature 
were a quite uncomplicated matter, RAWLS needs to draw on numerous assumptions to 
be able to deduce fi-om the 'original agreement' the two principles of justice. This grants 
the RAWLSian state of nature a particular significant status within his theory. It must be 
noted that RAWLS does not speak of a state of nature, but of an original position. This is 
not a matter of phraseology but is deeply connected to his concept of 'justice as fair-
ness', i.e. 'the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that 
" Law of Peoples, Preface. 
" For the most original account of it, see Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 5 4 ( 1 9 5 7 ) ; see Philosophical Re-
view, Vol . 6 4 ( 1 9 5 8 ) , for its more detailed version. For his fourth book see Collected Papers, edited 
by S A M U E L F R E E M A N (Cambridge, M A : HUP, 1 9 9 9 ) . 
" C f D R E B E N , 'On Rawls and Political Liberalism'; See R A W L S ' S Political Liberalism ( 1 9 9 3 ) , revised 
paperback edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 9 9 6 ) ; hereafter: Political Liberalism. 
C f and citations from Theory of Justice, § 3 . 
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is fair. ' '° ' And these two principles derive from the 'original agreement' made in a fair 
original position, which is by no means an 'unsatisfactory state of affairs fi-om which 
the contractors wish to escape' such as a HoBBESian state of war. 
To RAWLS , the usual escape-logic of the state of nature plays no role whatsoever; as he 
says, the state of nature as a 'historical or hypothetical benchmark is simply irrelevant to 
the question of justice.''"^ Hence, RAWLS'S original position corresponds to the idea of a 
state of nature only insofar as it functions as the 'initial situation' in the contract theory; 
and by considering the original position to be a 'purely hypothetical situation'"''', he 
makes it clear that he offers a 'hypothetical contract'. RAWLS depicts men as being 
equal and assumes 'mutually disinterested rationality'^'^^ among them. Yet since these 
characteristics per se do not guarantee a fair initial situation, the contracting individuals 
are placed under a 'veil of ignorance'. Being almost the defining feature of any social 
contract theory, R A W L S ascribes two meanings to equality: men are equal in the sense of 
being 'moral persons'; and men are equal insofar as each is awarded with the same right 
for making, accepting, and rejecting any proposals during the procedure of choosing the 
two principles of justice.'"^ Moreover, in the original position men do act 'rationally' 
and are 'mutually disinterested'. Connecting his theory with that of rational choice, the 
individual is assumed to 'have a coherent set of preferences between the options open to 
him'; to be able to 'rank these options according to how well they further his purposes'; 
to try to pursue the option that 'wi l l satisfy more of his desires rather than less'; and to 
be realistic in the sense that he wil l follow the option which 'has the greater chance of 
being successfully executed'. Yet, he additionally introduces a 'special assumption', 
that of the 'non-envious' character of these rational actors: they are solely concerned 
with absolute gains and are indifferent to the potential or actual losses of o t h e r s . I t is 
this indifference that leads to, what RAWLS calls, the 'mutual disinterestedness'; these 
rational persons are 'conceived as not taking an interest in one another's interests.''"* At 
«" I B I D . 
'"^  LESSNOFF, Social Contract, 135. 
Cf. and citation from R A W L S , 'Distributive Justice' (1967), in his Collected Papers, 134-5. 
'"^ Theory of Justice, § 20. 
I B I D . , § 2 5 . 
Cf. I B I D . , § 4. 
C f I B I D . , § 25. 
I B I D . . § 3. 
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first sight, it may seem that RAWLS presents an 'egoistic theory'; and it may seem cor-
rect that 'the parties in the original position are rational self-interested individuals who 
are nonenvious and nonaltruistic.^^^^ However, this provides only half of the story. Al-
truism - more precise: a 'limited altruism' or 'benevolence' - indeed does play a role in 
RAWLS'S theory. It is correct that altruism expressis verbis is not a defining characteris-
tic of men. The reason for this is, according to RAWLS , that a theory of justice based on 
'benevolence' would be too complex and unworkable. Yet, the benevolent attitude of 
men, albeit thin and limited as it is, is introduced through the backdoor since it is the 
product of the notion of 'mutual disinterestedness' and the veil of ignorance."" 
This latter and last feature of the original position is probably the most important, yet 
also the most controversial. As said, 'justice as fairness' requires an 'initial situation 
that is fair'; hence, in the original position, the contracting individuals must be 'fairly 
situated'. Only proving that his theory is not an 'egoistical theory', RAWLS says: 
'Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds 
and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantages'; 
and the utensil to accomplish this is the veil of ignorance. Covering the parties with 
such a veil provides them only with particular kinds of information or facts; it restricts 
certain knowledge in order to ensure that 'they are obliged to evaluate principles solely 
on the basis of general considerations': the parties know, for instance, the 'general facts 
about human society', and the 'basis of social organization', as well as understand 'po-
litical affairs and the principles of economic theory'; they do not know 'particular facts' 
such as their 'place in society', 'class position', 'social status', or their 'intelligence and 
strength'. In addition, they do not know the 'particular circumstances of their own soci-
ety' in the sense of not knowing its 'economic or political situation' or 'the level of civi-
lization and culture'. The veil of ignorance completes the characterisation of RAWLS'S 
initial situation, and its implications are substantial. It not only secures but also fosters 
equality; it prevents the assumed mutually disinterested rationality becoming accused of 
crude egoism; it supports designing the original position as a fair situation; and it pro-
hibits that the contract theory's 'outcome is biased by arbitrary contingencies'. Fur-
thermore, RAWLS believes that without the veil of ignorance, he 'would not be able to 
M E D I N A , Social Contract Theories..., 8 4 [italics added]. 
"° C f Theory of Justice, § 25. 
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work out any definite theory of justice at a l l . ' " ' Neither HoBBES, nor R O U S S E A U , nor 
K A N T needed to draw on as many premises with regard to the pre-contractual situation 
as R A W L S does. In order to arrive at the desired result, he has to depict men as being 
mutually disinterested, non-envious, and limitedly altruistic rational animals who are 
equal with respect to their quality as moral persons, to their right to choose, and to their 
highly restricted knowledge under the veil of ignorance. It goes without saying, 'that the 
parties in the original position are theoretically defined individuals.'"^ 
R A W L S ' S contract theory is concerned with the 'social justice' of the 'basic structure of 
society'; it aims to develop the 'principles of justice' - the principles that regulate how 
the 'major social institutions', i.e. the 'political constitution' and the primary 'economic 
and social arrangements', ought to distribute the so-called 'primary social goods', i.e. 
'rights', 'liberties', 'opportunities', and 'income and wealth', among society's members. 
These principles of justice derive from a social contract, that is, from the contracted 'fair 
agreement' over these principles which were chosen behind the veil of ignorance.""' 
Considering all the circumstances and qualifications of the original position, the con-
tracting parties, according to R A W L S , would never 'agree to a principle which may re-
quire lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater sum of advantages 
enjoyed by others'"'', i.e. the utilitarian logic. Instead, and rather diametrically opposed 
to that, they consent to the two principles of justice. 
The first principle states that every person has to have an 'equal right to basic liberties': 
these are the right to vote and to hold public office (i.e. 'political liberty'); the freedom 
of speech and assembly, of thought, and from psychological oppression; and the right to 
hold personal property. The second principle requires that social and economic inequali-
ties are arranged in such a way that they are to the 'greatest benefit of the least advan-
taged', i.e. the 'difference principle'. In addition, these two principles of justice are hi-
erarchical: the first is, so to speak, superior to the second. According to the rule of the 
'priority of liberty', the 'basic liberties can be restricted only for the sake of liberty' and 
must never be sacrificed for economic advantages."^ Adding to the argument that 
" ' Cf. and citations from IBID., § 24. 
" M B I D . , §25. 
IBID., § § 2 , 3 , I I . 
IBID., § 3 . 
I B I D . , § § 11,46. 
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R A W L S requires too many prerequisites, he needs to introduce one further assumption 
for the original position. In order to arrive at these two principles - which contribute to 
'make a constitutional democracy'"^, or more precise: to make a 'liberal welfare state'-
he assumes general 'risk-averseness' on part of the individuals. The contracting parties 
are driven by the 'maximin rule' which makes them, when having to choose between 
alternatives, 'to adopt the alternative the worst outcome of which is superior to the 
worst outcome of others.'"^ Politically, R A W L S ' S approach might be well interpreted as 
a combination of 'principles of social and economic equality associated with European 
socialism with [.. .] principles of pluralistic toleration and personal freedom associated 
with American liberalism'; yet in the end, it is 'closer in spirit to European social de-
mocracy than to any mainstream American political movement'."^ And leaving aside 
the massive criticism evoked by the political implications of his justice as fairness, now, 
the contractarianism-contractualism divide must come to light again. Whereas H O B B E S 
offers the proto-typical social contract being a result of rationally self-interested bar-
gaining, i.e. the contractarian line, ROUSSEAU and K A N T clearly represent the contractu-
alist approach; and R A W L S follows them. 
In view of all the prerequisites and qualifications the original position is equipped with, 
and taking further into consideration R A W L S ' S emphasis that it must not be seen as a 
'general assembly'; that it 'must be interpreted so that one can at any time adopt its per-
spective'; and that, therefore, the 'restrictions must be such that the same principles are 
always chosen'; from this it naturally follows, what R A W L S explicitly states himself, 
'that the parties have no basis for bargaining in the usual sense.' Instead, in the R A W L -
sian initial situation 'each is forced to choose for all ' ; and while this resembles 
R O U S S E A U ' S volonte generale, the key to such a conception must be found almost solely 
in the veil of ignorance. The veil is in effect similar to K A N T and his categorical impera-
tive insofar as he, too, when employing his (a priori) universal-law logic, has denied the 
IBID., §39 . 
IBID., §26 . 
Both citations from THOMAS NAGEL, 'Rawls and Liberalism', in FREEMAN (ed.). The Cambridge 
Companion to Rawls, 63. Considering these remarks, it should not be surprising why RAWLS is, 
among others, under attack from both libertarians and socialists (see, e.g., NoziCK's Anarchy, Stale, 
and Utopia, and BRIAN BARRY'S The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), re-
spectively). For a good overview of RAWLS'S critics see CHANDRAN KUKHATAS AND PHILIP PETTIT, 
Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); for specific criticism see 
NORMAN DANIELS (ed.), Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice, revised edi-
tion (Stanford: SUP, 1989). 
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role of knowledge about personal circumstances."^ Hence, for many critics, due to a 
lack of rationally self-interested bargaining, R A W L S ' S Theory of Justice does not involve 
a contract theory at all.'^° However, his two principles of justice do derive from a fair 
agreement; yet from a contract in the contractualists' sense a la R O U S S E A U and K A N T . 
Additionally, the RAWLsian version of the original agreement with its peculiar subject 
matter, i.e. the 'principles of justice for the basic structure of society', involves neither 
an 'original contract' in the historical sense, nor a 'hypothetical contract' in the H O B B E -
Sian and RousSEAUian sense. Instead, it somewhat resembles the unhistorical KANTian 
contract being an idea of reason. In R A W L S ' S 'justice as fairness', the legitimacy of the 
'basic structure of society' solely stems from the fair contractual agreement made by the 
parties in the original position behind the veil of ignorance; they consented to the two 
principles of justice according to which the society ought to be arranged. 
Now, before turning to R A W L S ' S international social contract, it is necessary to address 
the distinction between legitimacy in the sense of Theory of Justice and what he calls 
the 'liberal principle of legitimacy' worked out in Political Liberalism; that is the dis-
tinction between 'ideal theory' and 'non-ideal theory', respectively, and which is so 
important in his Law of Peoples. R A W L S ' S Theory of Justice aimed at working out 'from 
the idea of the social contract, represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, a theory of 
justice that is no longer open to objections often thought fatal to i t ' ' ^ ' ; it operated within 
the context of a 'perfectly just society', i.e. a 'well-ordered society'.'^^ Turning, so to 
speak, from ideal to non-ideal theory he changes the focus in Political Liberalism inso-
far as he 'considers how the well-ordered democratic society of justice as fairness may 
establish and preserve unity and stability given the reasonable pluralism characteristic 
of it''^"*; while the picture of the 'perfectly just society', according to R A W L S himself, 
'contradicts the facts of reasonable pluralism', his Political Liberalism not only 'regards 
that society as impossible' but also develops the solution to that problem.'^'* 
Theory of Justice, § 24, see § 40. 
See, e.g., JEAN HAMPTON, 'Contracts and Choices: Does Rawls Have a Social Contract Theory?', 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 77 (1980). 
Political Liberalism, Introduction to the Paperback Edition; Public Reason Revisited, § 7.3. 
Cf. Theory of Justice, § § 1 , 2 . 
Political Liberalism, Lecture IV, Introduction. 
Citations from Public Reason Revisited, § 7.3. 
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The idea of the liberal principle of legitimacy is closely intertwined with the idea of 
'public reason', which, in turn, is only feasible within the framework of a 'constitutional 
democracy' (for which, in turn again, he provided the philosophical conception'^^ in his 
Theory of Justice). In addition, it is intertwined with the question of exercising political 
power - i.e. the traditional subject matter of any contract theory and legitimacy - since, 
exactly because of granting pluralism in a society, some individuals 'may not accept the 
reasons widely said to justify the general structure of political a u t h o r i t y ' o r , in a 
broader sense, may not accept the basic structure of society. Based on the 'criterion of 
reciprocity', the liberal principle of legitimacy considers the exercise of political power 
as legitimate only when it is carried out 'in accordance with a constitution the essentials 
of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the 
light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.''^' This is the 
RAWLSian version of the legitimacy of political power, rooted in, what he calls, 'public 
reason', when assuming a constitutional democratic society with 'reasonable pluralism'. 
It is, so to speak, the idea of legitimacy in the light of his non-ideal theory which must 
not be conflised with legitimacy in the sense of justice as fairness, his ideal theory. 
Having these two meanings of legitimacy in mind, we must now turn to R A W L S ' S con-
tract theory and the question of legitimacy on the international sphere. Not only envis-
aging an international social contract like K A N T , he also follows him insofar as he rec-
ognizes the interplay - yet of course not in the HOBBESian sense - between the domestic 
and the international; indeed, a 'constitutional regime must establish an effective Law of 
Peoples in order to realize fully the freedom of its citizens.''^^ It may be appropriate to 
say that, because of the great many premises R A W L S draws, it is in fact the original po-
sition which creates the just society. The next section aims to show why it may be ap-
propriate to speak of R A W L S ' S 'Society of Peoples' as being ' K A N T light'. 
4.2.2 The Society of Peoples: Kant light 
The very fact that K A N T employed an international social contract for setting up his 
foedus pacificum made him an optimist; and in this sense R A W L S is an optimist, too. 
'^ ^ Cf. Theory of Justice, Preface for the Revised Edition. 
Political Liberalism, Lecture IV, § 1.2. 
IBID., § 1.3; see also Public Reason Revisited, § 1.2. 
Law of Peoples, Introduction. 
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Like K A N T , he also uses an international social contract in order to constitute an interna-
tional society, his 'Society of Peoples', and to define the 'basic principles governing it ' , 
his 'Eight Principles of the Law of Peoples'. Hence, two questions naturally arise: Who 
are the legitimate members of this Society of Peoples? and What is legitimate foreign 
policy behaviour regulating this Society? In his endeavour to take legitimacy beyond 
borders, R A W L S draws heavily on KANTian assumptions; but he also departs from him 
on crucial points. 
His Society of Peoples, as sketched out in the Law of Peoples^^^, must be seen in the 
light of the procedural account of justice as fairness; and it involves the concepts of the 
original position with its peculiar qualifications such as the veil of ignorance. As it was 
domestically: it is the veil of ignorance that unveils justice. Yet the Society of Peoples 
also involves the fact of reasonable pluralism among peoples, the fact he acknowledged 
in his Political Liberalism with regard to the domestic context. Interestingly and contro-
versially, the Eight Principles - the shared ideas of the peoples agreed to via a social 
contract - are somewhat based on the Theory of Justice's first principle, the equality 
principle. Much to the regret of many cosmopolitan liberals, they entirely do leave aside 
the 'difference principle'. And indeed, this is questionable when simply considering the 
'two main ideas' that 'motivate the Law of Peoples'. Firstly, R A W L S concedes that the 
'great evils of human history' - he names: unjust war, oppression, religious persecution, 
denial of liberty of conscience, starvation, poverty, genocide, and mass murder - do 
'follow from political injustice'; and, secondly, he proposes, that 'once the gravest 
forms of political injustice are eliminated by following just (or at least decent) social 
policies and establishing just (or at least decent) basic institutions, these great evils will 
eventually d isappear . 'Yet still, B E I T Z , one of the most prominent critics, acknowl-
edges R A W L S ' S 'duty of assistance', i.e. the international 'substitute' for the domestic 
difference principle, as 'highly progressive', given the current political circum-
stances.'-" 
The Society of Peoples includes 'all those peoples who follow the ideals and principles 
of the Law of Peoples in their mutual relations'; in other words: legitimate members of 
this Society are so-called Peoples who simply follow the Eight Principles of the Law of 
For the original (quite different) version of 1993, see his Collected Papers. 
Law of Peoples, Introduction. 
C f CHARLES R. BEITZ, 'Rawls's Law of Peoples', Ethics, Vol. 110 (2000), 694. 
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Peoples. And according to R A W L S , both 'constitutional liberal democratic govern-
ments', i.e. 'reasonable liberal p e o p l e s ' a n d , controversially, non-liberal govern-
ments, i.e. 'decent peoples', do follow the Law of Peoples. These two types of domestic 
societies - R A W L S distinguishes in total between five - are subsumed under the label of 
'well-ordered peoples'.'^^ Hence, it is the well-ordered peoples that are the legitimate 
members of the Society of Peoples. 
Importantly, R A W L S deliberately differentiates between peoples and states. In contrast 
to the realist understanding of states, which 'are often seen as rational [actors], anx-
iously concerned with their power-their capacity (military, economic, diplomatic) to 
influence other states-and always guided by their basic i n t e r e s t s ' he wishes to em-
phasize the 'moral character' and the ability of, what he calls, 'moral learning' of the 
peoples. Therefore, only peoples, not states, e.g. 'outlaw states', are capable of becom-
ing a member of the Society of Peoples, and they are the primary actors in that Soci-
ety.'"*^ The basic idea of R A W L S is to situate all the 'liberal peoples', like the individuals 
in the domestic case, in an original position. Here, the contracting parties, i.e. the 'ra-
tional representatives of liberal peoples', elaborate and agree to the Eight Principles. 
The parties, while being assumed as being free, equal, and rational actors, find them-
selves under the veil of ignorance. In the initial situation, under this veil, they are de-
prived of a certain kind of information about the liberal people whose interests they rep-
resent: they do know that they represent liberal peoples; yet, they do not know, for in-
stance, its 'size of territory and population', its 'relative strength', its 'extent of natural 
resources', and its 'level of economic development'.''^^ 
As in the domestic context, the contract the liberal peoples enter into is non-historical 
and hypothetical; again, 'hypothetical' understood somewhat in the KANTian sense; 
certainly not in sense of H O B B E S and R O U S S E A U . The parties, according to R A W L S , do 
agree to the following Eight Principles which 'would be honored, i f not all the time, 
then most of the time, so that it would be recognized as governing the relations among 
Hereafter: liberal peoples. 
C f and citation from Law of Peoples, Introduction. The other three types of societies, namely, outlaw 
states, burdened societies, and benevolent absolutisms, are, on the contrary, non-well-ordered. 
IBID., § 2.2. 
Cf. IBID., §§2.1 , 2.2, 5.1. 
Cf. IBID., § 3.2. 
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them''". The principles they consent to are: firstly, that 'Peoples are free and independ-
ent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples'; sec-
ondly, that 'Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings'; thirdly, that 'Peoples are 
equal and are parties to the agreement that bind them'; fourthly, that 'Peoples are to 
observe treaty of non-intervention'; fifthly, that 'Peoples have the right to self-defense 
but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense'; sixthly, that 'Peoples 
are to honour human rights'; seventhly, that 'Peoples are to observe certain specified 
restrictions in the conduct of war'; eighthly and lastly, that 'Peoples have a duty to as-
sist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or 
decent political or social regime'. 
Thus far, R A W L S ' S Society of Peoples shows a remarkable similarity to K A N T : liberal 
peoples, i.e. 'constitutional democracies' whose 'basic structure' became just via a so-
cial contract, engage with each other in societal relations; they do so by virtue of an 
international social contract, and agree on certain principles that govern this society and 
'make room for various forms of cooperative associations and federations among peo-
ples''''^. In addition, R A W L S follows K A N T in rejecting a 'world-state' leading to nothing 
more than 'global despotism'; and he does also when presuming that liberal peoples do 
not go to war with each other, hereby paying his respect to the democratic peace argu-
ment.'''^ He seems to fully approve K A N T ' S reasoning that the way to peaceful relations 
among peoples can only lead over an international social contract made among peoples, 
which are in turn the product of a social contract between its citizens - in K A N T ' S case 
the constitutional republics, in R A W L S ' S case the constitutional democracies. He also 
seems to approve that only social-contract-states obeying the Eight Principles are enti-
tled to (legitimate) membership of the Society of Peoples. Yet, decent peoples, too, 
obey the Eight Principles. 
Decent peoples are 'member[s] in good standing in a reasonable Society of Peoples'; 
they are, so to speak, 'legitimate' members of the Society. R A W L S makes it very clear 
that decent peoples must be distinguished from liberal peoples; he considers a people to 
be decent when it fulfils at least the following criteria: non-aggressiveness towards 
137 IBID., § 18.1. 
IBID., § 4 . 1 . 
IBID. 
Cf. IBID., § § 4 . 1 , 5 . 
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other peoples and respect for their political and social order; appreciation and protection 
of human rights on part of their members; guidzuice of the law 'by a common good idea 
of justice'.''*' Procedurally analogous to the practice known from the liberal peoples, 
R A W L S employs a second international social contract, in which the decent peoples 
agree to exactly the Eight Principles; they, too, contract from behind the veil of igno-
rance. And here, R A W L S departs from K A N T significantly. In the case of decent peoples 
there is 'no original position argument deriving the form of its basic structure''''^ as it 
was, naturally enough, the case with liberal peoples. Hence, the Society of Peoples in-
volves merely three contracts: one domestic social contract for the liberal peoples, and 
one international social contract for each of the liberal and decent peoples. 
Since decent peoples accept the Eight Principles, which make them members of the So-
ciety of Peoples, R A W L S gives up a crucial KANTian notion, namely, that of making a 
people's legitimacy dependent on a domestic social contract. R A W L S offers good rea-
sons to do so, and although he still is much in concord with K A N T , this marks a signifi-
cant break with him. Yet this is also the point where the divide within international lib-
eralism in the context of international distributive justice begins shining through more 
and more: R A W L S , as a proponent of social liberalism, on one side; cosmopolitan liber-
als (not to mention libertarians) on the other.'"^ 
By accepting decent peoples, which lack a social contract domestically, R A W L S takes 
into consideration what he domestically needed his Political Liberalism for, i.e. the 'fact 
of reasonable pluralism'. Domestically, peoples' citizens follow different, sometimes 
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral comprehensive doctrines; therefore, it 
was necessary to employ the conception of public reason leading to the criterion of re-
ciprocity, i.e. the liberal principle of legitimacy. R A W L S , correctly, sees the same kind of 
pluralism, though probably even stronger in its effect, functioning on the international 
level. Hence, liberal peoples must respect the comprehensive doctrines of non-liberal 
peoples, provided they meet the criteria as set out for the decent peoples and respect the 
Eight principles. To require all peoples to be liberal and to make non-liberal peoples 
Cf. and citation from IBID., § 8.2; for the description of a hypothetical decent people named Kazanisian 
see § 9.3. 
IBID., § 8.4. 
For a classification of the different perspectives on international distributive justice see CHARLES R. 
BEITZ, 'International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought', World Poli-
tics, Vol.51 (1999) . 
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subject of 'politically enforced sanctions' would mean to disrespect the decent peoples 
(and their citizens) causing only 'great bitterness and resentment'. Instead, it is R A W L S ' S 
strong belief that '[Ijiberal peoples must try to encourage decent peoples and not frus-
trate their vitality by coercively insisting that all societies be liberal'; he considers it as 
most important to 'maintaining mutual respect among peoples.'''*'' This is why R A W L S 
extends the Society of Peoples to non-liberal peoples; contrary to K A N T , he makes them, 
together with the liberal peoples, equally legitimate members of this international soci-
ety. 
Yet, the Law of Peoples also describes how the well-ordered peoples ought to deal with 
their non-well-ordered counterparts. Taking into consideration the 'highly nonideal 
conditions of our world with its great injustices and widespread social evils', it offers 
guidance for well-ordered peoples when engaging with, what R A W L S calls, outlaw states 
and burdened societies. When moving from ideal to non-ideal theory, he takes it as a 
'basic characteristic of well-ordered peoples that they wish to live in a world in which 
all peoples accept and follow the (ideal of the) Law of Peoples';''*^ more so, they ac-
tively, albeit not aggressively, 'seek a world in which all peoples have a well-ordered 
regime.''''^ The Eight Principles are 'familiar and traditional principles of justice among 
free and democratic peoples' and resemble not only K A N T ' S Six Preliminary Articles 
but also the principles of international law. Yet, particularly the eighth principle with its 
duty to assist burdened societies - i.e. societies 'whose historical, social, and economic 
circumstances make their achieving a well-ordered regime [.. .] difficult i f not impossi-
ble''''^ - has come under fire. As R A W L S himself admits: 'This principle is especially 
controversial.'"''^ In the domestic context, individuals were concerned with the equality 
of the 'primary social goods'; in the original position on the international level, both 
liberal and decent peoples are interested in the 'equality of and the equal rights of all 
peoples'. Domestically, the difference principle was then agreed to in order to justify 
inequalities among individuals; internationally, a corresponding principle is simply ir-
relevant: peoples strictly 'insist on an equality among themselves as peoples' and want 
C f La\v of Peoples, §§ 7.1, 7.2; citations from § 7.2. 
C f and citations from IBID., § 13.1. 
'^<'IBID.,§ 15.5. 
IBID.,§ 13.1. 
C f and citations from IBID., § 4.1. 
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nothing more than 'to preserve the equality and independence of their own society.'*'*^ 
Taking this assumed supremacy of equality together with the well-ordered peoples' as-
piration for ever-expanding the Society of Peoples, it becomes clear why they do not 
contract into something similar to a global 'Difference Principle', but - to the regret of 
cosmopolitan liberals'^" - merely into a duty of assistance. 
This duty to assist a burdened society endures until it has become a well-ordered peo-
ple; and once it follows the Eight Principles and becomes a (legitimate) member of the 
Society of Peoples, and once it is capable to determining its own course, any 'further 
assistance is not required, even though the now well-ordered society may still be rela-
tively poor.''^' Yet although the duty of assistance may for some not go far enough; 
although his extension of the Society of Peoples to decent peoples is in dispute with 
regard to its implications for the meaning and value of human rights; and although 
R A W L S constantly speaks of peoples and not of states and of their limited sovereignty, 
his theory is still said to be Westphalian in nature'". Nevertheless, given current world 
affairs, R A W L S ' S Law of Peoples indeed is 'highly progressive'; and not only this; it is 
also optimistic since he takes the social contract and the concept of legitimacy beyond 
borders. That makes him, in general, an appropriate source for legitimacy criteria in IR. 
H O B B E S and R O U S S E A U , this goes without saying, and R A W L S are worlds apart: the 
former two were never able to envisage something similar to a Society of Peoples, an 
international society where its members, being moral in nature, have contracted on 
common principles which ought to govern their relations. R A W L S does exactly this; he 
extends the idea of the social contract, hypothetical as it is, to the international level. 
Indeed, he is not so strict in the requirements for (legitimate) membership of the Society 
of Peoples as K A N T was; only constitutional republics were allowed to join the foedus 
pacificum whereas R A W L S opens the door for peoples lacking a domestic social con-
tract. This is: ' K A N T light'. Nonetheless, R A W L S follows K A N T closely, both domesti-
cally and internationally. More than K A N T , R A W L S emphasizes his belief that such a 
C f and citations from IBID., § 4.4. 
For an affirmative view of such a global difference principle see B E I T Z , Political Theory and Interna-
tional Relations, part III; see also B A R R Y ' S The Liberal Theory of Justice, chap. 12; THOMAS W. 
POGGE, 'An Egalitarian Law of Peoples', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23 (1994). 
Cf. Law of Peoples, § 16.2; citation from § 15.4. 
See, e.g., BElTZ, 'Rawls's Law of Peoples'; ALLEN BUCHANAN, 'Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a 
Vanished Westphalian World', Ethics, Vol. 110 (2000). 
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Society of Peoples is possible: it is not that it must exist, or that it will exist, but it is 
possible. He says that '[rjejecting the idea of a just and well-ordered Society of Peoples 
as impossible wil l [...] determine our politics in a significant way''^^ and this is simply 
a different narrative for K A N T ' S commanding that even i f the foedus paciftcum were a 
'pious hope' then it was 'still our maxim to work unceasingly towards it' - in R A W L S ' S 
case: 'work unceasingly towards' a world where all the 'great evils have been elimi-
nated and just (or at least decent) basic institutions established by liberal and decent 
peoples who honor the Law of Peoples'.'^ "* This world that R A W L S envisages is not a 
mere Utopia; is not the product of an 'Utopian realism''^^; but it is a 'realistic Utopia'. 
R A W L S has drawn on several 'basic facts', such as reasonable pluralism and, probably 
most importantly, liberal democratic peace; according to him, these 'can be confirmed 
by reflecting on history and political experience' and 'were not discovered by social 
theory'. This makes the Utopia a 'realistic Utopia'. And with this approach he admittedly 
follows R O U S S E A U who has taken 'men as they are' and the 'laws as they might be' 
when asking what social order could 'make the chains legitimate'.'^^ In the end, it must 
be said that R A W L S is, akin to his fellow optimist K A N T , certainly 'neither naive nor a 
fantasist'; and exactly this makes the closing remark in R A W L S ' S Law of Peoples even 
more truthful and credible: ' I f a reasonably just Society of Peoples whose members sub-
ordinate their power to reasonable aims is not possible, and human beings are largely 
amoral, i f not incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask, with Kant, whether it 
is worthwhile for human beings to live on the earth.''^^ 
Law of Peoples, § 18.3. 
IBID., § 18.2. 
For this difference see CHRIS BROWN, 'The construction of a 'realistic Utopia': John Rawls and inter-
national political theory'. Review of International Studies, Vol. 2 8 (2002), 20-1. 
C f Law of Peoples, Introduction; see Contrat Social, bk. I, para. 2. 
Law of Peoples, § 18.3. 
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5. Defending Kant, the Social Contract, and Legitimacy 
5.1 Defending Legitimacy: a modern concept under post-modern attack 
The question R A W L S leaves the reader with whether it was worthwhile for human beings 
to live on an earth where power and amorality reign is a rhetorical question; it is in no 
need of an answer. Yet, the focus of this concluding chapter must be of a different kind: 
it defends K A N T ' S social contract; it defends K A N T as the proper source for legitimacy 
criteria in IR. And although having already 'defeated' positivist international system 
theory, it must defend legitimacy against another 'enemy' residing in IR theory: post-
modernism. This is why this section has its starting point in N I E T Z S C H E , in his loss of 
belief in reason and rationality; he is as closely connected to the third wave of moder-
nity as H O B B E S is to the first wave and R O U S S E A U , K A N T , and ideologically R A W L S are 
to the second. From here to IR, especially to post-modem 'theories' of IR, the way is 
not very far. 
The main point is to demonstrate the attack legitimacy and the social contract are facing 
from this direction. Yet, post-modernism does not stand in the way of the overall argu-
ment: legitimacy needs to be studied in IR; it needs to be studied normatively bearing in 
mind its moral nature; and it is only normative international society theorists who are 
able to become engaged with international legitimacy for only they can get engaged 
properly with moral and political philosophy. It was also argued that legitimacy criteria 
must be derived from social contract theory; that H O B B E S , R O U S S E A U , K A N T , and 
R A W L S are a representative selection; and that only the latter two, the optimists, are an 
adequate source for such criteria. The further course of the chapter corresponds to these 
claims. The second section focuses on the social contract. It critically assesses the 'con-
tracts' of these four theorists against the ideal-types and criticisms as they were laid out 
earlier, and demonstrates their major similarities and differences. It argues that in the 
endeavour to find a proper source for legitimacy criteria, K A N T ' S contractus originarius 
is superior. The last section leaves, to some extent, the level of the social contract and 
concentrates on the concept of legitimacy and its role in IR. Maintaining the argument 
against orthodox IR and supportive of normative approaches, I relate the pessimists, 
H O B B E S and R O U S S E A U , to positivist international system theory and the optimists, 
K A N T and R A W L S , to normative international society theory. The pessimists are rather 
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inappropriate reference points for international legitimacy; the optimists are a rather 
reasonable and fitting source - particularly, K A N T . 
It is certainly true, though not good, that international legitimacy is not a core issue of 
scientific enquiry in IR, at least when understood as a moral concept. Unfortunately, 
there are many other topics that are given priority - not least because of the dominance 
of orthodox IR, which is ontologically and methodologically unable to study legitimacy 
in IR, and to study it normatively. And even i f it was possible to shake off the chains 
put on by orthodox IR, the next 'enemy' is already waiting. This 'enemy', oddly the 
arch-enemy of orthodox IR, of (neo)-realism in particular, poses an even 'greater threat' 
to international legitimacy; and it may be rather well described as IR's 'latest bete 
rto/re'': namely, post-modernism.^ 
The 'threat', that comes from it, is two-fold, but interrelated: first, the attack on progress 
and reason; second, the attack on legitimacy. The proper starting point is N I E T Z S C H E . It 
is he who 'inaugurates' the third wave of modernity; he is the intellectual father of 
'[t]his last epoch' with its radical questioning of the project of modernity.^ This 
NiETZSCHEan epoch or wave is seen as the 'turning point' into post-modernity. 
N I E T Z S C H E , according to H A B E R M A S , renounces the HEGELian 'hope in a dialectic of 
enlightenment' and, in his peculiar way, 'bids farewell' to it altogether.'' As a result -
and despite its other philosophical origins, esp. German romanticism^ - it is N I E T Z S C H E , 
the 'counterauthority to reason'^ who almost habitually stands as the 'prophet of the 
postmodern''. 'The' post-modernity - nothing could be more contradictory in the eyes 
' RICHARD D E V E T A K , 'Postmodernism' in S C O T T B U R C H I L L E T A L . (eds.), Theories of international rela-
tions, 2"^ edn. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 181. 
^ It almost goes without saying that the following on post-modernism can be nothing more than a tiny 
sketch of an incredibly large and diverse whole. 
' STRAUSS, 'What is Political Philosophy?', 56-7; C f STRAUSS, 'The Three Waves of Modernity', 94-8. 
" C f JURGEN HABERMAS, 'The Entry into Postmodemity: Nietzsche as a Turning Point', in his The Phi-
losophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, translated by FREDERICK LAWRENCE (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 84, 86. 
^ For an philosophic-historical overview, see, e.g., MICHAEL D R O L E T , 'Introduction', in his (ed.) The 
Postmodernism Reader: Foundational texts (London: Routledge, 2004), 13-8; and, G E R A L D HOLTON, 
'The Rise of Postmodemisms and the "End of Science'", Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 61 
(2000). 
* HABERMAS, 'The Entry into Postmodemity: Nietzsche as a Turning Point', 94. 
' KEN GEMES, 'Postmodemism's Use and Abuse of Nietzsche', Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search, Vol. 62 (2001), 337. For a critical standpoint on this matter, see IBID. It is worth mentioning 
that in the following the terms 'postmodern', 'post-modernism', and 'post-modernity', are, despite 
their different connotations, used interchangeably; for their specific nuances see, e.g., D R O L E T , 'In-
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of 'the' post-modems, which in turn is no less contradictory - is often understood as a 
particular historical period. However - following J E A N - F R A N C O I S L Y O T A R D , besides 
J A C Q U E S D E R R I D A * and M I C H E L F O U C A U L T ^ one of the most influential devotees of 
post-modernism - to be post-modem does not mean to be part of a certain epoch; but 
instead, to be part of a certain 'mood' or to possess and employ a certain 'state of 
mind.''" To understand the post-modem 'state of mind', one may look at the modem 
'mood' first: it is modem to prefer 'the quantitative over the qualitative'; to favour 'the 
objective over the subjective' and 'the sceptical over the mystical'; to disconnect 'the 
natural from the supematural'; to connect scientific knowledge with evolution; to ele-
vate knowledge to tmth; to equate the truth with the good; and to correlate ratio with 
progress. Since the lack of knowledge is the source of any misery and despair, the con-
tinual striving for and employment of knowledge, education, and reason frees men from 
suppression and leads them into liberation - leads them from moral decay to overall 
human progress.'' 
With K A N T , the 'intellectual climax of European Enlightenment' reaches its peak; 
hence, so does the belief in an indispensable positive correlation of ratio and progress. 
This leads to the post-modem 'mood': in general, it denies the idea of necessary pro-
gress; it denies the teleological character of history; and it denies that there is one 
'tmth'. What does exist is neither the product or the creation of God, nor of history, nor 
of reason, instead, it is the result of the arbitrary actions made by human beings; every-
thing is nothing more than: 'Choice posing as tmth'.'^ 
Although many other characteristics of the post-modem 'state of mind' could be 
pointed out - and certainly more cautiously - this is surely sufficient for turning now to 
the post-modem attack on legitimacy. Here, and in post-modem circles in general, 
troduction'; JOCHEN SCHULTE-SASSE, 'Modernity and Modernism, Postmodemity and Postmodern-
ism: Framing the Issue', Cultural Critique, No. 5 (1986-87). 
' See, e.g., his Of Grammatology (1967), translated by GAYATRI CHAKRAVORY SPIVAK (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
' See, e.g., his The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), translated by A. M. SHERIDAN SMITH (London: 
Tavistock, 1972). 
'Rules and Paradoxes and Svelte Appendix', Cultural Critique, No. 5 (1986-87) , 209. 
" Cf. ROBERT HOLLINGER, Postmodernism and the Social Sciences: A Thematic Approach (London: 
Sage, 1994), 7-13; HOLTON, 'The Rise of Postmodemisms and the "End of Science'", 329. 
Cf. JOHN A. VASQUEZ, 'The Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International 
Relations Theory After Enlightenment's Fall', in BOOTH AND SMITH (eds.). International Relations 
Theory Today, 219-21; citation from p. 220. 
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L Y O T A R D ' S term 'grand narrative''^ (or 'meta-narrative') plays the crucial role. Any 
modem science that 'seeks the truth' needs to 'legitimate the rules of its own game'; it 
must declare, justify, and defend what is ontologically, methodologically, and epistemo-
logically proper conduct in order to achieve universally valid results. Thus, it needs a 
point of reference for what proper conduct is, and what it is not. These reference points 
are found in the grand narratives, i.e. the grand theories of philosophy, of philosophy of 
science. In this sense, L Y O T A R D employs the term modem to refer to 'any science that 
legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit ap-
peal to some grand narrative'.^'* And science, especially the social sciences, is power-
f i i l : it is not only the scientific enquiry in certain matters human beings somehow have 
to deal with, but it is also 'a practice that creates a mode of life ' ; and consequently, a 
practice that simultaneously 'destroys other ways of thinking and living'.'^ This is why 
the post-modem becomes deeply sceptical about any science's reference points. Thus, 
post-modem is, according to L Y O T A R D (and self-admittedly 'simplified to the ex-
treme'), defined as 'incredulity toward metanarratives.''^ It is then only a small step for 
the post-moderns to be not only concemed with the mles of the science game, but also 
with the rules of the legitimacy game in the political sense; with regard to IR, with the 
'games' of IR theory and intemational legitimacy. 
Within IR, many post-modem scholars" - mainly by means of deconstmcting texts and 
by employing a NiETZSCHEan genealogical method - are trying their best 'to disturb 
habitual ways of thinking and acting in intemational relations''^; they are trying their 
best to prove how (neo-)realism, which they unsurprisingly have identified as the 
'dominant discourse' within IR, 'stmctures and constitutes reality, ordering the world to 
the advantage of some and to the disadvantage of others''^. They constantly have in 
'Rules and Paradoxes and Svelte Appendix', 209. 
Citations from JEAN-FRANCOIS L Y O T A R D , The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979), 
translated by GEOFF B E N N I N G T O N and BRIAN MASSUMI (Manchester: MUP, 2001) , xxiii [italics 
added]. 
Both citations from VASQUEZ, 'The Post-Positivist Debate...', 222. 
'* LYOTARD, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, xxiv. 
" The post-modern 'pioneer work' was certainly, among others, done by RICHARD K. ASHLEY, DAVID 
CAMPBELL, JAMES DER DERIAN, MICHAEL J . SHAPIRO, and R. B. J . WALKER. 
" JAMES DER DERIAN, 'The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in Intemational Relations', in JAMES 
DER DERIAN AND MICHAEL J . SHAPIRO (eds.), Internationat/lntertextual Relations (New York: Lex-
ington, 1989), 4. 
" BOUCHER, Political Theories of International Relations, 376. 
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mind that the ways how international relations are scientifically approached 'are not just 
matters of epistemology and ontology'; instead, they are products 'of power and author-
ity'.^" Post-modernists not only relentlessly question (neo-)realism's legitimacy, but 
also the way it legitimizes itself within IR theory. This then finally leads to the question 
of international legitimacy. 
It is not the case, as it was with orthodox IR, that post-modern theorists are generally 
hostile to the idea that something like legitimacy actually does exist in the international 
realm. However, and this makes it the 'greater threat': any enquiry into intemational 
legitimacy the way it was suggested throughout, i.e. to treat it as a moral concept and to 
study it normatively, needs a point of reference, and this must certainly provide an al-
most ideal-typical point of attack. To derive legitimacy criteria from a grand narrative is 
bad; to derive them from a contractarian grand narrative is even worse; but to derive 
them from a KANTian contractarian grand narrative whose social contract is solely 
grounded in reason completely a priori must be the worst. Admitted, H O B B E S , 
R O U S S E A U , K A N T , and R A W L S , and social contract theory in general, is the broader per-
spective of 'western white male'. And it is contestable whether the social contract the-
ory or utilitarianism or deontological theories provide a good foundation for legitimacy; 
it is contestable whether legitimacy ought to be treated as a moral concept or a legal 
concept or an 'empty' concept a la W E B E R ; it is contestable whether it ought to be stud-
ied normatively or descriptively; but it is incontestable that there must be reference 
points. I argued for the moral nature of legitimacy, and for its normative study, which 
requires us to elaborate criteria for the assessment. And just like legitimacy in an em-
pirical sense does not develop in a vacuum, legitimacy criteria for a normative study -
criteria for what is good and bad, right and wrong, just and unjust - do not grow on 
trees. I argue that they must be derived from social contract theory; and from K A N T ' S in 
particular. And this is what needs to be defended. 
5.2 Defending Kant part I: the four Social Contract theories evaluated 
The social contract is essentially a modern phenomenon. Although it has its roots in 
ancient Greece, it undoubtedly had its heyday in the seventeenth and eighteenth century; 
to be more precise and having the distinction between 'contract of society' and 'contract 
of government' in mind, the former had gained in strength and success, while the latter 
Both citations from DEVETAK, 'Postmodernism', 186. 
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was constantly loosing its influence. The four social contract theorists clearly reflect this 
nearness to modernity - not only historically but also both in the context of their 'con-
tracts' and their general systems of thought. R A W L S must be omitted here; his contract 
theory deals with principles of justice for the basic structure of a society and not with 
entering into or establishing a society or state. Yet the others - HOBBES, ROUSSEAU, and 
K A N T - are, naturally enough when considering their whole political philosophy, solely 
concerned with (and do employ) a 'contract of society', a contract of 'each with all ' , 
and do leave behind the 'contract of government' as a relic from the middle ages. And 
secondly, particularly HOBBES fiinctions as a textbook-example for how modern social 
contract theory radically breaks with the past, especially with the ARiSTOTLEian as-
sumptions of a natural political association ful l of natural political animals'. Instead, 
he relies on the Galilean resoluto-compositive method and on geometry in order to find 
truth and certainty. HOBBES therefore develops a radical and distinctive understanding 
of the political association as an artefact - and its 'Artificer is Man'. While ROUSSEAU 
is more sceptical about the role science plays for men than HOBBES and develops in his 
First Discourse the 'necessary connection' between the promotion of the sciences (and 
arts) and the moral corruption of men, he is nevertheless completely in line with him in 
considering the state as, in HOBBES'S words, 'a voluntary arrangement'. K A N T and 
R A W L S are similarly connected to (the second wave of) modernity: R A W L S self-
admittedly presents a theory that is 'highly Kantian in nature', and K A N T indeed does 
radicalize the belief in ratio. 
And it is this KANTian belief in ratio that leads to the next, probably most significant, 
point, namely, to the role anthropology plays in their contract theories. It was mentioned 
and argued all the way through that anthropology is a central ingredient of any social 
contract theory. Even though K A N T speaks of a contractus originarius, he, together with 
HOBBES, ROUSSEAU, and R A W L S , does not denote an 'original contract' in the historical 
sense; instead, all four of them lay much emphasis on the imaginary character of the 
contract. Hence, each does make use of an ideal-typical 'hypothetical contract'. Trying 
to avoid the traps lying ahead of both the 'original contract', i.e. so unhistorical and al-
most not provable; and the 'implicit contract', i.e. highly illogical and completely circu-
lar, the 'hypothetical contract' was accused (and so were the other two, too) of being 
dangerously arbitrary. Indeed, for H E G E L and B U R K E , for example, the state is of a 
much a higher value and quality than being simply made a product of a contract, i.e. of 
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the 'parties' purely arbitrary w i l l ' . And, undoubtedly, where, as it is especially the case 
for social contract theorists, man must become the focus of attention, there, almost natu-
rally, must be developed diverse underlying anthropological premises, which in turn 
then have an affect on the overall outcome. 
For H O B B E S , to bring his anthropology to the point, 'most men are of evil character' -
they are driven solely by their passions; they constantly seek to meet their needs, and 
are continually concerned with securing their future desires. In order to do this, they 
need nothing but power; and since its value is always relational to that of the others', 
H O B B E S ascribes to men 'a perpetuall and restlesse desire for Power after power, that 
ceaseth only in Death'. This alone, however, does not cause the state of nature being a 
bellum omnium contra omnes; ironically, it needs the assumption of man's natural 
equality: everyone is able to kill everyone, and therefore everyone has the equal chance 
to accomplish his primary goal to meet his own desires, now and in the future. Hence, 
man is not only driven by his passions, desires, and the struggle for power but also de-
termined by competition, diffidence and the strive for glory. 
Of a completely different nature is ROUSSEAU'S man: the noble savage solitarily roams 
the forests; possesses neither foresight, curiosity, education, nor reason; and while en-
joying (t)his wonderful independence, he nevertheless proves both to have pity and 
compassion for the suffering of other human beings, and to lack the desire to harm his 
fellows whatsoever. Of a completely different nature, then, is his state of nature, too -
who, except ROUSSEAU, can claim that it 'was the most conducive to Peace and the best 
suited to Mankind'; and that civil society (and the sciences and the arts) corrupted man. 
The only thing that unites HOBBES and ROUSSEAU is the profound rejection of man as 
being an ARlSTOTLEian zoon politikon; though their images of the state of nature are 
indisputably poles apart. 
The KANTian anthropology is at odds with ARISTOTLE'S, HOBBES'S, and ROUSSEAU'S: 
man is neither necessarily political, nor solely driven by passions, nor a compassionate 
wanderer. Instead, he is 'the only rational creature on earth'; however, he is also strug-
gling with his inner ambivalence. K A N T ' S animale rationabile, on the one hand, enjoys 
the company of others, while on the other, he wants (self-interestedly and by all means) 
to pursue 'what seems right and good to him\ Although, man is blessed with reason, his 
unsocial sociability soon sees him trapped in a HOBBESian state of nature, a war of all 
against all. And so, the situation occurs where three theorists employ three entirely dif-
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ferent anthropologies, creating two different kinds of pre-societal states of nature: one 
hell, one heaven. 
Although R A W L S social contract theory serves a different purpose, his premises must 
not be omitted here; indeed, in the original position - used by him not as a matter of 
phraseology, but to clearly distinguish it from the usual connotation 'state of nature' -
men are characterised as mutually-disinterested, non-envious, limitedly altruistic, and 
generally risk-averse. 
Accordingly then, as many different anthropologies are imderlying, as many different 
'social contract states' can be legitimized: HOBBES, seeing men's passions only control-
lable by passions, namely fear, legitimizes the over-powerful Leviathan since nothing 
but the 'terrour of some punishment' can coerce men to keep the contract - which oth-
erwise, exactly because of men's passions, would be worth no more than the parchment 
it is written on. ROUSSEAU, seeing men lying everywhere in chains because of the loss 
of independence, which progressively has taken place, legitimizes, out of his almost 
obsessive concern with freedom and equality, a republican state governed by the volonte 
generale. K A N T , seeing clearly the miseries of the law-less and war-like state of nature, 
legitimizes a Rechtsstaat with a republican constitution, which is grounded solely on 
right and law. R A W L S , finally, legitimizes in principle no other form of society than a 
liberal welfare state. 
The observation cited earlier that ' i t was common to all forms of social contract theory 
that no one has rightful political authority and no one is morally obliged to yield politi-
cal obedience except in the consequence of a social contract' must be somewhat refined. 
This description does not fit to all - not to the 'new contractarians' such as R A W L S who 
is, again, concerned with principles of justice within a society - but is at least common 
to the classical forms of social contract theory. Nonetheless, the question arises: obedi-
ence to whom; to what type of state; to a HOBBESian Leviathan or to a RAWLSian wel-
fare state of western provenience? So, indeed, the 'hypothetical contract' is arbitrary -
arbitrary in two senses. Firstly, it can hardly be denied that in social contract theories 
the state becomes a product of, in B U R K E ' S words, 'the fancy of the parties'; certainly, 
the question whether one likes this or not is of entirely different character though defi-
nitely not insignificant. And, secondly, on a meta-level, too, the accusation of arbitrari-
ness seems to be justified; this holds true particularly for the 'hypothetical contract' 
exactly because of its 'sandy foundation of a fiction' ( B E N T H A M ) - since, depending on 
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the (fictional) input, i.e. mainly the anthropological assumptions leading to this or that 
state of nature, it is 'virtually possible to legitimize anything, any time, any place'. 
Here then, an essential qualification must be made. Thus far, several aspects have been 
mentioned according to which the four theorists could be classified: so, for instance, 
their connection to the first or second wave of modernity, that is, HOBBES vs. 
ROUSSEAU, K A N T , and R A W L S , respectively; or their preoccupation with a contractarian 
or contractualist view, which exactly follows the categorizations just mentioned. How-
ever, there is another demarcation line - one which I consider to be probably most im-
portant and decisive; it separates them into two groups: HOBBES and ROUSSEAU on the 
on side, and K A N T (and, to some extent, R A W L S ) on the other. Al l four of them stress 
the hypothetical character of the state of nature and the social contract; and all four of 
them stress the irrelevance of the question whether such a contract could be proven to 
have existed historically or not. Yet, while the former two bring the state into existence 
out of certain conditions men have experienced or some historical circumstances - be 
they as hypothetical as they can possibly be - , K A N T , in particular, does not make the 
state a product of a variety of 'pragmatic motives'. R A W L S logically follows K A N T ; yet 
the problem with his social contract theory is that it still needs to draw on many basic 
premises - too many, making him simply an easy target. For K A N T , instead, the state is 
to be justified a priori; the social contract is not hypothetical, it is an a priori idea of 
reason. K A N T ' S contractus originarius is the 'logical pendant of the categorical impera-
tive' for the political; it is the Probierstein ('test') of the legitimacy of the state - com-
pletely detached from what historically or hypothetically historically has happened. This 
is the ideal place to come back to the waves of modernity it has been steadily referred 
to. Again: the contractus originarius is an a priori idea of reason. And it cannot be any-
thing else bearing in mind how the second wave was characterised: 'Reason replaces 
Nature'. The first wave, as exemplified by HOBBES, derived the ought from the is, from 
the state of nature, from human nature. On the contrary, the second wave, as it was car-
ried to the extreme by K A N T , derived the ought from reason. Here, man became 'radi-
cally liberated from the tutelage of nature' and the ought had no basis whatsoever in the 
is any longer; instead, the only basis for the ought, the social contract, and legitimacy 
has become reason., i.e. reason completely a priori. And all this makes his social con-
tract not only exceptional, but also his whole social contract theory so charming. 
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5.3 Defending Kant part 11: Optimists versus Pessimists 
Any social relationship, some sooner and some later, faces the question of legitimacy: 
those subject to power usually demand to catch a glimpse of it; those who hold power, 
therefore, need to provide evidence that they have it. Since being subordinated to naked 
power seems to be unacceptable, at least for most, power must be transformed into au-
thority - and this is the function legitimacy provides: authority is legitimate power, and 
only this implies 'the right to command, and correlatively, the right to be obeyed.' One 
can command by employing strategies of coercion or self-interest, and one, analo-
gously, can obey because out of fear or out of reward-based motives. However, one can 
also comply with norms by means of sensing a 'duty to obey'. And, indeed, it is legiti-
macy, the acknowledgement of a duty to obey, that lets M I L G R A M ' S test subjects shoot 
electric shocks through an innocent, and it is legitimacy, too, that lets 'powerful nations 
obey powerless rules'. Even more interesting than these two cases is to find where the 
judgment of something being legitimate (or illegitimate) stems from. Among the more 
than a dozen different bases mentioned so far, the social contract is only one possibility 
- yet the most superior - where legitimacy can have its source; and, the social contract, 
in turn, is only one theory among many others, employed by only one particular view-
point among many others. The lenses through which one sees it is the decisive aspect, 
i.e. the distinguishing feature, when enquiring into legitimacy. 
Following its etymological roots to jurisprudence, the meaning of legitimacy often 
seems simply to mean nothing more than legality; legitimacy grounds in 'legal validity', 
and it often involves a 'juridical-procedural' approach. Failing to see the moral connota-
tion of legitimacy, however, those lines of enquiries must be rejected as too 'positivistic 
and process-oriented'. Moving on to social sciences, and starting with the belief-centric 
WEBERian approach, legitimacy obtains an almost absurd undertone. Although being 
still widely used across political science and sociology, but also in IR, this method bases 
legitimacy on people's beliefs and opinions; as bizarre as it sounds: 'power is legitimate 
when the people believe it to be legitimate'; or, in IR, when states believe it to be le-
gitimate. Here, the separation of legitimacy from any sense of morality is made abso-
lute. 
Fortunately, adherents of normative social sciences tackle the question of legitimacy not 
only differently but also much more promisingly; prescriptive approaches to legitimacy 
look beyond actors' beliefs and offer a 'fialler view'. Employing this type of technique 
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means for the social scientist to put into place, as a first step, certain criteria which make 
clear what legitimacy means and what exactly it means for it to be conferred; in a f o l -
lowing step, then, relevant cases must be judged and assessed against these criteria. To-
gether wi th how moral and political philosophy view legitimacy - namely, where 'mo-
rality becomes the decisive yardstick'- and in stark contrast to jurisprudence and the 
descriptive WEBERian approach, it does do justice to legitimacy as a morally significant 
concept; its etymology speaks o f 'propriety', too. These are the three, rather: four, main 
lenses through which legitimacy is seen - and, one must not forget, also judged. And it 
also needs no extensive explanation to see that it has enormous implications for political 
l ife whether one follows, for example, a WEBERian line or the prescriptive approach 
when assessing, for example, the legitimacy o f a state. This then leads to the role the 
concept o f legitimacy plays in IR. It was shown that legitimacy does belong to norma-
tive international society theory, solely - and, as a result, so does the social contract, 
too. 
The case wi th positivist international system theory, or orthodox IR, seems to be quite 
straightforward. Following both a WALTZian neo-realism or neo-liberalism, states in 
their conduct towards other states or institutions behave completely different from one 
that the logic o f legitimacy would suggest; instead, they manoeuvre themselves through 
world polifics according to the principles coercion and self-interest, respectively. The 
question whether something was legitimate or not does not even arise in this context; 
and with legitimacy obviously being non-existent in the staXe-system, the part o f the 
social contract - in its fiinction as one source - is equally zero. 
This significantly changes when adhering to normative international society theory; 
only when adhering to the view that states feel themselves 'to be bound by a common 
set of rules in their relations with one another', legitimacy - as a normative concept 
which is not simply a label for power wrapped up - is able to unfold itself and to show 
its potential muscles. The very basic notion of society entails that ideas of what ought to 
be must be sufficiently shared among its members. And here, the social contract enters 
the stage. Where an international society is said to exist, two questions naturally and 
instantly arise: What are the principles, rules, norms, etc. which govern this society? 
And, secondly: Who is entitled to be a member? For the normative social scientist in IR, 
then, these questions must be reformulated: What ought to be the principles, rules, 
norms, etc. which govern this society? Secondly: Who ought to be entitled to be a mem-
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ber? The scientist needs to set up criteria which she or he can use to judge certain cases 
- whether it be, for instance, assessing the legitimacy of certain forms of state behaviour 
or the legitimacy of certain state's membership of international society. Where legiti-
macy is thought to be based on the social contract, the criteria must, unavoidably and 
unsurprisingly, be sought in and derived from social contract theory. Yet since there is 
not the social contract theory but a great many, and since most theories work with 
(somefimes fairly, sometimes extremely) different underlying objectives and premises 
producing (again: sometimes fairly, sometimes extremely) different results one must 
inevitably ask: legitimate according to which social contract theory? It almost goes 
without saying that when deriving the criteria one works with from, say, the HOBBESian 
theory, one will come to significantly different end results on the topic of (international) 
legitimacy compared to when underlying, say, a RousSEAUian or RAWLSian theory. 
This is the place now where I come back to the point made in the previous section, 
namely, that K A N T ' S social contract theory was 'charming'. The remainder of this sec-
fion defends why K A N T ' S theory, among the four, ought to be given priority when en-
quiring into legifimacy in IR; why his theory is the most appropriate source for legiti-
macy criteria in IR. 
HOBBES and ROUSSEAU, the pessimists, are anything but suitable for legifimacy in IR 
and their social contract theories analogously are of no use when searching for legiti-
macy criteria. As argued, legitimacy is a moral concept, which is closely cormected to 
the idea of an international society. Only within such a framework is it possible to be-
come engaged with it, and, in a second step, with its possible sources, of which one is 
the social contract. 
However distinguished they are as social contract theorists, both HOBBES and 
ROUSSEAU do not present a contract theory of international society. They cannot (or do 
not) even conceive the most primitive form of an intemafional society - as pessimistic 
as this is - and stop with their contract theory, so to speak, at state-borders. Yet, each 
does it for different reasons. HOBBES is in no doubt that the international sphere resem-
bles the state of nature he has already envisaged within the domestic context; that this 
condition is a 'state of hostility'; and that 'relations among states must be inescapably 
war-like'. Being entirely egocentric, states in the intemafional system do not follow a 
corrunon summum bonum, but, instead, do 'permanently pursue what they regard as to 
their greatest benefit'. The criticism HOBBES earns for such a portrayal of world affairs 
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is being discarded by him: 'Kings' and 'Persons of Soveraigne Authority' constantly, he 
says, would 'admit by their actions what they deny in their words.' Surprisingly, and in 
sharp contrast to the domestic sphere where HOBBES even let the wolves contract to the 
all-encompassing Leviathan to finish the bellum omnium contra omnes, he does not 
follow his own domestic logic. Instead, he leaves the states in this unpleasant environ-
ment; he does not introduce a social contract between the common-wealths in the inter-
national sphere; and does - seemingly for the eternal fiiture - furnish the states with the 
''absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge [...] most conducing to their [sic] benefit.' 
ROUSSEAU, too, is a pessimist - but one of different quality. Being, when considering 
his vita, probably the most interesting and fascinating social contract theorist among the 
four, he also comes to the conclusion that we should view the international arena simply 
as a state of war. He ridicules the idea of an 'European Society', and is certain that the 
'very princes' whose ratio is beftiddled by amour-propre would do anything they pos-
sibly are capable of to 'throw obstacles in the way of its establishment'. Yet, while 
HOBBES, for the benefit of domestic safety and well-being, accepts the international 
state of war, ROUSSEAU looks upon it in disgust and views it as the 'worst state possi-
ble'. But still, ROUSSEAU, like HOBBES, does not bring into being an international social 
contract; he also does not see an international society as either functioning or achiev-
able, and constantly attacks the 'brotherhood of Europe' which is nothing more than a 
farce to him. However, he seems at least to 'honour the benefits of a (true) international 
society'; in the end, for ROUSSEAU, all efforts to set one up must fail since there is one 
dilemma: 'men are crazy'. 
What unites HOBBES and ROUSSEAU is their pessimism about the international system -
and 'international system' seems to be the proper term in this context. These two writers 
definitely reject the notion of an international society, and, instead, see international 
politics driven solely by power and self-interest. Legitimacy has no place whatsoever in 
their thoughts. The close relationship, then, to positivist international system theory is 
quite obvious - definitely in the case of HOBBES. However, as obvious as it is with him, 
the more nebulous is the causa ROUSSEAU. Putting him in the system-comer is one 
thing, but placing him in the (neo-)realist camp is another. While definitely not having 
any affiliations with (neo-)liberalism, ROUSSEAU'S descriptive international thoughts 
may sound ftindamentally realist, but taken together with his whole political philosophy, 
it is doubtfiil whether he can be put in a tradition associated essentially with figures 
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such as M A C H I A V E L L I and HOBBES. Yet, undeniably, ROUSSEAU does not belong to 
normative international society theory. Therefore, he cannot play, together with 
HOBBES, any role in the quest for legitimacy criteria. This role is reserved to K A N T - he 
provides a picture-perfect social contract theory for international relations. 
K A N T ' S descriptive analysis of the relations between states is, similarly to HOBBES and 
ROUSSEAU, more than depressing; and it most closely resembles the HOBBESian state of 
nature. But while H O B B E S argues that in this law-less natural state 'there nothing is Un-
just', K A N T , somewhat following ROUSSEAU'S line, who thinks of it as being a 'moral 
scandal', claims that this 'state is itself one of injustice'. And ftirthermore, to K A N T , the 
existence of this kind of international state of nature is rather absurd: indeed, why do 
allegedly civilised people accept, some even prefer, a hostile international environment 
whose underlying logic they perceive to be entirely intolerable - what they regard as a 
'brutish debasement of humanity' - in the domestic context? Without a doubt, this in-
ternational state of war must be left behind. However, and likewise to the domestic con-
text, it is not experience, in this case the experience of war with all its consequences, 
which pushes states into the 'federation of peoples', but solely reason. Although declar-
ing the 'resultant distress' of war to be the main factor that let states leave the state of 
nature, in fact, this is no more than K A N T ' S use of a 'rhetorical device' to make the need 
of such a federation more intelligible. Instead, the 'driving force' is, not surprisingly, 
reason a priori - it tells us that 'There shall be no war'. And this, at the most abstract 
level, is the shared idea among states of what ought to be. 
In order to put the shared idea into practice, K A N T sees the need to establish a foedus 
pacificum, and to him it is necessary to establish a federation of peoples in accordance 
with the idea of an original social contract. Hence, states do contract to 'constitute' this 
federation; do contract to set out the 'basic principles governing i t ' ; and do contract to 
determine 'who is entitled to be its member'. This simply means, that they contract 
about the legitimacy of the 'society'; that they contract about the legitimacy of its prin-
ciples; and that they contract about the legitimacy of its members, respectively. Thus, 
legitimacy here solely stems from a social contract. But not only this; many other rea-
sons speak for K A N T , too. 
Firstly, and as just mentioned, his contract theory embraces all three crucial aspects 
when encountering the question of legitimacy in international relations. Secondly, since 
one must keep in mind WIGHT 'S assertion that the 'principles of [international] legiti-
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macy mark the region of approximation between international and domestic polities', it 
is a big plus for K A N T that he also intermingles the domestic sphere with the interna-
tional; 'establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-
governed external relationship with other states, and carmot be solved unless the latter is 
also solved', he says. Thirdly, since K A N T exclusively works with a priori principles or 
ideas of reason, his contract theory is not in the need of many premises or presupposi-
tions - as it is the case with R A W L S - which only makes his social contract look less 
arbitrary (in the two ways mentioned) and, hence, in general more defensible. 
This is, what I consider the most significant hurdle standing in the way of R A W L S . In-
deed, he is an optimist, too. He brings legitimacy in the international realm; he uses an 
international social contract to constitute the Society of Peoples and to set out the prin-
ciples and norms that ought to govern it. Yet still, R A W L S is somewhat unsuitable as a 
source for legitimacy criteria in IR. That he is modem is certainly true, and that he is 
well-established in political philosophy, too; that he is not so well-established in IR is 
also true, and although this must not be underestimated when having to defend him, it 
certainly does not play the crucial role; that he offers an imitation of K A N T ' S foedus 
pacificum, not to mention a 'light' version of it, does not make it easier to defend him, 
although this is not decisive either. The problem with R A W L S lies elsewhere: namely, in 
his contract theory. As simple as it sounds: R A W L S must draw on too many basic prem-
ises or assumptions for creating the original position as fair; so many that the actual 
contract is being pushed somewhat into the background. He seems to be so concemed 
with the initial situation, that some even deny that his theory is a social contract theory 
at all. Certainly, it is a contract theory, but it does not help very much when legitimacy 
criteria are derived from a social contract theory which constantly faces accusations 
whether it actually is one or not; and having in mind that one must defend every single 
one of all his great many premises, too, R A W L S seems to be anything but an appropriate 
source. It is his model K A N T who remains superior to HOBBES and ROUSSEAU, but also 
to R A W L S . 
What also speaks for K A N T is, fourthly, considering the moral connotation of legiti-
macy, that it is convenient to have his political philosophy founded on his moral theory. 
Fifthly, since legitimacy seems to have no place within orthodox IR, it is even more 
convenient for the purpose of its defense within IR theory, to have legitimacy and the 
social contract in international relations not to be brought up by someone who dreams 
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of a 'community of brotherly love and harmony', but by someone who may be well de-
scribed as a quite rational and realistic philosopher. And sixthly and probably most im-
portantly, K A N T grants legitimacy a higher and significant value. He does not make the 
mistake, as it was done in the first wave of modernity, to attach legitimacy more to the 
is which in effect simply reduced legifimacy to a tool of justifying the exisfing order 
leaving virtually no space for change. Instead, by detaching legitimacy from the is 
whatsoever and making it a product of reason a priori, K A N T ' S legifimacy must be seen 
as a critical tool steadily challenging the is to work towards the ought. And with all this 
having said, I must conclude that K A N T ' S social contract theory is the most promising 
source for the purposes of enquiring into legifimacy in international relations, and of 
deriving proper legitimacy criteria from it; for legitimacy in IR, K A N T , indeed, is 
'charming'. 
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